A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...) non-identity position. In the final section, the suggestions that the relevant notions of functional equivalence might be unpacked solely in terms of abstract automata features or entirely in terms of causal relations to nonintentionally characterized behavior are shown to be inadequate. (shrink)

I begin with a basic account of teleo-pragmatic functionalism and its main features. I then discuss what that view implies about the nature of cognition, theories and understanding and thus about the limits on our ability to explain the mental and its relation to the non-mental. I show that teleo-pragmatic functionalism leads naturally to a version of non-reductive physicalism that combines theoretical pluralism with a strongly contextualist and pragmatic view of theories and models. Though non-reductionist at the theoretical and conceptual (...) level, the view is nonetheless thoroughly and robustly physicalist in its ontology. (shrink)

In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exists, I want (...) to take a somewhat skeptical look at the underlying assumption that the gap is all that special. (shrink)