Cyber warfare is becoming a new reality with new battles fought everyday on virtual battlefields. For a century and a half, International Humanitarian Law has been a sentry for victims of wars guaranteeing their legal protection from the calamities of war, trying hard to respond to Clausewitz’s “chameleon of war”. Cyber conflict marks new chameleon’s colour together with the unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomic battle systems and other technologies deployed on battlefields. However, it would be greatly erroneous to claim that the (...) International Humanitarian Law may not apply to the new phenomena just because it is caused by the advanced technology. Even if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are already sixty years old, the International Humanitarian Law in itself has at minimum customary response mechanism, granting, in a spirit of Marten’s clause, protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience (Protocol I). Notwithstanding, some more complicated fundamental issues also have to be addressed: how the use of cybernetic weapons and means may affect the classic notion of armed conflict? How it can be interpreted in the light of new technologies, i.e. can we still rely on a classic understanding of weapon’s kinetic effect as the main element, or shall we embrace effectsbased “Schmitt’s criteria”. If it so happens, will it make an act without apparent damage to a person/property equal to military hostilities, required by the armed conflict notion and justify the real-life response to it. The effective or overall control tests were used for the attribution of non-state actor’s activity to the state party of an armed conflict but these tests might not meet its purpose in the virtual battlefield of loose networks and open-source communities. If the concept of armed conflict is treated more flexibly, other changes (including issues of attribution) may follow, as well. Perhaps this is the way how the combatant institute will evolve. With classic combatant’s criteria impossible to apply on virtual battlefields, one of the options would be to elaborate concepts of “constant combat function” and “direct participation in hostilities” more precisely, as well as to reconsider state’s affiliation requirements. (shrink)

The present article discusses a well-known religious philosophical and partially legal doctrine of the “Just war”, developed in the Christian tradition by St. Augustine, St. Tomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vittoria, Francisco Suarez, Hugo Grotius and many other thinkers. The main thesis of the doctrine is that war will be just only if it corresponds to certain criteria, such as autoritas principi (waged by the sovereign), justa causa (on just aim) and with recta intentio (animus) or the aim and will to (...) wage war in order to restore justice and not because of personal hate, revenge, lust for glory, etc. However, the impact of the doctrine was not limited by the Middle Ages and the Christian philosophic discourse. This doctrine shaped both emerging international law and international humanitarian law in one or another way. Even though it did not survive intact through the changing reality of the world, it is not so hard to trace the reflections of this doctrine even in contemporary international law. For example, while evaluating the armed conflict we still use the autoritas principi principle (armed conflicts may be fought only by defined subjects such as states or militarily - politically organised dissidents), moreover, when we are dealing with the concept of combatancy, the same principle applies in establishing whether a person is a legal fighter in the conflict or not, because his status directly stems from his belonging to the party of the conflict. With its strictly limited possibilities to use force, the contemporary jus contra bellum also somewhat resembles the doctrine, not only in the sense of justa causa (such as a possibility of unilateral use of force by the state only in self-defence) but also in recta intentio (e.g. the United Nations Security Council may order the use of force only with the intention to re-establish peace). Therefore, even though the doctrine is the product of the Middle Ages thought, it is not forgotten in our days. The possible military strike against Iran in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapon is already discussed in the light of this doctrine. Moreover, authors (though mainly not lawyers) discussing inadequacies of current international legal framework for the use of force (e.g. the need for humanitarian intervention) find their inspiration in the doctrine. (shrink)

The use of private military force by states has been a long-standing phenomena in the history of warfare. Armies of mercenaries, privateering and recruitment of foreign nationals into armed forces have been common during the Middle Ages and later on. However, with the invention of effective firearms and artillery, standing regular armies, conscription and other developments that resulted in the essential rise of costs of war, the role of private military entrepreneurs diminished. By the end of XIXth century the state (...) became almost the only subject that was able to wage a full-scale war. Nevertheless, already in the middle of the XXth century mercenarism has been reborn in Africa’s colonial and post-colonial wars. The end of the XXth century and the beginning of the XXI century witnesses an enormous rise of private security and military companies (PSMC) that are hired to perform different functions related to use of force not only by states, but also by other clients such as international organisations, transnational corporations, etc. A PSMC may be defined as a profit-seeking private enterprise, which is established according to the national law of the state and which is providing, on the basis of a contract, services directly or indirectly connected with the use of military force or its institutions whether in time of armed conflict or peace, notwithstanding how such company describes itself. International humanitarian law has no specific regulation of PSMC. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to state that the activity of PSMC is not regulated, because international humanitarian law in any case, in one or another way, is applicable to the personnel of PSMC if it is engaged in armed conflict of either international or non-international character. (shrink)

Yugoslav anti-war contention has remained an under-theorised topic almost twenty years after the end of the wars of Yugoslav succession. Rather than focusing on the?ontogenesis? of individual pacifist enterprises, this paper examines the reasons for which Yugoslav anti-war activisms have been marginalised in recent East European sociological scholarship. I argue that a thorough appreciation of these phenomena requires a Yugoslav/regional approach which has not been favoured by post-Yugoslav social science scholars. This article also offers a critical reading of the existing (...) attempts to theorise Yugoslav anti-war activisms. It criticises their failure to draw upon the rich conceptual ap?paratus of social movement theories developed within Western political sociology over the last couple of decades. In spite of the fact that the concept of?social movement? may be contested in the context of post-Yugoslav anti-war engagement on the basis of its quantitative marginality, this should not deter Yugoslav social scientists from applying and refining Anglo-Saxon social movement theories in a culturally sensitive manner. Specific dynamics of anti-war activism occurring within an armed conflict has not been sufficiently studied. This is an important knowledge lacuna where regional sociologists could offer a substantive contribution. jugoslovenski antiratni angazman je ostao nedovoljno teorijski obradjena tema i posle skoro dvadeset godina od kraja ratova za jugoslovensko nasledje. U ovom radu se ne fokusiram na?ontogenezu? individualnih mirovnih poduhvata, vec ispitujem razloge zbog kojih su jugoslovenski antiratni aktivizmi marginalizovani u skorasnjoj istocnoevropskoj socioloskoj literaturi. Tvrdim da razumevanje ovih fenomena zahteva jugoslovenski/regionalni pristup kojem do sada nije bila posvecena adekvatna paznja. Ovaj rad takodje donosi i jedno kriticko citanje postojecih napora da se teorijski pristupi jugoslovenskim antiratnim aktivizmima. Kritikujem propust istrazivaca da se posluze bogatim konceptualnim aparatom razvijenim u proteklih nekoliko decenija u okviru zapadne politicke sociologije. Iako koncept?drustvenog pokreta? moze biti diskutabilan u kontekstu jugoslovenskog antiratnog angazmana u smislu njegove kvantitativne marginalnosti, to ne bi trebalo da spreci primenu anglosaksonskih teorija drustvenih pokreta na kulturoloski senzitivan nacin. Specificna dinamika antiratnog organizovanja za vreme i na prostoru ratnog konflikta nije u dovoljnoj meri istrazena, pa bi ovdasnji istrazivaci na tom polju mogli dati bitan doprinos. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Slobodan Milosevic uttered a sentence which was afterwards repeated in the literature about the Yugoslav tragedy innummerable times. The sentence "Niko ne sme da vas bije" was directed to the Serb demonstrators in Kosovo. In this text, the author analyzes the ways this sentence was translated in factional literature and shows that different versions, apart from being different lexically and semantically, influence the political interpretation and understanding of the Yugoslav conflict. This text poses another, maybe even more (...) important question: are unprecise and wrong translations of Milosevic's words a proof of what Georg Johannesen claimed - that faction is fiction.. Pre dvadeset godina Slobodan Milosevic je izgovorio jednu recenicu koja je ponavljana nebrojeno puta u literaturi o jugoslovenskoj tragediji. Ta recenica je izgovorena u neposrednom kontaktu sa demonstrantima srpske nacionalnosti na Kosovu i glasi "Niko ne sme da vas bije". U ovom tekstu autor istrazuje nacine na koje je ova recenica prevodjena u strucnoj literaturi i/ili faktivnoj prozi i pokazuje kako njene razlicite verzije, osim sto se odlikuju velikim jezickim i semantickim razlikama, usmeravaju politicko tumacenje i razumevanje jugoslovenskog konflikta. Ovim tekstom postavlja se jos jedno, mozda i vaznije pitanje: da li je neprecizno i pogresno navodjenje Milosevicevog iskaza potvrda onoga sto je o faktivnoj prozi i/ili strucnoj literaturi govorio Georg Johanesen - da se radi o izmisljanju - fikciji sklopljenoj od reci.. (shrink)

Environmental protection in times of armed conflicts, irrespective internal or international, is rarely considered as a prioritized concern. Due to the concept of state sovereignty, this is especially problematic when examining interaction of warfare and environmental protection in non-international hostilities. Not only it is challenging to find any exhaustive and explicit legal provisions regulating the matter, but this issue has also been forgotten by international legal scholars. Therefore, in this article the author reviews written and customary norms laid down in (...) documents of various branches of international law, such as international humanitarian law, human rights law, environmental law and international criminal law, which directly or by way of interpretation may favour environmental protection in times of internal armed conflict. This is to be done in order to gather information about the sufficiency of legal framework on preservation of the environment in times of noninternational armed conflicts. After doing this research, a few possible means to improve current legal framework are suggested. The author suggests to impose civil liability, enact new comprehensive document, initiate changes in international criminal law and other. (shrink)

U ovom radu ispitujemo neke od glavnih postavki teorije o deliberativnoj demokratiji, kao sto su pitanja koja se ticu ucesnika deliberativnih inicijativa, sam proces deliberativne rasprave i deliberativnog odlucivanja i pitanja sticanja gradjanskih znanja i vestina kroz deliberaciju. U drugom delu rada razmatramo kako su ova pitanja artikulisana, ali i empirijski istrazena u okviru literature o izradi javnih politika koja posle?argumentativnog obrata? u svom usmerenju ponovo ukljucuje pitanja normativnog konflikta koji stoji u osnovi javnih politika, postajuci tako postempirijska analiza javnih (...) politika. Teorija o deliberativnoj demokratiji i postempirijska literatura o izradi javnih politika obradjuju slicna pitanja i probleme u pogledu ucestvovanja, deliberacije i sticanja vecih gradjanskih znanja i vestina i obe upucuju na slican zakljucak o potrebi da deliberativne inicijative, zajedno sa institucijama liberalne demokratije, postanu deo jednog?deliberativnog sistema? povezanog lancima medjusobne komunikacije i sticanja legitimiteta. (shrink)

U podrucju manjinskih prava EU promovira norme koje nemaju uporiste u zakonodavstvu EU i koje nisu dio pravne stecevine EU. Limiti uvjetovanosti implementacije manjinskih prava koje EU promovira vidljivi su mehanizmu pracenja te implementacije, ukljucujuci i redovna izvjesca Evropske komisije o napretku zemlje ka EU koja prate manjinske probleme u politickom kontekstu neke zemlje. Izvjesca se baziraju na Kopenhagenskim kriterijima o zastiti manjina. Potrebni su ozbiljni napori u implementaciji zakonskih normi manjinskih prava. Nekoliko faktora utice na implemenatciju: konfuzija oko pravne (...) prirode zastite manjinskih prava, neodre?enost formulacije standarda i koristi koje bi njihovim provo?enjem neka zemlja imala. Kako svi ti faktori ne bi doprinosili daljnjoj nedorecenosti, EU mora ujednaciti i jasno definirati standarde manjinskih prava, uvjeravajuci vlade da postojanje manjinskih grupa obogacuje drustvo, a mjere usmjerene na ocuvanje njihove specificnosti utjecu na smanjenje rizika od konflikta.Iako se na primjeru Hrvatske moze vidjeti da su usvojene, promjenom zakonodavstva, mnoge evropske norme zastite manjina, iz izvjesca Evropske komisije najblize je moguce vidjeti i njihovu limitiranost, tj. ne primjenjivanje zakona u realnost. Izvjesca Evropske komisije o napretku prikazuju da manjinski problem nije prioritet EU u pristupnim pregovorima, te poteskoce EU u pracenju napretka u nedostatku jasno definiranih mjerila u podrucju manjinskih prava. (shrink)

Šiame darbe Platono dialogas Valstybininkas analizuojamas filosofinio vientisumo ir savarankiškumo prieiga. Tokia prieiga yra aktuali atsižvelgiant į tradicinių Platono interpretavimo būdų, evoliucinio ir unitarinio metodų, keliamą problemą. Abu metodai Valstybininką interpretuoja didžiųjų Platono politinių dialogų, Valstybės ir Įstatymų, fone, taip trukdydami atskleisti vidinį dialogo teorinį nuoseklumą. Todėl straipsnyje renkamasi tirti pagrindines dialogo politines temas – konfliktą, valstybininkystę bei politinį žinojimą – ir šių temų ryšius. Aptariant politiškumo atsiradimą, jo svarbą konceptualizuojant politinę veiklą ir nurodant struktūrinius valstybininkystės elementus, straipsnyje teigiama, kad (...) dialoge glūdi nuosekli ir vidujai baigta politinė teorija. (shrink)

Straipsnyje tyrinėjamos dvi akrasijos sampratos ir jų santykis su atsakomybės priskyrimu Douglaso Husako baudžiamosios atsakomybės teorijoje. Nuo Platono Protagoro laikų akrasijos problema filosofijoje glaudžiai siejama su moralinio žinojimo klausimu. Pasitelkiant Antikos bei krikščioniškajai etikai itin reikšmingus tekstus, taip pat šiuolaikinius akratiško elgesio tyrinėjimus, straipsnyje išryškinama kita – vidiniu konfliktu paremta akrasijos samprata. Husako teorijoje taikoma akrasijos samprata akcentuoja moralinį žinojimą-nežinojimą. Tačiau jos prielaidų šaltinis yra ne Antika, o šiuolaikiniai moralinės atsakomybės priskyrimo skeptikai, nors paties Husako teorija nėra skeptinė. Darbe išryškinami (...) esminiai Husako teorijos trūkumai. Šie trūkumai atsiremia į Husako akratiško veikėjo sampratą ir kaip tokiam veikėjui priskiriama atsakomybė. Jų nagrinėjimas leidžia parodyti vidiniu konfliktu grįstos akrasijos sampratos pranašumus konstruojant neskeptinę baudžiamosios atsakomybės teoriją. (shrink)