Cognitive science of religion (CSR) has inspired a number of debunking arguments against god-belief. They aim to show that the belief-forming processes that underlie belief in god(s) are unreliable. The debate surrounding these arguments gives the impression that CSR offers new scientific evidence that threatens the rationality of religious belief. This impression, however, is partly misleading. A close look at a few widely discussed debunking arguments shows, first, that CSR theories as such are far from providing sufficient empirical evidence that (...) the belief-forming processes behind god-belief are unreliable. Thus, appealing solely to CSR theories makes a debunking argument weak. Second, there are strong arguments that also invoke CSR, but these gain their strength primarily from more familiar claims about evolutionary epistemology and religious diversity. What CSR actually does in these arguments is providing an explanation of why people might believe in gods even if gods did not exist. But explaining is not debunking. (shrink)

In “Milvian Bridges in Science, Religion, and Theology: Debunking Arguments and Cultural Evolution,” Lari Launonen and Aku Visala engage with an EDA against religious belief that appeals to cultural rather than biological evolution. According to this EDA, religious beliefs are unjustified, not because they are generated by biologically shaped cognitive processes that are unreliable as far as those beliefs are concerned but because they are generated by cultural processes that select for those beliefs for their ability to produce prosocial (...) behavior rather than for their truth sensitivity. Scientific beliefs, by contrast, are truth-sensitive because their cultural fitness depends on their power to produce accurate predictions. Their truth sensitivity explains the great amount of convergence on them that exists across cultures. In response to the EDA in question, Launonen and Visala argue that the difference between science and religion is actually more a matter of degree than a matter of kind, that there is considerable cross-cultural convergence on theistic and Christian beliefs, and that folk Christian beliefs, just as folk scientific ones, are truth-sensitive to the extent that they are constrained by expert beliefs. (shrink)

Against claims that cognitive science of religion undercuts belief in God, many defenders of theistic belief have invoked the Religious Reasons Reply: science cannot undercut belief in God if one has good independent reasons to believe. However, it is unclear whether this response helps salvage the god beliefs of most people. This paper considers four questions: (1) What reasons do Christians have for believing in God? (2) What kinds of beliefs about God can the reasons support? (3) Are the reasons (...) rationalizations? (4) Can cognitive science undercut the reasons? Many Christians invoke everyday religious experiences (EREs)—such as experiences of divine presence, guidance, and communication—as reasons to believe. Unlike another popular reason to believe in God (the appearance of design and beauty in nature), EREs can support beliefs about a relational God who is present to me, who guides my life, and who speaks to me. EREs are not rationalizations since they seem to cause and sustain such beliefs. Nonetheless, EREs like experiences of hearing God speak are problematic reasons to believe. ‘Soft’ voice-hearing experiences are easily undercut. ‘Hard’ experiences of an external, audible voice are probably underpinned by similar cognitive processes as audio-verbal hallucinations. (shrink)

Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A (...) Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place. (shrink)

Cognitive science of religion has inspired several debunking arguments against theistic belief. Hans Van Eyghen’s book Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion is the first monograph devoted to answering such arguments. This article focuses on Van Eyghen’s responses to two widely discussed debunking arguments, one by Matthew Braddock and another by John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths. Both responses have potential but also face problems. Even if Van Eyghen manages to show that these authors have not fully excluded the possibility of (...) noninferential theistic belief being underpinned by reliable belief-forming processes, he fails to offer convincing reasons to think the processes are in fact reliable. A positive argument for their reliability might ultimately have to be based on evidence for God’s existence, namely, theistic arguments. The question of the rationality of religious belief (de jure) thus cannot be isolated from the question of God’s existence (de facto). (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to statistically verify the links of income and education with information and communication technology diffusion across 191 countries of the world taking into account a total of 9 indicators best representing the socio-economic variables. Design/methodology/approach Multivariate regression analysis was used as a prime method to rigorously test the relationships of income and education with ICT diffusion across 191 countries. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to analyze and predict patterns in the data. Findings The (...) results support the hypotheses that income and education are positively related to ICT diffusion. The findings statistically confirm that poverty is a leading cause of digital divide worldwide. Research limitations/implications Academic, policy and practice groups should work in collaboration to fight against digital divide. Present results also imply that digital divide shall never end but rather it can be controlled to an extent with multiple collaborative efforts. Originality/value Prior research assignments on the digital divide concentrate on exploring the links between few socio-economic and ICT variables in select few regions theoretically. The present work addresses this literature gap by developing and testing two hypotheses to statistically investigate the relationships between a broad set of socio-economic and ICT indicators. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 60 Heft: 1 Seiten: 84-102.

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to create a conceptual framework, based on a structured literature review, to analyze the digital disability divide and help find solutions for it. A digital disability divide exists between people with impairments and those without impairments. Multiple studies have shown that people without impairments are less likely to own a computer or have an Internet connection than are people with impairments. However, the digital disability divide is seen in relation not only to access (...) but also to accessibility and use. For people with impairments, new technological innovations offer solutions for everyday challenges, such as finding information, communicating with others and using electronic services.Design/methodology/approach– For this study, 4,778 conference and journal publications were systematically analyzed.Findings– A number of key findings emerged. This field is relatively new, and the literature is highly focused on the technological and social aspects of the digital disability divide, with technology and societal attributes being the core sub-attributes for a comprehensive model. The previous literature did not significantly study the consequences of the financial situation of individuals; rather, the predominant focus was on the have-nots and countries with low income potentials. Furthermore, motivation reveals a compelling case within the digital disability divide subset.Originality/value– The review provides a consolidated view of past research on the general topic of the digital disability divide and the attributes that affect it. (shrink)

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.

In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.

This book shifts the focus from Critical Regionalism towards a broader concept of 'Transcultural Architecture' and defines Critical Regionalism as a subgroup of the latter. One of the benefits that this change of perspective brings about is that a large part of the political agenda of Critical Regionalism, which consists of resisting attitudes forged by typically Western experiences, is 'softened' and negotiated according to premises provided by local circumstances. At the book’s centre is an analysis of Reima and Raili (...) Pietilä’s Sief Palace Area project in Kuwait. Further cases of modern architecture in China, Korea, and Saudi Arabia show that the critique, which holds that Critical Regionalism is a typical 'western' exercise, is not sound in all circumstances. Furthermore, the book proposes that a certain 'architectural rationality' can be contained in architecture itself - not imposed by outside parameters like aesthetics, comfort or even tradition. (shrink)

In this article I examine the architecture and architectural thinking of Finnish Academician Reima Pietilä in relation to his design methodology. Pietilä was an architect with an original, creative, artistic personality, who set out early in his career to develop the form language, and theory of modern architecture, moving it towards an organic expressionism. Finnish nature mysticism was a source of inspiration for him, and ‘nature architecture’ one of his key concepts.