Two modes of reasoning are used by humans – the `theoretical' (formal) and the `empirical' (non-formal), the first operating with inside-the-syllogism information, the second utilising out-of-the-syllogism information. Cross-cultural research (since Lévy-Bruhl, and especially after Luria) and developmental research (since Piaget) discovered respectively that members of `traditional' societies and children up to a certain age are able to operate only in the empirical mode.The paper brings together diverse discussions about usage of these modes in actual discourse (Ennis, Johnson-Laird, (...) Moore, Olson, Ong, etc.). It concentrates on contradictory opinions as to whether contemporary individuals after they acquire the formal mode preserve and utilise the empirical mode. In this connection it discusses results of neurological experiments investigating performance in solving syllogisms under conditions of transitory suppression of the left or the right hemisphere (Deglin et al.) which demonstrated that one and the same person, depending on which hemisphere is suppressed, uses both strategies. The activated right hemisphere utilizes the `empirical' pattern, the activated left hemisphere utilizes the `logical' pattern. Thus both mechanisms of reasoning are present in the brain simultaneously, but each of them is controlled by different hemispheres. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to broaden the concept of musical meaning from an abstract and emotionally neutral cognitive representation to an emotion-integrating description that is related to the evolutionary approach to music. Starting from the dispositional machinery for dealing with music as a temporal and sounding phenomenon, musical emotions are considered as adaptive responses to be aroused in human beings as the product of neural structures that are specialized for their processing. A theoretical and empirical background is (...) provided in order to bring together the findings of music and emotion studies and the evolutionary approach to musical meaning. The theoretical grounding elaborates on the transition from referential to affective semantics, the distinction between expression and induction of emotions, and the tension between discrete-digital and analog-continuous processing of the sounds. The empirical background provides evidence from several findings such as infant-directed speech, referential emotive vocalizations and separation calls in lower mammals, the distinction between the acoustic and vehicle mode of sound perception, and the bodily and physiological reactions to the sounds. It is argued, finally, that early affective processing reflects the way emotions make our bodies feel, which in turn reflects on the emotions expressed and decoded. As such, there is a dynamic tension between nature and nurture, which is reflected in the nature-nurture-nature cycle of musical sense-making. (shrink)

Many normative political theorists have engaged in the systematic collection and/or analysis of empirical data to inform the development of their arguments over the past several decades. Yet, the approach they employ has typically not been treated as a distinctive mode of theorizing. It has been mostly overlooked in surveys of normative political theory methods and methodologies, as well as by those critics who assert that political theory is too abstracted from actual political contestation. Our aim is to (...) unearth this grounded normative theory (GNT) approach – to identify its definitive practices and highlight its potential significance. We detail four overlapping commitments characteristic of GNT. These include commitments to expanding the comprehensiveness of input for normative arguments through original empirical research and/or analysis, recursivity in the development of normative claims, attentiveness to the systematic inclusion of a range of voices and ways of knowing, and accountability to those engaged by the theorist in empirical contexts. We discuss methodological distinctions within GNT, including between more- and less-solidaristic approaches. We discuss how GNT answers calls for theorists to engage more closely with empirical political dynamics and we consider responses to possible critiques. (shrink)

Hintikka argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (...) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce’s work on abduction. Recent work on abduction goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is considered worth conjecturing and the decision either to use further this hypothesis to do some inferential work in the given domain of enquiry, or to test it experimentally. The latter step, when it takes place, is an inductive mode of inference that should be distinguished from the abductive inference that led to the hypothesis. In this paper, I argue that in real scientific practise both the distinction between a properly speaking abductive phase and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing and evaluation, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been discovered in a preceding abduction and releasing or activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work in the domain of enquiry in which the ignorance problem arose in the first place are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory development and elaboration and this defies and any attempt to analyze this intricate process into discrete well defined steps. Thus, my arguments reinforce Magnani’s view on abduction and its function in scientific practise. (shrink)

Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, (...) reasoning, in particular inductive reasoning on the testimony of perception, is based on a theory of causation. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible, cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays (...) represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a re-interpretation of qualitative and quantitative modeling from a representationalist perspective. In this view, both approaches attempt to construct abstract representations of empirical relational structures. Whereas quantitative research uses variable-based models that abstract from individual cases, qualitative research favors case-based models that abstract from individual characteristics. Variable-based models are usually stated in the form of quantified sentences. This syntactic structure implies that sentences about individual cases are derived using deductive reasoning. In contrast, case-based models (...) are usually stated using context-dependent existential sentences. This syntactic structure implies that sentences about other cases are justifiable by inductive reasoning. We apply this representationalist perspective to the problems of generalization and replication. Using the analytical framework of modal logic, we argue that the modes of reasoning are often not only applied to the context that has been studied empirically, but also on a between-contexts level. Consequently, quantitative researchers mostly adhere to a top-down strategy of generalization, whereas qualitative researchers usually follow a bottom-up strategy of generalization. Depending on which strategy is employed, the role of replication attempts is very different. In deductive reasoning, replication attempts serve as empirical tests of the underlying theory. Therefore, failed replications imply a faulty theory. From an inductive perspective, however, replication attempts serve to explore the scope of the theory. Consequently, failed replications do not question the theory per se, but help to shape its boundary conditions. We conclude that quantitative research may benefit from a bottom-up generalization strategy as it is employed in most qualitative research programs. Inductive reasoning forces us to think about the boundary conditions of our theories and provides a framework for generalization beyond statistical testing. In this perspective, failed replications are just as informative as successful replications, because they help to explore the scope of our theories. (shrink)

What makes psychedelic psychotherapy work? Is it the induction of psychedelic experience, with its distinct patterns of hallucinations and insights, or is it the neural ‘shakeup’ that moves the brain out of its regular mode of functioning and into a more disordered state? We consider the role that attention-related phenomenological changes play in psychedelic transformation and psychotherapy. We review Letheby’s account of psychedelic psychotherapy, which appeals to increases in phenomenal opacity as the central mechanism of psychotherapeutic transformation. We argue (...) that there is an alternative vehicle of psychedelic transformation that this account overlooks, involving radically transparent experiences. We outline the common kinds of phenomenal transparency shifts typical of psychedelic experiences, and argue that in many cases, such shifts are responsible for the psychotherapeutic benefits. This argument motivates an alternative approach to possible mechanisms of psychedelic self-transformation, and opens up a new venue of empirical research into the role of attention and phenomenology in psychedelic psychotherapy. (shrink)

Introduction. The relevance of the research topic is determined by the necessity to study financial phenomena and processes in order to understand the economic essence of public finance in the life of society. The strategic imperative for the formation of public finance is the development of an appropriate provision for its implementation, adequate to the complex and changeable circumstances of the territory development. The main purpose of the study is to identify the features of performing the functions of public finance (...) for regions with a specific mode of operating. Methods. When solving the tasks, the author uses general logical methods: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy; empirical level methods: observation, description, measurement, modeling, as well as private and special methods of scientific research: comparative analysis, system approach, the Robinsonade model (Crusoe model). Scientific novelty of the research. The scientific novelty of the results lies in solving an important scientific problem - identifying the features of implementing the allocative function of public finance in the regions with a specific mode of operating (as exemplified by the Donetsk People’s Republic, where there is a special military and political situation, a mobilization type of economy, a transitional period due to the integration of the Republic into the system of the Russian Federation federal relations) in order to improve the system of public finance management in such regions. Results. The main results of the study consist in characterizing the process of implementing the allocation function of public finance, which makes it possible to determine the maximum effect of economic actions of the subjects in the current conditions, as well as to lay the foundations for analyzing the following distribution function of public finance. Conclusions. The author makes a conclusion that in the context of strengthening the role of public finance, not only in ensuring the economic development of the Donetsk People’s Republic, but also in the post-crisis recovery and stabilization of business activity, the implementation of the allocation function of public finance becomes important. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste artigo, argumentamos a favor de uma versão sofisticada do realismo científico, tendo como eixo norteador a análise do desempenho do que consideramos ser o seu elemento de defesa estratégico: o “argumento do milagre”. O realismo científico é a perspectiva comprometida com as nossas melhores teorias científicas, isto é, com a existência de entidades, processos, relações etc., observáveis ou inobserváveis, indispensáveis para explicar o seu sucesso empírico, em particular, com aqueles componentes das teorias que são cruciais para se alcançar (...) novas previsões bem-sucedidas. O argumento do milagre é um tipo de abdução ou inferência da melhor explicação e se expressa na célebre formulação de Putnam : “O realismo científico é a única filosofia que não faz do sucesso da ciência um milagre.” Analisamos e rebatemos duas importantes modalidades de argumentação antirrealista: a indução pessimista e a circularidade viciosa da inferência da melhor explicação. Acreditamos estar justificados quanto à defesa da intuição básica do realismo científico, com o apoio de uma versão fortalecida e articulada do argumento do milagre, mediante as qualificações de novidade preditiva e fecundidade teórica: a ciência é bem-sucedida em explicar e prever fenômenos, inclusive novos, porque suas melhores teorias são verdadeiras e as entidades inobserváveis postuladas por essas teorias realmente existem. Concluímos que o argumento do milagre continua sendo basilar e estratégico na defesa do realismo científico.: In this article, we argue in favor of a sophisticated version of scientific realism, based on an analysis of what we consider to be the strategic element of its defense: the “miracle argument”. Scientific realism is the perspective applicable to our best scientific theories; that is, it applies to entities, processes, and relationships, etc., whether observable or unobservable, which are indispensable for explaining the empirical success of theories, and it applies particularly to those components of the theories that are crucial to achieving new and successful forecasts. The miracle argument is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation, and is expressed in the famous formulation of Putnam : “[Scientific] realism is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of the science a miracle.” We analyze and refute two important modes of antirealist argument: pessimistic induction and vicious circularity of inference to the best explanation. We believe that we are justified in defending the basic intuition of scientific realism, supported by a strengthened version of the miracle argument, together with the attributes of predictive novelty and theoretical fecundity. From this perspective, science succeeds in explaining and predicting phenomena, including new phenomena, because its best theories are true, and the unobservable entities postulated by these theories actually exist. We conclude that the miracle argument continues to be basic and strategic in the defense of scientific realism. (shrink)

Historians looking to make history a professional discipline of study in Victorian Britain believed they had to establish firm boundaries demarcating history from other literary disciplines. James Anthony Froude ignored such boundaries. The popularity of his historical narratives was a constant reminder of the continued existence of a supposedly overturned phase of historiography in which the historian was also a man of letters, transcending the boundary separating fact from fiction and literature from history. Just as professionalizing historians were constructing a (...) methodology that called on historians to be inductive empirical workers, Froude refused to accept the new science of history, and suggested instead that history was an individual enterprise, one more concerned with drama and art than with science. E. A. Freeman warned the historical community that they “cannot welcome [Froude] as a partner in their labors, as a fellow-worker in the cause of historic truth.”This article examines the boundary work of a professionalizing history by considering the attempt to exclude Froude from the historian’s discourse, an attempt that involved a communal campaign that sought to represent Froude as “constitutionally inaccurate.” Froude suffered from “an inborn and incurable twist,” argued Freeman, thereby diagnosing “Froude’s disease” as the inability to “make an accurate statement about any matter.” By unpacking the construction of “Froude’s disease,” the article exposes the disciplinary techniques at work in the professionalization of history, techniques that sought to exclude non-scientific modes of thought such as that offered by Froude. (shrink)