Abstract In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that personal identity is indeterminate and that identity is not what matters in personal survival. Parfit argues that traditional views of personal identity have counterintuitive consequences and that they violate a plausible requirement, suggested by Bernard Williams, that must be met by any acceptable criterion of identity. Parfit argues that, unlike traditional determinate views of personal identity, his view succeeds in accommodating intuitions and in meeting (an analogue to) Williams' requirement. I argue (...) that Parfit's view has more counterintuitive consequences than do the traditional views of identity. Though the traditional views do seem to violate Williams' requirement, Parfit's view fares no better. In fact, it seems that any theory of personal survival that appeals to connections that may hold to a greater or lesser extent will fail to meet the relevant requirement. This is an important general point, since the requirement is a plausible one. (shrink)

In this book, Richard Keshen focuses on a moral ideal of reasonable self-esteem. The person who values reasonableness will evaluate herself and others in ways that conform to a set of critical standards of reasonableness. Conformity to these standards, Keshen argues, brings about a tendency to develop certain personality traits and reject others. The traits adopted and cultivated are ones which are beneficial to the person, and conducive to positive feelings of self-esteem. Thus, the person who begins with a commitment (...) to reasonableness is likely to have a life that is desirable and rewarding. (shrink)