Experiments in ideography: curious devices for representing propositional attitudes and propositional nexuses

Abstract

In the first of these prospective representations, I am using a sort of hollowedout upright box in the turnstile that represents belief ; below I will use a filled-in upright box to represent knowledge. I suspect that the second way I am imagining writing it - by putting the content believed in a thinly framed box (knowledge by contrast having something more, a heavy frame) - would have some advantages – for example when we consider some of the other phenomena we might want to find latent in this material, e.g. action, acting together. It is a defect of all of the whole setup that the representation of atomic unembedded knowledge attributions does not bring out the fact that the one who makes them is committed to the proposition, i.e., that knowledge is ‘factive’

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