There has been much written of late on the topic of panentheism. Dissatisfied with many contemporary descriptions of “panentheism” and the related “pantheism,” which we feel arise out of theistic presuppositions, we produce our own definition of sorts, rooted in and paying respect to the term’s etymology and the concept’s roots in Indian religion and western philosophy. Furthermore, we consider and comment on the arguments and comments concerning panentheism’s definition and plausibility put forth by Göcke, Mullins, and Nickel.

In his recent article in Sophia, Benedikt Paul Göcke concluded that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ : 75). As the article progresses, Göcke clarifies his view of what panentheism is, essentially identical to Göcke’s view of classical theism in every way, except in the world’s modal relation to God. This concept is vastly different to many of the panentheistic notions that (...) are more commonly held. While it is not initially made transparent—especially with the label Göcke chooses to use—it becomes increasingly clear that Göcke critiques a God concept of his own making. More common variations of panentheism are contrasted with Göcke’s version, in order to provide a broader and more accurate view of the ancient concept, and to demonstrate that Göcke’s view of panentheism is idiosyncratic. It is finally explained that even if Göcke’s view of panentheism were definitive, he has not successfully argued for the relative unattractiveness of the concept, relative to his view of classical theism. (shrink)

This monograph offers a critique of arguments for the existence of a specifically Christian God advanced by prominent scholar William Lane Craig. The discussion incorporates philosophical, mathematical, scientific, historical, and sociological approaches. The author does not seek to criticize religion in general, or Christianity specifically. Rather, he examines the modern and relatively sophisticated evidential case for Christian theism. Scholars have been arguing for theism or naturalism for centuries, and there seems little to add to the discussion, especially from the theistic (...) side. However, to assume that either theism or naturalism obtains is a false dichotomy. There are alternatives to both that merit consideration. Employing a probabilistic approach, the author advances this discussion. His work uniquely utilizes not only naturalistic hypotheses to argue against theism. It also presents supernaturalistic hypotheses. This leaves no question that theism is almost certainly false, even if some form of divine reality exists. This project seeks not to argue that Christianity or any other faith or religion is undesirable, but only to critically examine evidentialist claims posited by Christianity’s learned apologists. In fact, a major secondary aim is to consider alternative god-conceptions, such as polytheism and pantheism. This work aims to highlight that Christian theism is often granted special privileges by theistic philosophers of religion, which seems doubly inappropriate when certain alternative god-conceptions may even prove to be more plausible. (shrink)

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism. We develop an argument from infinitely many alternatives, which decisively demonstrates that if a monotheistic or polytheistic god-model obtains, it will almost certainly be polytheistic. Probabilistic calculations are performed in order to illustrate the difficulties faced by the monotheistic proponent. After considering possible objections, such as whether there should be limits placed on how many possible god-models could obtain, we (...) conclude that our argument from infinitely many alternatives is sound, and highly unlikely to be overcome. (shrink)

Theologian Benedikt Paul Göcke claimed that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ :75). As much of my research considers the alternatives to classical theism, I published a damning reply essay : 389–395). I comprehensively noted the many problems with his notion of ‘panentheism’, finding that it differed greatly from mainstream and earlier Eastern and Western interpretations, had little to do with the (...) etymology of the term and differed only from his concept of theism in that the world is necessary instead of contingent. It is the latter point that led to Göcke’s ‘unattractive’ conclusion, though he had not demonstrated whether the world is contingent or necessary. Göcke responded to my essay : 397–400), and this is my further response, which explains that—and why—my criticisms still stand. (shrink)

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms. [1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence – especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world – many (...) of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the – arguably infinite – number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists. [1] I take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence. (shrink)

With the assistance of historian Richard Carrier, I have just published Jesus Did Not Exist: A Debate Among Atheists, as a spiritual sequel to my earlier There Was No Jesus, There Is No God. Unsurprisingly, I argue that it is very reasonable to doubt Jesus' historical existence. The basic premise of the book is to examine the arguments of four scholars who have recently published significant works about this controversial issue. What follows is a brief summary of these analyses.

Having spent many years researching the best apologetics Christian philosophers could offer, I recently started examining Muslim apologetics. Focussing on the arguments for the Islamic God’s existence by popular Muslim apologist Hamza Andreas Tzortzis, I conclude that they are terrible, and are not of the same quality as the best arguments for the truth of Christianity. Furthermore, I converted one of these into a powerful argument against mainstream Islamic/quranic theism, which can be utilised by atheists and Christians alike; and just (...) about anybody else. (shrink)

William Lane Craig is a prolific Christian apologist who has written many articles and popular books on the mainly philosophical arguments for God's existence, and is famed for his debating, and his engaging with the public. His work with philosophical arguments is significant, as there is no confirmed empirical evidence for the existence of God, nor can there be any good historical evidence; sound historical methodology necessarily being dismissive of supernatural claims. Craig has formulated a number of arguments that he (...) presents in a clear and accessible cumulative case. (shrink)

Few critical scholars have responded to my recent work on the controversial topic of Jesus’ probable ahistoricity. Disregarding my advice that this should be a debate among atheists, Brenda Watson has become the first to respond in an academic journal. Stephen Law also received some criticism for his own article on scepticism about Jesus. I respond to them all here.Export citation.

Having spent many years engaging with Christian claims about miracles, especially the purported resurrection of Jesus, I now shift attention to Islamic miracle claims, the most striking of which seems to me to be Muhammad’s alleged splitting of the moon. I explain, in a Bayesian fashion, why this almost certainly did not happen.

Yujin Nagasawa has recently, in a sense, demonstrated that God, the central subject of his perfect being theism (PBT), exists, via his maximal God approach. In this article, I shall explain that Nagasawa’s journey towards this conclusion is fraught and that the conclusion, while plausibly correct, is of limited significance given that Nagasawa’s perfect being theism is not a single hypothesis but a very broad catch-all hypothesis that includes concepts of God that most would deny are worthy of the term.

Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne. Edited by Bergmann Michael and Brower Jeffrey E.

In the analytic Philosophy of Religion, much ink has been spilt on the existence of some sort of supernatural reality. Such work is usually done by theists; those that find classical theism to be probably true. It is my contention that theism is unjustly privileged by many in the field, even when supernaturalism has been – competently or incompetently – argued for. As such, I present a series of challenges for the theist, finding them to be insuperable at present. The (...) first such challenge concerns the challenge of polytheism. Polytheism is often very casually overlooked on the basis that monotheism is ‘simpler’. Recognising that such simplicity is not necessarily truth-conducive, I argue that polytheism, as a catch-all hypothesis, ought to be preferred. The second challenge proceeds from an assumption not only of supernaturalism, but also of monotheism. There are infinitely many monotheistic alternatives to theism, which can be conceived by simply tweaking the typical attributes of God. Again, simplicity is typically appealed to, and again found to be unhelpful. Furthermore, there are the deistic alternatives to consider also, many of which are seemingly more probable than theism. Finally, I consider the pantheistic god models, deciding that pantheisms are generally more robust and make fewer ad hoc assumptions about the world. As an aside, I concisely discuss the difficulties in moving from theism to Christian theism, which includes an argument against miracles, and a brief explanation of the increasing trend of questioning Jesus’ historical existence. (shrink)

In the analytic Philosophy of Religion, much ink has been spilt on the existence of some sort of supernatural reality. Such work is usually done by theists; those that find classical theism to be probably true. It is my contention that theism is unjustly privileged by many in the field, even when supernaturalism has been – competently or incompetently – argued for. As such, I present a series of challenges for the theist, finding them to be insuperable at present. The (...) first such challenge concerns the challenge of polytheism. Polytheism is often very casually overlooked on the basis that monotheism is ‘simpler’. Recognising that such simplicity is not necessarily truth-conducive, I argue that polytheism, as a catch-all hypothesis, ought to be preferred. The second challenge proceeds from an assumption not only of supernaturalism, but also of monotheism. There are infinitely many monotheistic alternatives to theism, which can be conceived by simply tweaking the typical attributes of God. Again, simplicity is typically appealed to, and again found to be unhelpful. Furthermore, there are the deistic alternatives to consider also, many of which are seemingly more probable than theism. Finally, I consider the pantheistic god models, deciding that pantheisms are generally more robust and make fewer ad hoc assumptions about the world. As an aside, I concisely discuss the difficulties in moving from theism to Christian theism, which includes an argument against miracles, and a brief explanation of the increasing trend of questioning Jesus’ historical existence. (shrink)

Since publishing my argument for polytheisms over monotheism with Herman Philipse, I have encountered many monotheists who were perturbed, but who had not formulated a proper rebuttal. It is also hard not to notice that there is generally a dearth of publications arguing for monotheism's being more probable than polytheism, perhaps because it is generally taken for granted. As such, I am delighted that Mark Saward has taken up the challenge to address at least some of the original article's claims. (...) Unfortunately, his critique fails to establish why polytheism is improbable, and why monotheism is to be privileged by philosophers of religion. I further reiterate that the threat of extreme agnosticism is a bizarre approach for the monotheistic evidentialist, posing no problems whatsoever for agnostic atheists, such as myself In fact, I assert that extreme agnosticism still allows discussants, even further encourages them, to declare monotheism (and also classical theism) to be epistemically improbable. (shrink)

Scott Aikin offers a much-needed comprehensive treatment of the Clifford-James debate on the ethics of belief. He aims to present the core arguments of William Clifford’s The Ethics of Belief and William James’ The Will to Believe and to provide commentary . Aikin begins by discussing Clifford’s ship owner case . Knowing that his ship is old, poorly built, and often needs repairs, the ship owner chooses to ignore the evidence and instead focuses on the character of the ship-builders and (...) his feeling that providence will protect the passengers. As a consequence, the ship owner believes that all will be well. All is not well, and many innocents lose their lives. By overlooking the evidence and believing that less relevant factors rendered the decision to set sail a sound one, the ship owner has committed a crime. Had the ship safely completed its journey, the ship owner is still guilty, as lives were still endangered and only luck prevented a disaster. Commenting on anoth .. (shrink)