There is an extensive literature on the usage of Blissymbolics in augmentative and alternative communication that contradicts Morin's contention that it fails as an ideography. Morin's notion of “standardization” (target article, sect. X, para. X) is at odds with the highly developed understanding of this notion in linguistics. What Morin seems to have in mind corresponds to the notion of emergence in iterative and multiagent models of language learning.

One novel example and/or perspective in support of “Why the learning account fails” is the impressive ability of humans to recognize and memorize facial features and accurately and reliably connect those to related identities. Furthermore, neuroimaging analysis presents an example in support of the crucial role of standardization in the lack of adoption of ideography.

An ideography is a general-purpose code made of pictures that do not encode language, which can be used autonomously – not just as a mnemonic prop – to encode information on a broad range of topics. Why are viable ideographies so hard to find? I contend that self-sufficient graphic codes need to be narrowly specialized. Writing systems are only an apparent exception: At their core, they are notations of a spoken language. Even if they also encode nonlinguistic information, they (...) are useless to someone who lacks linguistic competence in the encoded language or a related one. The versatility of writing is thus vicarious: Writing borrows it from spoken language. Why is it so difficult to build a fully generalist graphic code? The most widespread answer points to a learnability problem. We possess specialized cognitive resources for learning spoken language, but lack them for graphic codes. I argue in favor of a different account: What is difficult about graphic codes is not so much learning or teaching them as getting every user to learn and teach the same code. This standardization problem does not affect spoken or signed languages as much. Those are based on cheap and transient signals, allowing for easy online repairing of miscommunication, and require face-to-face interactions where the advantages of common ground are maximized. Graphic codes lack these advantages, which makes them smaller in size and more specialized. (shrink)

Si c'est une tache de la philosophie de rompre la domination du mot sur l'esprit humain en devoilant les illusions qui souvent naissent presque inevitablement de l'utilisation de la langue en ce qui concerne des relations entre concepts, en liberant la pensee de ce dont elle est atteinte uniquement par la nature du moyen d'expression de la langue, alors mon ideographie developpee plus avant pour ces buts pourra devenir un outil utile aux philosophes. [...] L'arithmetique a ete le point de (...) depart du raisonnement qui m'a conduit a mon ideographie. Ainsi je pense d'abord l'appliquer a cette science en cherchant a mieux analyser ses concepts et a fonder plus profondement ses theoremes. (shrink)

All sufficiently large functional notations (ideographic or otherwise) are composites of discrete, structured elements (e.g., phonemes, morphemes, numerals). We must consider not only the modality but also the structure of the existing, workable ideographic/semasiographic systems we know (e.g., musical and numerical notation) to establish the cognitive limitations militating against humans memorizing and standardizing domain-general ideographies that would parallel written language.

The standardization account predicts short message service (SMS) interactions, allowed by current technology, will support the use and conventionalization of ideographs. Relying on psycholinguistic theories of dialogue, we argue that ideographs (such as emoji) can be used by interlocutors in SMS interactions, so that the main contributor can use them to accompany language and the addressee can use them as stand-alone feedback.

Morin suggested that one of the reasons for the difficulty in standardizing graphic codes is that the production of spoken language reduces the need for graphic codes. Here we try to extend their claims from a psychological perspective, which allows us to conclude that the puzzle of ideography is perhaps related to human psychological traits and psychological evolution.

Writing systems display ubiquitous linguistic structure, from the recursive syntactic properties of their glyphs to the morphology/phonology of their combinatorics. This extends to Ancient Egyptian, Chinese, and Sumerian ideograms. Pure ideography requires switching this influence off. The pervasive linguistic tinge to the fabric of writing systems suggests that the chances of breaking what Morin terms language's lock-in effect are slim.

Morin argues that fully fledged ideography is hindered by a problem of standardization. In general, the argument makes a great deal of sense, but we find that it is easier to grasp if, unlike the author, we consider ideography a language – one whose symbols (graphs) are not as effortless to produce as those of spoken and sign languages (phones, gestures).

In the first of these prospective representations, I am using a sort of hollowedout upright box in the turnstile that represents belief ; below I will use a filled-in upright box to represent knowledge. I suspect that the second way I am imagining writing it - by putting the content believed in a thinly framed box (knowledge by contrast having something more, a heavy frame) - would have some advantages – for example when we consider some of the other phenomena (...) we might want to find latent in this material, e.g. action, acting together. It is a defect of all of the whole setup that the representation of atomic unembedded knowledge attributions does not bring out the fact that the one who makes them is committed to the proposition, i.e., that knowledge is ‘factive’. (shrink)

The possibility of ideography is an empirical question. Prior examples of graphic codes do not provide compelling evidence for the infeasibility of ideography, because they fail to satisfy essential cognitive requirements that have only recently been revealed by studies of representational systems in cognitive science. Design criteria derived from cognitive principles suggest how effective graphic codes may be engineered.

Despite the once-common idea that a universal ideography would have numerous advantages, attempts to develop such ideographies have failed. Here, we make use of the biological idea of fitness landscapes to help us understand the nonevolution of such a universal ideographic code as well as how we might reach this potential global fitness peak in the design space.

Self-sufficient ideographies are rare because they are stifled by the issue of standardization. Similar issues arise with abstract art or drawings created by young children or great apes. We propose that mathematical indices and artificial intelligence can help us decode ideography, and if not to understand its meaning, at least to know that meaning exists.

We posit a cognitive account of the puzzle of ideography, which complements the standardization account of Morin. Efficient standardization of spoken language is phenomenologically attributed to a modality effect coupled with chunking of cognitive representations, further aided by multisensory integration and the serialized nature of attention. These mechanisms explain why languages dominate graphic codes for general-purpose communication.

Morin argues that ideographies are limited because graphic codes lack a capacity for proliferating standardization. However, natural graphic systems display rich standardization and can be placed in sequences using complex combinatorial structures. In contrast, ideographies are not natural, and their limitations lie in their attempts to artificially force a graphic system to behave like a writing system.

Can we explain the advantage natural languages enjoy over ideographies in a way that enables us to attempt the design of an ideography that “works”? I deploy an adapted version of Shannon's source- and channel-coding partitioning of a communication system to explain the communicative dynamics and shortfalls of ideographies, and reveal ways in which entrenchable, generalist ideographies could be designed.

Despite obvious advantages, no generalised ideographic codes have evolved through cultural evolution to rely on iconicity. Morin suggests that this is because of missing means of standardisation, which glottographic codes get from natural languages. Although we agree, we also point to the important role of the available media, which might support some forms of reference more effectively than others.

Communication barriers long-associated with ideographs, including combinatorial grapholinguistic complexity, computational encoding–decoding complexity, and technological rendering and deployment, become trivialized through advancements in interoperable smart mobile digital devices. Such technologies impart unprecedented extended-reality user hazards only mitigated by unprecedented colloquial and bureaucratic societal norms. Digital age norms thus influence natural ideographic language origins and evolution in ways novel to human history.

How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...) be contrasted with a third-person perspective, in which judgement is understood as an empirical, psychological phenomenon. Frege’s logic is essentially a first-person engagement, as each of us can make use of the ideography as a science of logic only if we ourselves have made the relevant judgements. Finally, I claim that the judging agent as conceived by Frege can, after all, be understood as a transcendental ego. (shrink)

The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...) this answer. In §2, I shall briefly consider his enthymematic argument for the conclusion that the word 'true' resists any attempt at defining it. In §3, I shall discuss his thesis that the thought that things are thus and so is identical with the thought that it is true that things are thus and so. The reasons we are offered for this thesis will be found wanting. In §4, I shall comment extensively on Frege's claim that, in a non-formal language like the one I am currently trying to speak, we can say whatever we want to say without ever using the word 'true' or any of its synonyms. I will reject the propositional-redundancy claim, endorse the assertive-redundancy claim and deny the connection Frege ascribes to them. In his classic 1892 paper 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (On Sense and Signification) Frege argues that truth-values are objects. In §5, I shall scrutinize his argument. In §6, I will show that in Frege's ideography (Begriffsschrift) truth, far from being redundant, is omnipresent. The final §7 is again on truth-bearers, this time as a topic in the theory of intentionality and in metaphysics. In the course of discussing Frege's views on the objecthood, the objectivity of thoughts and the timelessness of truth(s), I will plead for a somewhat mitigated Platonism. (shrink)

I offer an analysis of the sentence "the concept horse is a concept". It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, "the concept horse", indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege's ideography. The predicate "is a concept", on the other hand, should not be thought (...) of as referring to a function. It will be argued that the analysis of sentences of the form "C is a concept" requires the introduction of a new form of statement. Such statements are not to be thought of as having function--argument form, but rather the structure subject--copula--predicate. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) a cherché à réduire le raisonnement mathématique aux lois logiques générales. il a pour cela construit l'idéographie, langage formulaire, et mené une réflexion sur les réquisits de la pensée ainsi que sur la nécessité logique. A. Benmakhlouf se base sur la thématique du requis, du nécessaire et du superflu dans l'oeuvre de ce logicien.

To the extent that we expect ideographs to be closer to the reality they depict than spoken or written words we are succumbing to the perennial allure of positivistic thinking. Morin powerfully argues that human communication, including ideography, cannot be understood apart from practice, thus removing the positivistic assumption that made the “puzzle of ideography” puzzling in the first place.

If, as it appears, failure of standardization blocks the rise of general-purpose ideography, then a more precise characterization of “standardization” should help illuminate aspects of the process. Comparison is made with several histories of standardization to outline relevant dimensions and thresholds. This line of inquiry is particularly important for the forward-looking question of whether such ideography can ever arise.

RésuméL'héritage kantien dans la philosophie fregéenne de la connaissance est aujourd'hui largement reconnu. La présente analyse porte sur la point, déjà réputé central par J. Vuillemin , du jugement de recognition. On tente de montrer: °) le style transcendantal du traitement fregéen du problème des objets logiques, dont la nécessité s'introduit a partir des Grundlagen avec celle des extensions de concept, absentes de la première idéographie; style dont on tente d'expliquer les changements qu'il opére dans le modèle de la Begriffsbildung (...) kantienne. 2°) l'ambiguité de la recognition fondée par la source logique de connaissance d'objets logiques, ou par un principe d'image logique, qu'explicitera Wittgenstein, des invariants les plus généraux des opérations de pensée dans l'idéolographie. 3°) le lien du principe de recognition avec une supposition de détermination complète et son ultime formulation dans la théorie de la source géométrique; ses racines dans la formation mathématique de Frege. On conclut par la question posée par l'algébrisation de la logique, étrangére au style transcendantal de l'une des œuvres qui lui ont, fût‐ce de manière voilée par un principe de recognition, donné naissance. (shrink)

The learning account of the puzzle of ideography cannot be dismissed as readily as Morin maintains, and is compatible with the standardization account. The reading difficulties of deaf and dyslexic individuals, who cannot easily form connections between written letter strings and spoken words, suggest limits to our ability to bypass speech and reliably access meaning directly from graphic symbols.

This response takes advantage of the diverse and wide-ranging series of commentaries to clarify some aspects of the target article, and flesh out other aspects. My central point is a plea to take graphic codes seriously as codes, rather than as a kind of visual art or as a byproduct of spoken language; only in this way can the puzzle of ideography be identified and solved. In this perspective, I argue that graphic codes do not derive their expressive power (...) from iconicity alone (unlike visual arts), and I clarify the peculiar relationship that ties writing to spoken language. I then discuss three possible solutions to the puzzle of ideography. I argue that a learning account still cannot explain why ideographies fail to evolve, even if we emancipate the learning account from the version that Liberman put forward; I develop my preferred solution, the “standardization account,” and contrast it with a third solution suggested by some commentaries, which says that ideographies do not evolve because they would make communication too costly. I consider, by way of conclusion, the consequences of these views for the future evolution of ideography. (shrink)

En 1967, Ignacio Angelelli publie un ouvrage pionnier: la bibliographie fregeenne est encore assez mince quand l'etudiant du Professeur Bochenski soutient, a Fribourg en Suisse, sa dissertation doctorale. L'essentiel des ouvrages, articles et recensions du grand logicien est encore disperse et non reedite. Mais le principal interet de l'ouvrage dont nous donnons ici une premiere traduction francaise ne tient pas seulement au fait qu'il marque une date importante dans le champ des etudes fregeennes et qu'il peut constituer a sa maniere (...) un classique; son importance est directement liee a son objet et a sa methode. L'objet est clairement assigne des la premiere phrase de l'introduction. Si l'Ideographie est bien le document fondateur de la logique contemporaine, digne de prendre rang aux cotes des Analytiques d'Aristote, comment determiner plus precisement la signification et la portee de cette rupture fregeenne par rapport a la tradition philosophique? Autrement dit, il ne s'agit pour l'auteur ni de presenter un expose general de la pensee de Frege, ni de discuter de questions techniques que son oeuvre aura laisse ouvertes dans une riche posterite (Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine...), mais bien de situer cette percee en vue de mieux la comprendre, quitte a critiquer certains de ses aspects ou de ses attendus. (shrink)

The present study is an ideography applied to the work and intellectual activity of the Romanian-born Jewish scholar Leon Volovici. A careful analysis of his writings reveals a series of essential directions - landmarks and recurrent themes of his work - that Volovici himself followed without hesitation throughout his intellectual becoming. Succinctly, the case of Leon Volovici represents a remarkable model of practicing cultural dialogue and achieving intellectual histories from several perspectives. In addition to brief introductory considerations and concluding (...) remarks, this study focuses upon the following dimensions of his writings: i) the role of intellectual dialogue and the meaning of dialogic culture in Volovici's view; ii) the systematic presentation of the dimensions of Romanian antisemitism in the period between 1850 and 1940; iii) the presentation of the historical and sociological dimensions of the idea of writer in Romanian culture and iv) the remembrance of Volovici's identity in the context of his wanderings through distinct geographic spaces. Our conclusion is that all these dimensions are coherent with one another, making up the general image of Leon Volovici's work. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Cette investigation, qui se veut radicale et diversifiée de la canonique du dialogue, réunit les éléments d'une nouvelle analytique de la communication. « Copyright Electre » Pages de début Avertissement I - Un programme de recherche philosophique (...) II - Dialogue, dialogisme, interlocution III - Les illusions de l'alternance IV - Renforcement du modèle V - Un langage libéré des contraintes de l'interlocution : l'idéographie frégéenne VI - Croyance commune et croyance communiquée VII - La structure inter-rogative du questionnement VIII - Notion D'a priori communicationnel IX - Prolégomènes à une philosophie du dialogue X - Objections et réponses XI - La controverse méta-théorique XII - La communicabilité et la question critique Épilogue Notes Ouvrages cités ouconsultés Index des noms propres Pages de fin. (shrink)

Se ha tratado de desprestigiar al postmodernismo y no se ha valorado su gran contribución a la cultura universal. El postmodernismo empieza a desarrollarse cuando el ser humano se da cuenta que no tan solo sus órganos de los sentidos pueden engañarlo, sino que también su intelecto, razón y sus facultades superiores más preciadas. Las caídas del positivismo y del racionalismo le abrieron la puerta, apoyado por la insuficiencia de la ciencia y la filosofía para entender el universo. La nomología (...) (legalidad) ha tenido que resignarse frente a la ideografía (procesos irrepetibles e irreversibles) para entender el desarrollo universal. La antinomia del mentiroso, el teorema de Gödel, los procesos caóticos, la impredecibilidad, la incertidumbre, son parte de sus elementos sustantivos. El postmodernismo ha condenado a los ideologismos nomológicos o raciales que terminaron en las masacres de la Revolución Francesa, el Nazismo y las dos Guerras Mundiales, entre otros. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objet l’analyse de trois types de théorisations de la signification basées sur un modèle binaire du signe. Celles de Frege, Husserl et Saussure. Relevant d’un même paradigme, les deux premières sont confrontées en tant que s’y développent deux conceptions opposées de la signification – extensionnelle chez Frege, intensionnelle chez Husserl – contribuant à la mise en place, selon des perspectives opposées, de la dualisation de la syntaxe et de la sémantique. Relativement à cette conséquence, leur paradigme (...) est ensuite opposé à celui de la sémiologie structurale de Saussure dans laquelle l’interaction de la syntaxe et de la sémantique est internalisée au niveau du système qu’intègrent les signes comme éléments. De sorte que ce que l’on vise au terme de cet article, c’est à mettre au jour une explication possible de la raison de la divergence entre deux types de conceptions de la sémantique qui organiseront le développement de courants concurrents tout au long de l’histoire de la linguistique du 20e siècle, l’une formelle et mathématisée, l’autre structurale. (shrink)