Countermeasures for mpox (formerly known as monkeypox), primarily vaccines, have been in limited supply in many countries during outbreaks. Equitable allocation of scarce resources during public health emergencies is a complex challenge. Identifying the objectives and core values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures, using those values to provide guidance for priority groups and prioritisation tiers, and optimising allocation implementation are important. The fundamental values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures are: preventing death and illness; reducing the association between (...) death or illness and unjust disparities; prioritising those who prevent harm or mitigate disparities; recognising contributions to combating an outbreak; and treating similar individuals similarly. Ethically and equitably marshalling available countermeasures requires articulating these fundamental objectives, identifying priority tiers, and recognising trade-offs between prioritising the people at the highest risk of infection and the people at the highest risk of harm if infected. These five values can provide guidance on preferable priority categories for a more ethically sound response and suggest methods for optimising allocation of countermeasures for mpox and other diseases for which countermeasures are in short supply. Properly marshalling available countermeasures will be crucial for future effective and equitable national responses to outbreaks. (shrink)

With the world grappling with continued spread of monkeypox internationally, vaccines play a crucial role in mitigating the harms from infection and preventing spread. However, countries with the greatest need - particularly historically endemic countries with the highest monkeypox case-fatality rates - are not able to acquire scarce vaccines. This is unjust, and requires rectification through equitable allocation of vaccines globally. We propose applying the Fair Priority Model for such allocation, which emphasizes three key principles: 1) preventing harm; (...) 2) prioritizing the disadvantaged; and 3) treating people with equal moral concern. Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEPV) has the most potential to mitigate harm, and so ensuring countries have sufficient supply for PEPV should be the first priority. And historically endemic countries, which face disadvantages that compound potential harms from monkeypox, should be the first recipients of such vaccines. Once sufficient supply is allocated for countries to apply PEPV, global allocation could move on to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), again prioritizing historically endemic countries first before distribution to the rest of the global community, based on projected number of cases and vulnerability to harm. (shrink)

SARS and monkeypox have given the public health community a unique opportunity to examine the use of quarantine measures. Until recently, the word “quarantine”was not used in polite conversation, and evoked unsavory images. The recent SARS epidemic illustrated the important role of quarantine and isolation as a public health response to communicable disease.As public health officials in Toronto began to take control of the SARS epidemic, a second wave of the disease emerged. In the first SARS epidemic, approximately 8,200 (...) individuals were isolated. There were approximately 82 probable cases, 66 suspect cases, and 24 deaths. On May 22, 2003, SARS II emerged. In total, approximately 13,000 people were quarantined. SARS II saw the onset of difficult questions being asked about the control and spread of SARS.The province of Ontario establishes the public health policies and legislative framework for the entire province. (shrink)

SARS and monkeypox have given the public health community a unique opportunity to examine the use of quarantine measures. Until recently, the word “quarantine”was not used in polite conversation, and evoked unsavory images. The recent SARS epidemic illustrated the important role of quarantine and isolation as a public health response to communicable disease.As public health officials in Toronto began to take control of the SARS epidemic, a second wave of the disease emerged. In the first SARS epidemic, approximately 8,200 (...) individuals were isolated. There were approximately 82 probable cases, 66 suspect cases, and 24 deaths. On May 22, 2003, SARS II emerged. In total, approximately 13,000 people were quarantined. SARS II saw the onset of difficult questions being asked about the control and spread of SARS.The province of Ontario establishes the public health policies and legislative framework for the entire province. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 6-7, September–October 2022.