We advance the thesis that the method of experimental economics can make significant contributions to normative, as opposed to descriptive, business ethics. We contend that there are two basic ways in which experimental economics may make this contribution, and we exemplify these ways by pointing to experimental support of social contract theory as rational foundation for business ethics. These two ways are: (1) adding psychological realism; and (2) testing some quasi-empirical assumptions present in normative theory. In order to make good (...) our methodological claim, we first describe the methodological rules of experimental economics, distinguishing this method from other behavioral business ethics approaches. We also contemplate the possible objection that empirical methods cannot bear on normative ethics because there is no way of bridging the gap between descriptive theory (how people behave) and normative theory (how people ought to behave). (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 32, Issue S2, Page 65-67, September 2023.

The appearance of the following pages might suggest an "intellectual biography". My purpose is not, though, to offer such a simple thing . Indeed, I would like to follow the evolution of Gauthier's thought not only to show how a thinker evolved from a particular view about a particular problem toward a quite original and suggestive formulation, but also to deepen our comprehension of moral contractarianism and its implications, by means of its contextualization. For this reason, I will focus not (...) on Gauthier's philosophical production as a whole , but on the papers and works that mark the line toward moral contractarianism as it is found in Morals by Agreement . The trajectory we are about to go over is not, therefore, only a personal adventure , but the adventure of ideas. This will not be an easy journey. Our focus on the historical development of concepts will prevent us from giving a fully systematic account of every one of them. The unfamiliar reader may be disappointed as we use somewhat strange terms without completely explaining their meaning. We beg acquiescence with our method, hoping that, on the whole, the essential ideas will be understandable without a detailed discussion. (shrink)

Lorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, (...) and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually-as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue- and collectively-as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules. (shrink)

Lorenzo Sacconi’s recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders’ conformist preferences – their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...) We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction. (shrink)

Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...) We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy , and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction. (shrink)

The article “Diálogos de paz en Colombia: una Mirada desde la justicia del resarcimiento”[1] holds that the end-of-conflict agreement signed by the Colombian government and the FARC does not bring any general utility; specially because of the absolute impunity that Transitional Justice implies. The deal is dubbed “utilitarian”, meaning that the agreement was made in the personal interests of those who intervened in it -Government and guerrilla-. In contrast, this article will defend the general utility of the agreement and show (...) that, although there are social costs, these were necessary to end the conflict. And they are more than offset in terms of general well-being by the outcome itself.------------------------[1] Article written by Ángel Emilio Muñoz Cardona and published by this journal in the vol. XXI/2 2017. (shrink)