Philosophy Compass 8 (7):622-632 (2013)

Authors
Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
In this survey paper, I start from two classical theses of speech act theory: that speech act content is uniformly propositional and that sentence mood encodes illocutionary force. These theses have been questioned in recent work, both in philosophy and linguistics. The force/content distinction itself – a cornerstone of 20‐century philosophy of language – has come to be rejected by some theorists, unmoved by the famous ‘Frege–Geach’ argument. The paper reviews some of these debates.
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12045
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References found in this work BETA

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Elements of Symbolic Logic.Hans Reichenbach - 1947 - London: Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Force Cancellation.François Recanati - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1403-1424.
Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
The Redundancy of the Act.John Collins - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3519-3545.
Pretense, Cancellation, and the Act Theory of Propositions.Manuel García-Carpintero - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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