In a recent paper (Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 4, June 2000), Jason Stanley argues that there are no `unarticulated constituents', contrary to what advocates of Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) have claimed. All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form, he says. In this paper I maintain that there are unarticulated constituents, and I defend TCP. Stanley's argument exploits the fact that the alleged unarticulated constituents can be `bound', that is, they can be made to vary with the values (...) introduced by operators in the sentence. I show that Stanley's argument rests on a fallacy, and I provide alternative analyses of the data. (shrink)

François Recanati; IV*—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 57–74, h.

In the paper author discusses ideas of L. Wittgenstein who renounced formalism which was characteristic of the "Tractatus" epoch. The change is connected with the adoption of a different conception of language which refers, among other, problems to the new approach to "generality" (e.g. to generalized sentences). Wittgenstein rejected the proposition of analytical reductionism which is a conviction that it is possible to reduce and analyse "generality". He changed his opinion connected with the theory of meaning. The problems discussed above, (...) dealt with by earlier conceptions of Frege and Russell belong to important problems of the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

My responses to seven critical reviews of my book *Mental Files* published in a special issue of the journal Disputatio, edited by F. Salis. The reviewers are: Keith Hall, David Papineau, Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri, Peter Pagin, Thea Goodsell, Krista Lawlor and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero.

In this paper, I argue that that polysemy is a two-sided phenomenon. It can be reduced neither to pragmatic modulation nor to ambiguity, for it is a mixture of both. The senses of a polysemous expression result from pragmatic modulation but they are stored in memory, as the senses of an ambiguous expression are. The difference with straightforward ambiguity is that the modulation relations between the senses are transparent to the language users: the senses are felt as related – they (...) form a family of senses. In other words, whereas two homonymous expressions are different expressions, with the same phonological realization but distinct meanings, a polyseme is a single expression, i.e. a semantic as well as a phonological unit. It has one meaning, which should not be confused with the separate senses which it contributes in context. Different ways of thinking of that unitary meaning will be discussed, and consequences drawn for the debate between more or less radical versions of Contextualism. (shrink)

The issues addressed in philosophical papers on quotation generally concern only a particular type of quotation, which I call ‘closed quotation’. The other main type, ‘open quotation’, is ignored, and this neglect leads to bad theorizing. Not only is a general theory of quotation out of reach: the specific phenomenon of closed quotation itself cannot be properly understood if it is not appropriately situated within the kind to which it belongs. Once the distinction between open and closed quotation has been (...) drawn and properly appreciated, it is tempting to consider that only closed quotation is relevant to semantics. Open quotation is more a matter of pragmatics: it is a matter of what people do with words, rather than a matter of content and truth-conditions. In this way one can provide the beginning of a justification for the neglect of open quotation in current semantic theorizing. There is some truth in this view, yet the phenomenon of ‘mixed quotation’, investigated at length in this paper, is interesting precisely because it shows that things are not so simple. Important issues concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics will thus be raised. (shrink)

For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two varieties: explicit and implicit. While explicit de se thoughts can be construed as a variety of de re thought, implicit de se thoughts cannot: their content is thetic, while the content of de re thoughts is categoric. The notion of an implicit de se thought is claimed to play a central role in accounting (...) for the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. Lewis has attempted to unify de re and de se in the opposite direction: by reducing de re to de se . This, however, works only if we internalize the acquaintance relations. I criticize Lewis's internalization strategy on the grounds that it rests on Egocentrism (the view that every occurrent thought is ultimately about the thinker at the time of thinking). In the conclusion, I suggest another way of unifying de re and de se , by extending the implicit/explicit distinction to de re thoughts themselves. (shrink)

For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought ; for Lewis, it is the other way round. To a large extent, the conflict between the two positions is merely apparent: it is due to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between two types of de se thought. In view of this distinction, we can maintain both that de se thought is a special case of de re thought, and that de re thought is (...) a special case of de se thought. Still, I argue, Lewis's position can be criticized on the grounds that it internalizes acquaintance relations. (shrink)

In this survey paper, I start from two classical theses of speech act theory: that speech act content is uniformly propositional and that sentence mood encodes illocutionary force. These theses have been questioned in recent work, both in philosophy and linguistics. The force/content distinction itself – a cornerstone of 20‐century philosophy of language – has come to be rejected by some theorists, unmoved by the famous ‘Frege–Geach’ argument. The paper reviews some of these debates.

This chapter analyzes Dworkin’s view that there can be morally unsettling individual responsibility gaps in cases of collectively generated bad outcomes. I focus on two of the more provocative aspects of Dworkin’s discussion. First, I challenge Dworkin’s view that group responsibility is indispensable for comprehensive moral evaluations. Second, I assess the related contention that those confronting IRGs can realize significant expressive value by conceiving of some group as a responsible entity that can be blamed for the relevant bad outcome. In (...) sum, I argue that there are weighty reasons why moral theorists should take care not to point too quickly to group responsibility and blame as the best and most discerning ways of demystifying IRGs. (shrink)

The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is tacit (...) references to a location, it takes place for pragmatic reasons and casts no light on the semantics of meteorological predicates. Since then, several authors have reanalysed the counter-example, so as to make it compatible with the standard view. I discuss those attempts and argue that my account is superior. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject (...) Sperber's claim that quasi-belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief. (shrink)

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

Il y a une pente universitaire à s'enfermer dans les textes en perdant de vue la réalité. C'est l'aboutissement d'un vice constitutif. En effet, depuis Aristote au moins, toutes les doctrines se sont développées sur la base d'un dédoublement ontologique entre un domaine des 'idées' et un domaine de la réalité elle-même. Ce dédoublement repose sur une imagination étrangère à l'expérience. Pour y voir plus clair, il faut s'appuyer constamment sur ce qui est donné tel qu'il est donné. Pour cela, (...) il faut déplacer l'attention depuis les contenus vers la manière dont nous les saisissons consciemment en confrontant l'expérience commune et la figure scientifique corrélative"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cette méditation en première personne tourne autour de l’antique et grande question : Que faire? et s’appuie sur le texte des Essais de Montaigne. La question du « faire » y est interrogée et relancée par-delà le « produire » et la production qui, aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, risquent de l’emporter et de l’engloutir tandis qu’est brossé un portrait chinois (taoïste!) de celui dont Nietzsche disait si bien : « c’est à lui que je m’attacherais si l’on me donnait pour (...) tâche de faire de cette terre une patrie ». (shrink)

À partir d’une certaine idée de la finitude, nous avons voulu simplement dénoncer le fantasme d’un monde sans frontières.

Sans la mort, arche du rien, exit, avec la philosophie, la question fondamentale de la métaphysique : pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose et non pas plutôt rien? Depuis son commencement, la philosophie n’a cessé de s’affronter à la mort, n’a cessé d’essayer de la penser, hésitant entre un memento mori et un memento vivere. Mais se demander si la pensée de la mort nous invite à la jouissance ou à l’abnégation et si on peut apprendre à mourir sont peut-être questions (...) oiseuses et indécidables. Pour sortir de cette indétermination, il faut sortir du cercle de la morale, distinguer d’abord le pur fait contingent de la mort, du mourir lui-même comme structure de l’existence humaine et reconnaître à la fois que, si nous ne cessons de lutter contre la mort et si, le plus souvent, nous lui tournons le dos, nous sommes, à elle, adossés et que, sans elle, nous ne ferions rien. (shrink)

It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of 'semantic flexibility'? It is argued that semantic flexibility reduces to context-sensitivity and does not raise unsurmountable problems for standard compositional accounts. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume too simple a view of context-sensitivity. Two basic forms of context-sensitivity are distinguished in the paper. (...) The second form — sense modulation — shows that, in a sense, there is more in the meaning of the whole than can be derived from the meanings of the parts. (shrink)

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

Every statement represents a certain state of affairs as holding in a certain situation, which the statement concerns. The situation which a statement concerns is indicated by the context. It must be distinguished from whichever situation may be explicitly mentioned in the statement. In this framework, two cognitive processes are analysed: projection and reflection. Both involve two representations: one which concerns a situation s, and another one which explicitly mentions that situation. Through reflection we go from the representation concerning s (...) to the representation mentioning s. Through projection we go from the representation mentioning s to the representation concerning s. (shrink)

Nanotechnology is an important platform technology which will add new features like improved biocompatibility, smaller size, and more sophisticated electronics to neuro-implants improving their therapeutic potential. Especially in view of possible advantages for patients, research and development of nanotechnologically improved neuro implants is a moral obligation. However, the development of brain implants by itself touches many ethical, social and legal issues, which also apply in a specific way to devices enabled or improved by nanotechnology. For researchers developing nanotechnology such issues (...) are rather distant from their daily work in the lab, but as soon as they use their materials or devices in medical applications such as therapy of brain diseases they have to be aware of and deal with them. This paper is intended to raise sensitivity for the ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) involved in applying nanotechnology in brain implants or other devices by highlighting the short term problems of testing and clinical trials within the existing regulatory frameworks (A), the short and medium-term questions of risks in the application of the devices (B) and the long-term perspectives related to problems of enhancement (C). To identify and address such issues properly nanotechnologists should involve ethical, legal and social experts and regulatory bodies in their research as early as possible. This will help to remove pressure from regulatory bodies, to settle public concern and to prevent non-acceptable developments for the benefit of the patients. (shrink)

In response to Mandy Simons’ defence of a classical Gricean approach to pragmatic enrichment in terms of conversational implicature, I emphasize the following contrast. Conversational implicatures are generated by a global inference which uses as a premise the fact that the speaker has said that p, but only the triggering inference is global in cases of pragmatic enrichment. What generates the correct interpretation is a process of reconstrual, which locally maps the literal meaning of a constituent to a modulated meaning (...) and composes that meaning with that of the other constituents. That process is constrained by Gricean considerations but that is true of all pragmatic aspects of interpretation, whether pre-propositional or post-propositional. Just as indexical resolution, though pragmatic and constrained by Gricean considerations, does not fit the two-stage model through which Grice accounts for conversational implicatures, so pragmatic modulation can’t be accounted for in terms of that model despite the fact that, like conversational implicatures and unlike indexical resolution, modulation is pragmatically rather than semantically triggered. (shrink)

Cher*** Me revoici après neuvaine. Et aujourd'hui, mon regard porte au large. Et la mer apportera à chaque homme des raisons d'espérer, comme le sommeil la cohorte des rêves. C'est le point où la résidence numérique sur « Rhuthmos », en vient à s'enlacer avec l'exposition que je prépare à la « Galerie des Paysages » durant le festival d'Avignon. Le thème aura trait à une poétique intime — tu fais bien de me rappeler, cher ami, mon abus de langage (...) : je prends cette - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

D'Avignon, en cette nuit du 7 mars Cher **** De nouvelles rêveries m'ont porté vers le cœur de mes structures Lorsqu'on s'y projette, on s'y trouve enveloppé du textile qui abrite mais n'enferme Ni toiles, ni filets, ce sont des jerseys lâches, des tulles diaphanes Des interfaces sensibles, qui au vent s'emplissent et se plissent, et qui bruissent aux flux, et qui vibrent à la terre Des mailles qui distillent les rosées, percolent des alcools, infusent la nuit, pénètrent le jour (...) Et qui pourtant, - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher ***, En ce temps de festival, j'ai le plaisir de te présenter l'exposition que je donne actuellement à la galerie d'Avignon. Le titre en est « Les bateaux ivres de la liberté ». Sache que je dispose de quelques bannettes pour des festivaliers en déshérence dans la ville surpeuplée. Graphisme : FW En ce ci bel été, très cher. Fr - Résidence numérique — François Villais.

Cher*** Je rentre à l'instant des « Iles d'Auvergne », d'où mon silence de ces dernières semaines. La traversée, avec « Gevaudan Airline », ne s'est pas faite sans péripéties. Je m'étendrai, sous peu, sur l'installation pilote « dénouée, déliée, déroulée, dressée » que j'ai pu élever là-bas, et dont je te donne un aperçu ci-dessous. Mais tu voudras bien, avant cela me suivre brièvement dans les étranges fantasmagories qui hantent mon avance vers l'été. « Les chiens de fer » (...) A l'approche d'Avignon, autour de - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Le posé-sol, Dans mes installations, touche à l'origine du mouvement qui me porte. Si je puis rêver un détail achevé, c'est bien celui de ce délicat contact. Mâture : le touché Elle pèse et appuie, mais sans bruire Un touché sans blesser Un posé, mais léger De bambous, infondés Non encastrés, enfoncés, enterrés La surface n'est ni creusée, ni troublée Le mat est creux Sa trace est — moins qu'un disque — un anneau A sa disparition, sur le gazon, ce (...) seul signe Griffe d'un visiteur fugace - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher***, Il est temps de te rapporter le « filage », cette gestuelle que j'ai donnée durant mon séjour aux « îles d'Auvergne », en cette vitalité printanière de fin de mai. Le résultat final, en frange d'univers, est autonome, inattendu, énigmatique et incongru. La structure, arrivée ce matin, repartira sous peu. Anecdote improbable dans le paysage, l'on marche à lui, en cette montagne, et je te donne ci-dessous la scène finale, en son décor naturel : A l'entrée, l'invite : (...) L'appel s'étend loin sur la - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher*** Je m'en viens te soumettre un projet d'exposition à la Galerie des Paysages, à Avignon, durant le festival de théâtre, en juillet prochain. « New York à vif » Une approche de la matière de la ville de New York, au delà du minéral, comme d'un « corps urbain », incarné, quasi charnel. Ce thème s'inscrit dans la continuité de mes travaux et installations de land-art, et de mes expositions, qui prolongent depuis 2002 ma carrière d'architecte, commencée en 1987. (...) Ces recherches sont centrées sur - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher ****, Il émane de ma Rêverie d'aujourd'hui un désir de projet de volumes dans le paysage mieux assis et assumé. Détachement progressif des modes d'insertion confortables — qui ont été néanmoins de bons leviers : M'appuyant sur le « land-art », mobiliser le génie du paysage comme plateforme pour des expressions plastiques de grande échelle afin d'en faire émerger du sens. Utiliser le paysage comme environnement harmonique à un statuaire monumental - Résidence numérique — François Villais.

This article maintains that an important class of scientific generalizations should be reinterpreted: they have typically been understood as ceteris paribus laws, but are, in fact, generics. Four arguments are presented to support this thesis. One argument is that the interpretation in terms of ceteris paribus laws is a historical accident. The other three arguments draw on similarities between these generalizations and archetypal generics: they come with similar inferential commitments, they share a syntactic form, and the existing theories to make (...) sense of them are alike. Once these generalizations are properly understood as generics, the recent cognitive approach to generics can be extended to the study of the relevant sciences. The last section indicates ways in which this extension is fruitful for the two strands of research that we combine: the philosophy of science literature on generalizations and the semantics literature on generics. (shrink)

To deal with memory-based modes of presentation I propose a couple of revisions to the standard criterion of difference for modes of presentation attributed to Frege. First, we need to broaden the scope of the criterion so that not merely the thoughts of a given subject at a given time may or may not involve the same way of thinking of some object, but also the thoughts of a subject at different times. Second, we need to ‘relativize’ the criterion of (...) difference to particular subjects in particular situations. Thanks to these revisions, we can make sense of Evans’ notion of a dynamic mode of presentation that persists through time despite lower-level changes. A dynamic mode of presentation is a complex mode of presentation involving several epistemically rewarding relations to the reference successively (in contrast to composite modes of presentation, which involve several epistemically rewarding relations simultaneously). I show how this idea can be cashed out in the mental file framework, and how, in that framework, we can provide a straightforward answer to the question: when is a mode of presentation based on a memory M the same as the mode of presentation based on the perception P from which the memory derives? The answer appeals to the distinction between anchored and unanchored memories. (shrink)

The variety-of-evidence thesis has been criticized by Bovens and Hartmann. This article points to two limitations of their Bayesian model: the conceptualization of unreliable evidential sources as randomizing and the restriction to comparing full independence to full dependence. It is shown that the variety-of-evidence thesis is rehabilitated when unreliable sources are reconceptualized as systematically biased. However, it turns out that allowing for degrees of independence leads to a qualification of the variety-of-evidence thesis: as Bovens and Hartmann claimed, more independence does (...) not always imply stronger confirmation. (shrink)