We force and obtain three models in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds and in which, below the least supercompact cardinal, GCH fails unboundedly often. In two of these models, GCH fails on a set having measure 1 with respect to certain canonical measures. There are no restrictions in all of our models on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

We force and construct models in which there are non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals which aren't measurable limits of strongly compact cardinals and in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds non-trivially except at strongly compact cardinals. In these models, every measurable cardinal κ which isn't either strongly compact or a witness to a certain phenomenon first discovered by Menas is such that for every regular cardinal λ > κ, κ (...) is λ strongly compact iff κ is λ supercompact. (shrink)

We construct models for the level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness in which for κ the least supercompact cardinal and δ ≤ κ any cardinal which is either a strong cardinal or a measurable limit of strong cardinals, 2δ > δ+ and δ is < 2δ supercompact. In these models, the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals can be arbitrary, and the size of the power set of (...) κ can essentially be made as large as desired. This extends and generalizes [5, Theorem 2] and [4, Theorem 4]. We also sketch how our techniques can be used to establish a weak indestructibility result. (shrink)

It is known that if $\kappa < \lambda$ are such that κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ is 2λ supercompact, then level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness fails. We prove a theorem which points towards this result being best possible. Specifically, we show that relative to the existence of a supercompact cardinal, there is a model for level by level equivalence between strong compactness and (...) supercompactness containing a supercompact cardinal κ in which κ’s strong compactness is indestructible under κ-directed closed forcing. (shrink)

Can a supercompact cardinal κ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above κ, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it (...) can. (shrink)

If κ < λ are such that κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ is 2λ supercompact, it is known from [4] that {δ < κ | δ is a measurable cardinal which is not a limit of measurable cardinals and δ violates level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness}must be unbounded in κ. On the other hand, using a variant of the argument used to establish this fact, it is possible to (...) prove that if κ < λ are such that κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ is measurable, then {δ < κ | δ is a measurable cardinal which is not a limit of measurable cardinals and δ satisfies level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness}must be unbounded in κ. The two aforementioned phenomena, however, need not occur in a universe with an indestructibly supercompact cardinal and sufficiently few large cardinals. In particular, we show how to construct a model with an indestructibly supercompact cardinal κ in which if δ < κ is a measurable cardinal which is not a limit of measurable cardinals, then δ must satisfy level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. We also, however, show how to construct a model with an indestructibly supercompact cardinal κ in which if δ < κ is a measurable cardinal which is not a limit of measurable cardinals, then δ must violate level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. (shrink)

We establish an Easton theorem for the least supercompact cardinal that is consistent with the level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. In both our ground model and the model witnessing the conclusions of our theorem, there are no restrictions on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals. We also briefly indicate how our methods of proof yield an Easton theorem that is consistent with the level by level (...) equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness in a universe with a restricted number of large cardinals. We conclude by posing some related open questions. (shrink)

We construct two models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which all non-supercompact measurable cardinals are strictly taller than they are either strongly compact or supercompact. In the first of these models, level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In the other, level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. Each universe has only one strongly compact cardinal and contains relatively few large (...) cardinals. (shrink)

We force and construct a model in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds, along with certain additional combinatorial properties. In particular, in this model, ♦ δ holds for every regular uncountable cardinal δ, and below the least supercompact cardinal κ, □ δ holds on a stationary subset of κ. There are no restrictions in our model on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

We construct a model for the level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness in which the least supercompact cardinal κ has its strong compactness indestructible under adding arbitrarily many Cohen subsets. There are no restrictions on the large cardinal structure of our model.

We construct a model for the level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness in which below the least supercompact cardinal κ, there is a stationary set of cardinals on which SCH fails. In this model, the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals can be arbitrary.

We construct models for the level-by-level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness containing failures of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis at inaccessible cardinals. In one of these models, no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal, and for every inaccessible cardinal $\delta $, $2^{\delta }\gt \delta ^{++}$. In another of these models, no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal, and the only inaccessible cardinals at which GCH holds are also measurable. These (...) results extend and generalize earlier work of the author. (shrink)

Starting from a model “κ is supercompact” + “No cardinal is supercompact up to a measurable cardinal”, we force and construct a model such that “κ is supercompact” + “No cardinal is supercompact up to a measurable cardinal” + “δ is measurable iff δ is tall” in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. This extends and generalizes both [, Theorem 1] and the results of.

We prove an indestructibility theorem for degrees of supercompactness that is compatible with level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness.

If are such that δ is indestructibly supercompact and γ is measurable, then it must be the case that level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness fails. We prove a theorem which points to this result being best possible. Specifically, we show that relative to the existence of cardinals such that κ1 is λ‐supercompact and λ is inaccessible, there is a model for level by level inequivalence between strong (...) compactness and supercompactness containing a supercompact cardinal in which κ’s strong compactness, but not supercompactness, is indestructible under κ‐directed closed forcing. In this model, κ is the least strongly compact cardinal, and no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal. (shrink)

We force and construct a model in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds, along with a strong form of diamond and a version of square consistent with supercompactness. This generalises a result due to the first author. There are no restrictions in our model on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

We construct four models containing one supercompact cardinal in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness and level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness are precisely controlled at each non‐supercompact measurable cardinal. In these models, no cardinal κ is ‐supercompact, where is the least inaccessible cardinal greater than κ.

Suppose λ > κ is measurable. We show that if κ is either indestructibly supercompact or indestructibly strong, then A = {δ < κ | δ is measurable, yet δ is neither δ + strongly compact nor a limit of measurable cardinals} must be unbounded in κ. The large cardinal hypothesis on λ is necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two models in which ${A = \emptyset}$ . The first of these contains a supercompact cardinal κ (...) and is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s supercompactness is indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ is δ + strongly compact. The second of these contains a strong cardinal κ and is such that no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ’s strongness is indestructible under < κ-strategically closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing, and level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. The model from the first of our forcing constructions is used to show that it is consistent, relative to a supercompact cardinal, for the least cardinal κ which is both strong and has its strongness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which has its supercompactness indestructible under κ-directed closed, (κ +, ∞)-distributive forcing. It further follows as a corollary of the first of our forcing constructions that it is possible to build a model containing a supercompact cardinal κ in which no cardinal δ > κ is measurable, κ is indestructibly supercompact, and every measurable cardinal δ < κ which is not a limit of measurable cardinals is δ + strongly compact. (shrink)

We construct models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In each model, above the supercompact cardinal, there are finitely many strongly compact cardinals, and the strongly compact and measurable cardinals precisely coincide.

We show that the theories “ZFC \ There is a supercompact cardinal” and “ZFC \ There is a supercompact cardinal \ Level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds” are equiconsistent.

We construct a variety of inner models exhibiting features usually obtained by forcing over universes with large cardinals. For example, if there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a Laver indestructible supercompact cardinal. If there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a supercompact cardinal κ for which 2κ = κ+, another for which 2κ = κ++ and another in which the least strongly compact cardinal is supercompact. If there is a (...) strongly compact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a strongly compact cardinal, for which the measurable cardinals are bounded below it and another inner model W with a strongly compact cardinal κ, such that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${H^{V}_{\kappa^+} \subseteq {\rm HOD}^W}$$\end{document}. Similar facts hold for supercompact, measurable and strongly Ramsey cardinals. If a cardinal is supercompact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model of the Proper Forcing Axiom and another inner model with a supercompact cardinal in which GCH + V = HOD holds. Under the same hypothesis, there is an inner model with level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness, and indeed, another in which there is level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. If a cardinal is strongly compact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model in which the least measurable cardinal is strongly compact. If there is a weakly iterable limit δ of <δ-supercompact cardinals, then there is an inner model with a proper class of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals. We describe three general proof methods, which can be used to prove many similar results. (shrink)

This paper explores several topics related to Woodin’s HOD conjecture. We improve the large cardinal hypothesis of Woodin’s HOD dichotomy theorem from an extendible cardinal to a strongly compact cardinal. We show that assuming there is a strongly compact cardinal and the HOD hypothesis holds, there is no elementary embedding from HOD to HOD, settling a question of Woodin. We show that the HOD hypothesis is equivalent to a uniqueness property of elementary embeddings of levels of the cumulative hierarchy. We (...) prove that the HOD hypothesis holds if and only if every regular cardinal above the first strongly compact cardinal carries an ordinal definable [Formula: see text]-Jónsson algebra. We show that if the HOD hypothesis holds and HOD satisfies the Ultrapower Axiom, then every supercompact cardinal is supercompact in HOD. (shrink)

Lascar described E KP as a composition of E L and the topological closure of E L (Casanovas et al. in J Math Log 1(2):305–319). We generalize this result to some other pairs of equivalence relations. Motivated by an attempt to construct a new example of a non-G-compact theory, we consider the following example. Assume G is a group definable in a structure M. We define a structure M′ consisting of M and X as two sorts, where X is (...) an affine copy of G and in M′ we have the structure of M and the action of G on X. We prove that the Lascar group of M′ is a semi-direct product of the Lascar group of M and G/G L . We discuss the relationship between G-compactness of M and M′. This example may yield new examples of non-G-compact theories. (shrink)

In “A new proof of the completeness of the Lukasiewicz axioms” Chang proved that any totally ordered MV-algebra A was isomorphic to the segment \}\) of a totally ordered l-group with strong unit A *. This was done by the simple intuitive idea of putting denumerable copies of A on top of each other. Moreover, he also show that any such group G can be recovered from its segment since \^*}\), establishing an equivalence of categories. In “Interpretation of (...) AF C *-algebras in Lukasiewicz sentential calculus” Mundici extended this result to arbitrary MV-algebras and l-groups with strong unit. He takes the representation of A as a sub-direct product of chains A i, and observes that \ where \. Then he let A * be the l-subgroup generated by A inside \. He proves that this idea works, and establish an equivalence of categories in a rather elaborate way by means of his concept of good sequences and its complicated arithmetics. In this note, essentially self-contained except for Chang’s result, we give a simple proof of this equivalence taking advantage directly of the arithmetics of the the product l-group \, avoiding entirely the notion of good sequence. (shrink)

We provide comprehensive, level-by-level characterizations of large cardinals, in the range from weakly compact to strongly compact, by closure properties of powerful images of accessible functors. In the process, we show that these properties are also equivalent to various forms of tameness for abstract elementary classes. This systematizes and extends results of [W. Boney and S. Unger, Large cardinal axioms from tameness in AECs, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.145(10) (2017) 4517–4532; A. Brooke-Taylor and J. Rosický, Accessible images revisited, Proc. (...) AMS145(3) (2016) 1317–1327; M. Lieberman, A category-theoretic characterization of almost measurable cardinals (Submitted, 2018); M. Lieberman and J. Rosický, Classification theory for accessible categories. J. Symbolic Logic81(1) (2016) 1647–1648]. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. Motivated by results of Bagaria, Magidor and Väänänen, we study characterizations of large cardinal properties through reflection principles for classes of structures. More specifically, we aim to characterize notions from the lower end of the large cardinal hierarchy through the principle [math] introduced by Bagaria and Väänänen. Our results isolate a narrow interval in the large cardinal hierarchy that is bounded from below by total indescribability and from above by subtleness, (...) and contains all large cardinals that can be characterized through the validity of the principle [math] for all classes of structures defined by formulas in a fixed level of the Lévy hierarchy. Moreover, it turns out that no property that can be characterized through this principle can provably imply strong inaccessibility. The proofs of these results rely heavily on the notion of shrewd cardinals, introduced by Rathjen in a proof-theoretic context, and embedding characterizations of these cardinals that resembles Magidor’s classical characterization of supercompactness. In addition, we show that several important weak large cardinal properties, like weak inaccessibility, weak Mahloness or weak [math]-indescribability, can be canonically characterized through localized versions of the principle [math]. Finally, the techniques developed in the proofs of these characterizations also allow us to show that Hamkin’s weakly compact embedding property is equivalent to Lévy’s notion of weak [math]-indescribability. (shrink)

Louveau and Rosendal [5] have shown that the relation of bi-embeddability for countable graphs as well as for many other natural classes of countable structures is complete under Borel reducibility for analytic equivalence relations. This is in strong contrast to the case of the isomorphism relation, which as an equivalence relation on graphs (or on any class of countable structures consisting of the models of a sentence of L ω ₁ ω ) is far from complete (see (...) [5, 2]). In this article we strengthen the results of [5] by showing that not only does bi-embeddability give rise to analytic equivalence relations which are complete under Borel reducibility, but in fact any analytic equivalence relation is Borel equivalent to such a relation. This result and the techniques introduced answer questions raised in [5] about the comparison between isomorphism and bi-embeddability. Finally, as in [5] our results apply not only to classes of countable structures defined by sentences of ω ₁ ω , but also to discrete metric or ultrametric Polish spaces, compact metrizable topological spaces and separable Banach spaces, with various notions of embeddability appropriate for these classes, as well as to actions of Polish monoids. (shrink)

The existence of superstition and religious beliefs in most, if not all, human societies is puzzling for behavioral ecology. These phenomena bring about various fitness costs ranging from burial objects to celibacy, and these costs are not outweighed by any obvious benefits. In an attempt to resolve this problem, we present a verbal model describing how humans and other organisms learn from the observation of coincidence (associative learning). As in statistical analysis, learning organisms need rules to distinguish between real (...) patterns and randomness. These rules, which we argue are equivalent to setting the level of α for rejection of the null hypothesis in statistics, are governed by risk management as well as by comparison to previous experiences. Risk management means that the cost of a possible type I error (superstition) has to be traded off against the cost of a possible type II error (ignorance). This trade-off implies that the occurrence of superstitious beliefs is an inevitable consequence of an organism’s ability to learn from observation of coincidence. Comparison with previous experiences (as in Bayesian statistics) improves the chances of making the right decision. While this Bayesian approach is found in most learning organisms, humans have evolved a unique ability to judge from experiences whether a candidate subject has the power to mechanistically cause the observed effect. Such “strong” causal thinking evolved because it allowed humans to understand and manipulate their environment. Strong causal thinking, however, involves the generation of hypotheses about underlying mechanisms (i.e., beliefs). Assuming that natural selection has favored individuals that learn quicker and more successfully than others owing to (1) active search to detect patterns and (2) the desire to explain these patterns mechanistically, we suggest that superstition has evolved as a by-product of the first, and that belief has evolved as a by-product of the second. (shrink)

Louveau and Rosendal [5] have shown that the relation of bi-embeddability for countable graphs as well as for many other natural classes of countable structures is complete under Borel reducibility for analytic equivalence relations. This is in strong contrast to the case of the isomorphism relation, which as an equivalence relation on graphs is far from complete.In this article we strengthen the results of [5] by showing that not only does bi-embeddability give rise to analytic equivalence (...) relations which are complete under Borel reducibility, but in fact any analytic equivalence relation is Borel equivalent to such a relation. This result and the techniques introduced answer questions raised in [5] about the comparison between isomorphism and bi-embeddability. Finally, as in [5] our results apply not only to classes of countable structures defined by sentences of ℒω1ω, but also to discrete metric or ultrametric Polish spaces, compact metrizable topological spaces and separable Banach spaces, with various notions of embeddability appropriate for these classes, as well as to actions of Polish monoids. (shrink)

We show that it is consistent, relative to n ∈ ω supercompact cardinals, for the strongly compact and measurable Woodin cardinals to coincide precisely. In particular, it is consistent for the first n strongly compact cardinals to be the first n measurable Woodin cardinals, with no cardinal above the n th strongly compact cardinal being measurable. In addition, we show that it is consistent, relative to a proper class of supercompact cardinals, for the strongly compact cardinals and the cardinals which (...) are both strong cardinals and Woodin cardinals to coincide precisely. We also show how the techniques employed can be used to prove additional theorems about possible relationships between Woodin cardinals and strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

We explore Woodin's Universality Theorem and consider to what extent large cardinal properties are transferred into HOD (and other inner models). We also separate the concepts of supercompactness, supercompactness in HOD and being HOD-supercompact. For example, we produce a model where a proper class of supercompact cardinals are not HOD-supercompact but are supercompact in HOD. Additionally we introduce a way to measure the degree of HOD-supercompactness of a supercompact cardinal, and we develop methods to control these degrees (...) simultaneously for a proper class of supercompact cardinals. Finally, we also produce a model in which the unique supercompact cardinal is also the only strongly compact cardinal, no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal, level by level inequivalence holds and the unique supercompact cardinal is not HOD-supercompact. (shrink)

We point out a connection between reflection principles and generic large cardinals. One principle of pure reflection is introduced that is as strong as generic supercompactness of ω2 by Σ-closed forcing. This new concept implies CH and extends the reflection principles for stationary sets in a canonical way.

There is a balance between the amount of (weak) indestructibility one can have and the amount of strong cardinals. It’s consistent relative to large cardinals to have lots of strong cardinals and all of their degrees of strength are weakly indestructible. But this necessitates the destructibility of the partially strong cardinals. Guaranteeing the indestructibility of the partially strong cardinals is shown to be harder. In particular, this work establishes an equiconsistency between: 1.a proper class (...) of cardinals that are strong reflecting strongs; and2.weak indestructibility for (κ+2)-strength for all cardinals κ in the presence of a proper class of strong cardinals.These have a much higher consistency strength than: 3.weak indestructibility for all degrees of strength for a proper class of strong cardinals.This discrepancy holds even if we weaken (2) from the presence of a proper class to just two strong cardinals. (2) is also equivalent to weak indestructibility for all λ-strength for λ far beyond (κ+2); well beyond the next measurable limit of measurables above κ, but before the next μ that is (μ+2)-strong.One direction of the equiconsistency of (1) and (2) is proven using forcing and the other using core model techniques from inner model theory. Additionally, connections between weak indestructibility and the reflection properties associated with Woodin cardinals are discussed, and similar results are derived for supercompacts and supercompacts reflecting supercompacts.Abstract prepared by James Holland.E-mail: [email protected]: https://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~jch258/assets/dis.pdf. (shrink)

The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely (...) the problem of how material objects persist through time : the endurantism vs. perdurantism controversy. It has been argued that this debate is a good example of a merely verbal one, where two allegedly competing views are in fact translatable one into each other – they end up, contrary to appearances, to be equivalent. In my closer look at this debate, I will conclude that this is correct, but only to some extent, and that there does remain room for substantive disagreement. The second thing that I wish to achieve in this paper, and that I hope will stem from my considerations about the persistence debate, is to defend a metaontological view that emphasizes that when asking the question "Are metaphysical debates substantive or verbal?" the correct answer is "It depends." Some debates are substantive, some debates are merely verbal, sometimes it is true that a problem or a question can be formulated in equally good frameworks where there is no fact of the matter as to which one is correct or where we just cannot know it. Furthermore, importantly, as my examination of the persistence debate will show, there is room for the view that a debate is largely merely verbal but not entirely and that some parts of it are substantive, and decidable by philosophical methods. It is possible, and it is the case with respect to the persistence debate, that inside a debate some points are merely verbal while other are places of substantive disagreement. A moral of this is that, at the end of the day, the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics. (shrink)

Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in (...) which a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

We show that MRP + MA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . This generalizes a result by Weiß who showed that PFA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . Consequently any of the known methods to prove MRP + MA consistent relative to some large cardinal hypothesis requires the existence of a strongly compact cardinal. Moreover if one wants to force MRP + MA (...) with a proper forcing, it requires at least a supercompact cardinal. We also study the relationship between MRP and some weak versions of square. We show that MRP implies the failure of □(λ, ω) for all λ ≥ ω 2 and we give a direct proof that MRP + MA implies the failure of □(λ, ω 1 ) for all λ ≥ ω 2. (shrink)

The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely (...) the problem of how material objects persist through time : the endurantism vs. perdurantism controversy. It has been argued that this debate is a good example of a merely verbal one, where two allegedly competing views are in fact translatable one into each other – they end up, contrary to appearances, to be equivalent. In my closer look at this debate, I will conclude that this is correct, but only to some extent, and that there does remain room for substantive disagreement. The second thing that I wish to achieve in this paper, and that I hope will stem from my considerations about the persistence debate, is to defend a metaontological view that emphasizes that when asking the question "Are metaphysical debates substantive or verbal?" the correct answer is "It depends." Some debates are substantive, some debates are merely verbal, sometimes it is true that a problem or a question can be formulated in equally good frameworks where there is no fact of the matter as to which one is correct or where we just cannot know it. Furthermore, importantly, as my examination of the persistence debate will show, there is room for the view that a debate is largely merely verbal but not entirely and that some parts of it are substantive, and decidable by philosophical methods. It is possible, and it is the case with respect to the persistence debate, that inside a debate some points are merely verbal while other are places of substantive disagreement. A moral of this is that, at the end of the day, the best way to do meta-metaphysics is to do first-level metaphysics. (shrink)

The strong tree property and ITP (also called the super tree property) are generalizations of the tree property that characterize strong compactness and supercompactness up to inaccessibility. That is, an inaccessible cardinal $\kappa $ is strongly compact if and only if the strong tree property holds at $\kappa $, and supercompact if and only if ITP holds at $\kappa $. We present several results motivated by the problem of obtaining the strong tree property and (...) ITP at many successive cardinals simultaneously; these results focus on the successors of singular cardinals. We describe a general class of forcings that will obtain the strong tree property and ITP at the successor of a singular cardinal of any cofinality. Generalizing a result of Neeman about the tree property, we show that it is consistent for ITP to hold at $\aleph _n$ for all $2 \leq n < \omega $ simultaneously with the strong tree property at $\aleph _{\omega +1}$ ; we also show that it is consistent for ITP to hold at $\aleph _n$ for all $3 < n < \omega $ and at $\aleph _{\omega +1}$ simultaneously. Finally, turning our attention to singular cardinals of uncountable cofinality, we show that it is consistent for the strong and super tree properties to hold at successors of singulars of multiple cofinalities simultaneously. (shrink)

In this paper we study a reducibility that has been introduced by Klaus Weihrauch or, more precisely, a natural extension for multi-valued functions on represented spaces. We call the corresponding equivalence classes Weihrauch degrees and we show that the corresponding partial order induces a lower semi-lattice. It turns out that parallelization is a closure operator for this semi-lattice and that the parallelized Weihrauch degrees even form a lattice into which the Medvedev lattice and the Turing degrees can be embedded. (...) The importance of Weihrauch degrees is based on the fact that multi-valued functions on represented spaces can be considered as realizers of mathematical theorems in a very natural way and studying the Weihrauch reductions between theorems in this sense means to ask which theorems can be transformed continuously or computably into each other. As crucial corner points of this classification scheme the limited principle of omniscience LPO, the lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO and their parallelizations are studied. It is proved that parallelized LLPO is equivalent to Weak Kőnig's Lemma and hence to the Hahn—Banach Theorem in this new and very strong sense. We call a multi-valued function weakly computable if it is reducible to the Weihrauch degree of parallelized LLPO and we present a new proof, based on a computational version of Kleene's ternary logic, that the class of weakly computable operations is closed under composition. Moreover, weakly computable operations on computable metric spaces are characterized as operations that admit upper semi-computable compact-valued selectors and it is proved that any single-valued weakly computable operation is already computable in the ordinary sense. (shrink)

We prove from suitable large cardinal hypotheses that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and even nearly θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}-supercompact, for any desired θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}. In addition, we prove several global results showing how the entire class of weakly compactcardinals, a proper class, can be made to coincide with the class of unfoldable cardinals, with the class of weakly measurable cardinals or (...) with the class of nearly θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}-supercompact cardinals κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}, for nearly any desired function κ↦θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa\mapsto\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}. These results answer several questions that had been open in the literature and extend to these large cardinals the identity-crises phenomenon, first identified by Magidor with the strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

The tree property at κ+ states that there are no Aronszajn trees on κ+, or, equivalently, that every κ+ tree has a cofinal branch. For singular strong limit cardinals κ, there is tension between the tree property at κ+ and failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis at κ; the former is typically the result of the presence of strongly compact cardinals in the background, and the latter is impossible above strongly compacts. In this paper, we reconcile the two. (...) We prove from large cardinals that the tree property at κ+ is consistent with failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis at κ. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. The Ultrapower Axiom is a combinatorial principle concerning the structure of large cardinals that is true in all known canonical inner models of set theory. A longstanding test question for inner model theory is the equiconsistency of strongly compact and supercompact cardinals. In this paper, it is shown that under the Ultrapower Axiom, the least strongly compact cardinal is supercompact. A number of stronger results are established, setting the stage for (...) a complete analysis of strong compactness and supercompactness under UA that will be carried out in the sequel to this paper. (shrink)

The California Verbal Learning Test-Second Edition, is a commonly used tool to assess episodic memory. This study analyzed learning and memory characteristics in a cognitively healthy Chinese population, as well as the effects of age, sex and education on CVLT-II factors. In total, 246 healthy people aged 20–80 years and 29 persons with multiple sclerosis were included in this study and completed the CVLT-II. Factors including total learning, learning strategy, serial position effects, short-delay free and cued recall, long-delay free and (...) cued recall, repetitions and intrusions during recall, hits and false positives of recognition, and total recognition discriminability were calculated. The effects of age, sex and education on these factors were analyzed using ANCOVA or independent two-sample t-tests and further confirmed by multiple regression analysis. The regression-based normative data were then computed by the equivalent scores method. Moreover, differences in learning and memory were compared between persons with MS and age-, sex- and education-matched healthy individuals. Most CVLT-II factors significantly differed between different age and education groups; in particular, better performance in total learning, recall, semantic clustering and recognition was observed in the younger and more educated groups than in the older and less educated groups. Male participants showed higher recency effect scores, more repetitions and fewer hits than female participants. Compared with healthy individuals, persons with MS showed extensive impairments in memory processes, such as learning, recall, learning strategy and recognition. These findings indicated that verbal learning and memory were highly dependent on age and educational level but not strongly affected by sex. The CVLT-II effectively assesses episodic memory impairment in the Chinese-speaking population. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic introduced many restrictions to in-person interactions, and remote social interactions may be especially important for managing loneliness when such restrictions are in place. However, it is unclear how social interactions are related to loneliness when in-person interactions are limited. Data were collected between February 2021 and March 2022 from a sample of 581 university students. Participants reported their loneliness and participation in positive in-person or remote social interactions each day for 14 days. Results from dynamic structural (...) equation models showed that participants felt less lonely than they usually felt on the days they engaged in positive remote interactions at the within-person level. Moreover, participants generally felt less lonely when engaging more frequently in remote interactions, but only when in-person interactions were restricted (between-person level). Some of these results varied by changing COVID-19 restrictions. Finally, for participants who felt lonelier in general, the effect of positive in-person and remote interactions on loneliness was less strong. These findings suggest that social interactions may buffer loneliness but are not as impactful for those who experience greater loneliness. (shrink)

Given a Polish groupG, let$E(G)$be the right coset equivalence relation$G^{\omega }/c(G)$, where$c(G)$is the group of all convergent sequences inG. The connected component of the identity of a Polish groupGis denoted by$G_0$.Let$G,H$be locally compact abelian Polish groups. If$E(G)\leq _B E(H)$, then there is a continuous homomorphism$S:G_0\rightarrow H_0$such that$\ker (S)$is non-archimedean. The converse is also true whenGis connected and compact.For$n\in {\mathbb {N}}^+$, the partially ordered set$P(\omega )/\mbox {Fin}$can be embedded into Borel equivalence relations between$E({\mathbb {R}}^n)$and$E({\mathbb {T}}^n)$.

The Mössbauer rotor effect recently gained a renewed interest due to the discovery and explanation of an additional effect of clock synchronization which has been missed for about 50 years, i.e. starting from a famous book of Pauli, till some recent experimental analyses. The theoretical explanation of such an additional effect is due to some recent papers in both the general relativistic and the special relativistic frameworks. In the first case the key point of the approach is the Einstein’s (...) class='Hi'>equivalence principle, which, in the words of the same Einstein, enables “the point of view to interpret the rotating system K’ as at rest, and the centrifugal field as a gravitational field”. In this paper, we analyse both the history of the Mössbauer rotor effect and its interpretation from the point of view of Einstein’s general theory of relativity by adding some new insight. In particular, it will be shown that, if on one hand the “traditional” effect of redshift has a strong analogy with the gravitational redshift, on the other hand the additional effect of clock synchronization has an intriguing analogy with the cosmological redshift. Finally, we show that a recent claim in the literature that the second effect of clock synchronization does not exist is not correct. (shrink)

The implementation of corporate social responsibility is crucial for the legitimacy of an organization in today’s globalized economy. This study aims to enrich our knowledge of the implementation of the largest voluntary CSR initiative—the UN Global Compact. Drawing on insights from stakeholder, network, and institutional theory, I derive a positive impact of UNGC participation duration on the implementation level of the UNGC principles, despite potential weaknesses in the initiative’s accountability structure. Moreover, I scrutinize the validity of the newly introduced (...) UNGC “Differentiation Programme” before applying this framework in the empirical analysis. Results from ordinal, linear, and instrumental variable regression models suggest that, contrary to claims made by UNGC critics, the duration of UNGC participation does affect the level of UNGC implementation. However, this effect appears to be much smaller than previous practitioner studies have suggested. Moreover, strong local UNGC networks affect the implementation level of the UNGC positively. Their hypothesized moderating role between UNGC participation duration and UNGC implementation level, however, is only significant in networks with activities of high quality rather than high quantity. (shrink)

Starting with a model in which κ is the least inaccessible limit of cardinals δ which are δ+ strongly compact, we force and construct a model in which κ remains inaccessible and in which, for every cardinal γ < κ, □γ+ω fails but □γ+ω, ω holds. This generalizes a result of Ben-David and Magidor and provides an analogue in the context of strong compactness to a result of the author and Cummings in the context of supercompactness.