This paper offers a defence of sense-datum statements from A.J. Ayer’s perspective that represents a response to Quine’s naturalistic ontology. Starting with Quine’s “On What There Is” (1948), and the following “Symposium” of 1951, I argue that Ayer’s proposed method of establishing sense-datum statements in his “Symposium” piece, which challenges Quine’s ontology of physical objects, is not a viable alternative to Quine’s scientific naturalism. I argue that by taking a broadly intensional approach, Ayer can offer a response to Quine’s position. (...) More specifically, I contend that it is possible to form a distinctly non-scientific, epistemological account of sense-data by employing primitive “sensory predicates” within basic propositions. In terms of ontology, a technical ruling for “existence”, working alongside appropriate “meaning-rules”, legislates for basic sense-datum statements, thus distancing them from the regimented, extensionalised, stimulus meaning strategy indicative of Quine’s naturalistic ontology. (shrink)

The first genuine and comprehensive English-language handbook to the study of Kant's philosophy, containing sections on Kant's key works, the philosophical and historical contexts of his philosophy, essays on the reception and influence of the Kantian philosophy, a lexical A-Z list of lemmata addressing central themes and concepts of Kant's thought and an extensive English-language bibliography of secondary literature.

A comprehensive and practical study tool, introducing Kant's thought and key works and exploring his continuing influence.