In this article I discuss a recent proposal according to which human beings are in need of moral enhancement by novel biomedical means in order to reduce the risk of catastrophes that could threaten the very possibility of continued human existence on this planet. I raise two objections to this proposal. The first objection claims that the idea that human beings could be morally enhanced by altering our emotional psychological inclinations, such as altruism, is misguided. In the line with Kantian (...) understanding of morality I argue that our morality is based on rationality and not on inclinations. If we take this view of morality it becomes clear that the proposed enhancement by biomedical means cannot be moral enhancement. What is enhanced is emotional aspect of our character, not our morality. People enhanced in this way would not act on the basis of their deliberate choices but on basis of preprogramed psychological inclination. This would in turn undermine our basic moral concept of freedom and, thereby, of moral responsibility. The second objection to the proposal show how the idea that moral enhancement by biomedical means should be mandatory violates political freedom of citizens. Faced with the objection that moral enhancement by biomedical means could be necessary in order to prevent catastrophic destruction of environment, in the final part of this chapter I try to point to education and liberal democracy as the alternative and morally acceptable ways of changing our behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine an influential argument in favor of political realism. The argument claims that international relations, by analogy with Hobbes’s state of nature at the individual level, are governed by anarchy which makes it irrational for states to observe the principles of morality and justice since there are no guarantees that they will be observed by other states. However, this analogy is unsustainable due to the differences that exist between agents on the international and individual levels. (...) Compared to the insecurity of the state of nature, the level of insecurity of international relations is lower, which makes it possible for co-operation between states to be established. This conclusion is additionally corroborated by insights of the game theories, especially those of iterated prisoner’s dilemma. (shrink)

U prvom dijelu ovoga rada ukratko ću izložiti Berčićeva stajališta o moralnoj odgovornosti, pri čemu ću se usredotočiti na njegove prijedloge kriterija koje neki subjekt mora zadovoljiti kako bi mu se mogla pripisati moralna odgovornost. Posebno ću razmotriti njegov prikaz Strawsonova viđenja moralne odgovornosti i teorije prema kojoj moralna odgovornost ovisi o sposobnosti subjekta da bude “osjetljiv na razloge”. Tvrdit ću da skupine prema oba ova kriterija mogu biti subjekti kojima se pripisuje moralna odgovornost. Ovaj stav opravdavam tvrdnjom da skupine (...) imaju sposobnost djelovanja, tj. da skupine mogu biti djelatnici koji donose moralno relevantne odluke i izvršavaju moralno relevantna djelovanja. Posjedujući ove sposobnosti skupni djelatnici su moralni subjekti prikladni da budu moralno odgovorni za djela koja su učinjena u njihovo ime. U svojoj analizi oslanjat ću se na radove Philipa Pettita i Christiana Lista, dvojice filozofa koji su u novije vrijeme ponudili nove uvide na području teorije djelovanja. (shrink)

In this article, the authors give an answer to the question of whether God would be worthy of worship had He created (or even permitted) a world where no human action was freely done. Presupposing God’s omnibenevolence in applying the doctrine of no responsibility for actions not freely done, we consider two possible answers to the question of why God would create such a deterministic world. Whichever of these answers proved to be true, we conclude that God would be worthy (...) of worship because He would provide the best outcome for everyone. (shrink)

Goran Švob was an influential Croatian logician and philosopher or language. According to him, logic should be based on a theory of meaning, propositions and truth, and, in its core, is inseparable from central philosophical questions. Švob was especially inspired by Frege's early logical philosophy. According to Švob, the concept of identity should include naming and knowledge and has self-identity of objects as its "degenerate" case.

The first beginnings of modern logic in Croatia are recognizable as early as in the middle of the 19th century in Vatroslav Bertić. At the turn of the 20th century, Albin Nagy, who was teaching in Italy, made contributions to algebraic logic and to the philosophy of logic. At that time, a distinctive author Mate Meršić stood out, also working on algebraic logic. In the Croatian academic philosophy, until the publication of Gajo Petrović's textbook (1964) and the contributions by Heda (...) Festini, a critical or indifferent attitude toward modern logic prevailed. The first comprehensive modern logic textbook in Croatian was written by mathematician Vladimir Devidé (1964), known, for example, for his axiomatizations of natural numbers and classical propositional logic. In the Croatian philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s, influential logicians are Goran Švob and mathematician Zvonimir Šikić. At the turn of the 21st century, logical investigations are being intensified and extended to various branches of the contemporary logic. (shrink)