Clark and Chalmer’s conception of spatially extended memory is underpinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach to memory, criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach, perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition, might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C’s characterization of the notebook but (...) also in the notion that Inga’s memory is notebook-like. Insofar as Inga’s practices, or conceptions, of remembering might be notebook-like this should not be taken as evidence of the existence of an internal store, but could instead be the result of prior interaction with notebook-like artifacts. (shrink)

Although Kirsh and Maglio's work on ?epistemic? and ?pragmatic? action provides us with some valuable insights, the degree of overlap, or interpenetration, between these two terms suggests that there is something problematic in the distinction. On one analysis, it might be suggested that epistemic and pragmatic actions are not both ?types of action? in the same sense and, perhaps, that there may not be a strong sense in which ?pragmatic actions? are a type of action at all. Things are further (...) complicated by definitional issues. In the case of ?epistemic action?, if the conception of what counts as such is too wide-ranging the term ceases to be useful. (shrink)