This paper develops an analysis of the relationship between politics and suffering in the writings of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Both thinkers uphold the tragic idea of suffering as a crucible in which the uniquely human powers of self-creation - having reached, apparently, their lowest point - are revealed in all of their grand majesty. Yet they diverge dramatically when it comes to working out the political implications of this idea. Whereas Hölderlin deploys the tragic revaluation of (...) suffering on behalf of democracy, Nietzsche deploys this same revaluation against democracy. My argument suggests that the differences between Hölderlin and Nietzsche refer more to their different points in the development of the modern age than to any substantive difference in the structure of their thinking, and that unearthing Nietzsche's origins in Hölderlin enables us to retrieve the wider compass of the idea of suffering on which Nietzsche relies in developing his critique of modern democratic politics, and so also a wider compass for settling some of the debates that have arisen around his political thought. Key Words: democracy • Hölderlin • Nietzsche • suffering • tragedy. (shrink)

This article explores the conceptual commitments underlying Luxemburg’s repudiation of the discourse of disappointment which had overtaken the European socialist movement during the First World War. My analysis brushes against the grain of the traditional interpretation of Luxemburg’s admonitions ‘to be cheerful despite everything and anything’ as arising from her allegiance to a Marxist philosophy of history which decrees that socialism must inevitably prevail and so refuses to give way to disappointment or despair. The philosophy of history which Luxemburg absorbed (...) from Marx, notably through the Eighteenth Brumaire, prophesies the ultimate victory of socialism but ordains that the actual events and experiences through which this victory is prepared will consist in catastrophes rather than conquests. In Luxemburg, I suggest, we can see more clearly how the experience of failure could make the realization of socialism more rather than less certain, and in terms that refer more directly to the inner situation of the socialist activist than the abstract assurances on which Marx relied: failure occasions the opportunity for deeper learning but, more importantly, it is in the experience of failure that the commitment on which the realization of socialism depends is tested and, in Luxemburg’s hands at least, forged. (shrink)