1.  98
    Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.
    Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than evaluating, behavior. In (...)
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  2.  75
    Exploring Metaethical Commitments: Moral Objectivity and Moral Progress.Kevin Uttich, George Tsai & Tania Lombrozo - 2014 - In Hagop Sarkissian Jennifer Cole Wright (ed.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 188-208.
    Presents the results of our study comparing two different approaches (those of Goodwin and Darley 2008, and Sarkissian et al. 2011) to empirically measuring people's belief in moral objectivity. Examines the relationship between belief in moral objectivity and two other metaethical attitudes: belief in moral progress and belief in a just world.
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  3.  19
    Putting normativity in its proper place.Tania Lombrozo & Kevin Uttich - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):344 - 345.
    Knobe considers two explanations for the influence of moral considerations on cognitive systems: the position, and the position. We suggest that this dichotomy conflates questions at computational and algorithmic levels, and suggest that distinguishing the issues at these levels reveals a third, viable option, which we call the position.
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