In 2016, France passed a major law that is unique in giving terminally ill and suffering patients the right to the controversial procedure of continuous deep sedation until death (CDS). In so doing, the law identifies CDS as a sui generis clinical practice, distinct from other forms of palliative sedation therapy, as well as from euthanasia. As such, it reconfigures the ethical debate over CDS in interesting ways. This paper addresses one aspect of this reconfiguration and its implications for the (...) intentions at work in this complex time at the end of life. The concept of intention is often considered central to the ethics of end-of-life care, but its role is recognized to be problematic, with charges of elusiveness and ambiguity. I aim to show that consideration of the French law affords a new understanding of the intentionality of CDS, and that in addition to the obvious importance of this for clarifying the ethics of the practice, it may suggest new ways of addressing the wider problem of ambiguous clinical intentions at end of life. (shrink)

The author discusses a puzzle about the place of intention in art, a puzzle first articulated by Richard Wollheim in his well‐known lecture ‘On Drawing an Object’. The puzzle arises if we try to hold jointly three commonly‐held claims, viz. Art is intentional; The artist, in making a work of art, needs to observe what he has done, in order to know what he has done; A necessary condition of intentional action is that when an agent acts intentionally then he (...) knows what he is doing without observation, or any need for it. Prima facie it would appear that we cannot hold all these claims together.The author spells out the problem, discusses Wollheim’s own solution to it and seeks to dispel the puzzle by closer attention to intention and action in relation to artistic production. (shrink)

The author discusses a puzzle about the place of intention in art, a puzzle first articulated by Richard Wollheim in his well‐known lecture ‘On Drawing an Object’. The puzzle arises if we try to hold jointly three commonly‐held claims, viz. (1) Art is intentional; (2) The artist, in making a work of art, needs to observe what he has done, in order to know what he has done; (3) A necessary condition of intentional action is that when an agent acts (...) intentionally then he knows what he is (intentionally) doing without observation, or any need for it. Prima facie it would appear that we cannot hold all these claims together.The author spells out the problem, discusses Wollheim’s own solution to it (which he rejects) and seeks to dispel the puzzle by closer attention to intention and action in relation to artistic production. (shrink)