An analysis of the Jain metaphysics of non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) shows how the epistemological theory of points of view (nayavāda) and the sevenfold schema of predication (saptabhaṅgī) provide a foundation for the central Jain principle of nonviolence (ahiṃsā).

This essay will pose and seek to answer the following question: If, as Swami Vivekananda claims, the four yogas are independent and equally effective paths to God-realization and liberation from the cycle of rebirth, then what must reality be like? What ontology is implied by the claim that the four yogas are all equally effective paths to the supreme goal of religious life? What metaphysical conditions would enable this pluralistic assertion to be true? Swami Vivekananda’s worldview is frequently identified with (...) Advaita Vedānta. We shall see that Vivekananda’s teaching is certainly Advaitic in what could be called a broad sense. As Anantanand Rambachan and others, however, have pointed out, it would be incorrect to identify Swami Vivekananda’s teachings in any rigid or dogmatic sense with the classical Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara; this is because Vivekananda’s teaching departs from that of Śaṅkara in some significant ways, not least in his assertion of the independent salvific efficacy of the four yogas. This essay will argue that Swami Vivekananda’s pluralism, based on the concept of the four yogas, is far more akin to the deep religious pluralism that is advocated by contemporary philosophers of religion in the Whiteheadian tradition of process thought like David Ray Griffin and John Cobb, the classical Jain doctrines of relativity (anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda), and, most especially, the Vijñāna Vedānta of Vivekananda’s guru, Sri Ramakrishna, than any of these approaches is to the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Advaita Vedānta, in Vivekananda’s pluralistic worldview, becomes one valid conceptual matrix among many that bear the ability to support an efficacious path to liberation. This essay is intended not as an historical reconstruction of Vivekananda’s thought, so much as a constructive philosophical contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversations about both religious (and, more broadly, worldview) pluralism and the religious and philosophical legacies of both Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. The former conversation has arrived at something of an impasse (as recounted by Kenneth Rose), while the latter conversation has recently been revived, thanks to the work of Swami Medhananda (formerly Ayon Maharaj) and Arpita Mitra. (shrink)

John Hick’s revolutionary, “Copernican” approach to religious diversity received a great deal of criticism in his lifetime from more conservative theologians and philosophers of religion, many of whom were seeking to preserve a unique place of pre-eminence for Christianity amongst the world’s faiths. Critical responses to Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis have also emerged, however, from amongst his fellow religious pluralists, who have sought either to build upon or to go beyond his pivotal and groundbreaking work. In the same spirit as the (...) responses given by this latter group, this chapter will seek to look beyond Hick’s important work, certainly not in an unfriendly fashion, but with the understanding that Hick is the proverbial “giant” upon whose shoulders subsequent generations of pluralists are standing as we seek to advance pluralism even further than he did in his work. Specifically, this chapter will draw on the Jain concepts of anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda, as well as the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and his successors in the movement of process philosophy, to reconceptualize the Real, not on a Kantian foundation, as is done in the Pluralistic Hypothesis, but on the basis of a robust metaphysical realism. The aim of this approach to pluralism is to capture more fully the sense of mystics from diverse religious traditions that they have actually perceived the Real as such, and not merely one of its phenomenal appearances. (shrink)

The central goal of the _cross-cultural critical thinking movement_ is to change the dominant model of critical thinking pedagogy that is used in the US, UK, and those countries that follow this model. At present the model is centered on an Anglo-American and Euro-Centric model of critical thinking that actively and blatantly ignores contributions to logic and critical thinking education from non-Western sources; more importantly, the model implicitly sends the message to students of critical thinking that _critical thinking_ is a (...) valuable set of skills that derives from what is taken to be Western culture. Cross-cultural critical thinking, by contrast, is centered on a globally inclusive model of critical thinking that presents contributions to critical thinking from a variety of different cultures and traditions. This alternative model aims in part to convey the message that critical thinking is part of the human condition and that understanding it within the human condition is essential to the proper deployment of it in a pluralistic society where there is disagreement over matters of ultimate value. In this paper I offer a presentation and defense of a set of contributions deriving from the Jaina tradition of philosophy that could be presented in a globally sensitive critical thinking course. The central concepts I present and interpret are: non-one-sidedness, the theory of epistemic standpoints, intellectual non-violence, and the theory of seven-fold predication. In each case I focus on the relevance that the concept has for critical thinking education at the introductory level. (shrink)

Jaina authors use a pluralistic epistemological model as a tool to claim the superiority of Jainism over the other schools of Indian thought. In this article the general tendency of the Jaina’s epistemic pluralism is discussed and it is shown how the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin tries to establish the Jainas’ pluralism on rational grounds by identifying erroneous epistemic alternatives through methodological falsification.