In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can Creatures Cause Forms?Aquinas on Cosmology and EvolutionLucas PrietoThus formulated, the question may seem odd. It is enough to look at nature to see that many of the relations that are established between substances are causal relations that results in the production of a form. So, for example, the fire from a match in contact with a piece of paper produces fire, in such a way that the agent (...) causes a new form because it communicates its own actuality. In this sense, at the natural level, we can even say that all production involves the causation of a form. The question becomes meaningful, however, when we distinguish between being the cause of this form inasmuch as it actualizes a matter and being the cause of the form as such—that is, between causing a particular order in a matter and being the cause of the reason for this order.1 Continuing with the example: the fire of the match is specifically the same as the fire found in the paper, so that the former cannot be the cause per se of the fire of the latter—that is, the fire of the match is not that which gives reason for the formality of the fire—because in that case it would be the cause of its own formality. The argument leads us to postulate another agent that is the cause of fire as such.So, we can now ask: can creatures be ultimately responsible (at the created level) for this particular ontological configuration? That is, can creatures cause a natural form as such? Aquinas answers yes, and his answer is of particular importance in explaining the causal order among creatures [End Page 441] and the possibility of true specific novelty in the universe. In this article I will advance how Aquinas justifies ontological novelty by resorting to intra-mundane causes and then show how this causal model allows us to understand the transformism of species (evolution) in a Thomistic framework. To do so, we will formulate our argument in three steps: (1) first we will analyze the notion of form that Aquinas handles in order to understand also how it can be caused in an individual, (2) then we will study the various ways in which the causation of a form can occur, and (3) finally, we will apply these conclusions to the problem of evolution.Form and IndividualFor Aquinas, form is a fundamental ontological principle of the corporeal entity because it structures matter according to a determined order of perfection. By the form we can distinguish between different entities because a formal perfection supposes a certain term or limit of the act that implies the deprivation of the perfection of another form. A dog indicates a certain degree of perfection, but by the fact of being a dog it lacks the perfection of being a cat. Now, in the physical world, we find an innumerable diversity of entities that differ from each other not only in their form or essence, but also as individuals, which shows that, ultimately, the fundamental distinction is not between being a cat and being a dog, but between being this cat and being this dog, or more clearly, between this dog and that dog. Aquinas holds that this diversity and inequality, both specific and numerical, is something positively willed and caused by God as first agent.2 But does this mean that the diverse structuring of matter is produced by a special divine action? That is, is the formal difference the effect of a creative act of God?In the Summa theologiae, Thomas directly addresses this problem by asking whether creation is mixed in the works of nature and of the arts, which is equivalent, in the last analysis, to the question of the origin of novelty in the physical world.3 Indeed, when an entity is generated, a substance appears that is not absolutely contained in the preceding causes. The agent certainly communicates his actuality by resembling the effect to himself, but in the effect, there is always something else that escapes the essential principles. Therefore, how can this novelty of the effect be founded? Before answering this question... (shrink)

Gradually, the multiverse hypothesis has been gaining popularity, not only in the scientific and academic sphere, but also in popular culture. This hypothesis, however, is not recent; Thomas Aquinas himself had to respond to a version of it. Although the problem is broad and must be approached in an interdisciplinary dialogue, the Thomistic approach is very interesting, since he accepts the plurality of worlds as something possible but denies that it is a possibility made real. His answer, which is the (...) subject of this article, is an opportunity to think about our representation of God and his causal activity. (shrink)

Aunque irreductibles entre sí, los actos del entendimiento y de la voluntad constituyen el dinamismo operativo propio del viviente racional. Ahora bien, al estudiar la relación o interacción entre ambas potencias, se suele decir que el entendimiento tiene prioridad en cuanto a la especificación de la voluntad, mientras que la voluntad lo tiene con respecto al ejercicio. En este artículo, sin embargo, quisiéramos invertir el problema y analizar, desde principios tomasianos, en qué sentido se podría decir que el ejercicio de (...) la voluntad depende del entendimiento, por una parte, y cómo puede la inclinación afectar el conocimiento de un objeto. (shrink)

La dependencia necesaria de la criatura respecto de Dios ha sido una posición común dentro del teísmo clásico. En los últimos años, sin embargo, se ha contestado dicha posición desde la hipótesis de la inercia existencial. Según esta última teoría, no haría falta recurrir a una causa trascendente para explicar la permanencia en el ser de las cosas. Tomás de Aquino, por el contrario, desde la constatación de una composición en todo ente finito, postula el recurso necesario a algo simple (...) que dé razón de ella. (shrink)

Agustín Echavarría y Rubén Pereda (Eds.). Providencia, libertad y mal. Estudios en Teología filosófica analítica. Granada, Comares, 2021, 169 pp. ISBN 978-84-1369-2098.