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  1.  73
    Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe.Kerah Gordon-Solmon & Theron Pummer - forthcoming - Law and Philosophy.
    Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act on their lesser-evil justifications. Our primary task is to refute Frowe’s flagship argument. (...)
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  2.  32
    Should Contractualists Decompose?Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):259-287.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 3, Page 259-287, Summer 2019.
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  3.  25
    Comparative Desert Vs. Fairness.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):367-387.
    In the recent book The Geometry of Desert, Shelly Kagan explores, with a rare degree of precision, how best to cash out two fundamental and widely shared intuitions. The first intuition says that virtuous people deserve to be doing well, and that less virtuous people deserve to be doing less well – and thus, that it’s good if virtuous people are doing well and if less virtuous people are doing less well. The second intuition says that the distribution of the (...)
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  4.  19
    Not as a Means: Killing as a Side Effect in Self‐Defense.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1074-1090.
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  5.  15
    Luck, Love, and Extreme Skiing: Distributive Injustice Without Unfairness.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2016 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 3 (1).
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  6.  25
    Self-Defence Against Multiple Threats.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2015 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 9 If a threat is liable to be defensively killed, there is a defeasible justification for killing her. On certain prevailing assumptions about liability, which I accept, there are liability justifications for killing _any number_ of minimally responsible threats, each of whom would otherwise kill a single non-responsible victim. Absent harms to third parties, these justifications appear, counter-intuitively, to be undefeated. I argue that this counter-intuitive appearance is deceptive.
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  7.  57
    Self-Defence Against Multiple Threats.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2):125-133.
    _ Source: _Page Count 9 If a threat is liable to be defensively killed, there is a defeasible justification for killing her. On certain prevailing assumptions about liability, which I accept, there are liability justifications for killing _any number_ of minimally responsible threats, each of whom would otherwise kill a single non-responsible victim. Absent harms to third parties, these justifications appear, counter-intuitively, to be undefeated. I argue that this counter-intuitive appearance is deceptive.
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  8.  30
    Ethics Without Intention, by Di Nucci, Ezio: London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014, Pp. V + 264, £18.99.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-837.
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  9.  30
    Can Comparative Desert Do Without Equality?Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):189-205.
    In the article ‘Equality and Desert,’ Shelly Kagan rejects the principle of equality as an arbiter of distributive justice. He claims instead that all of our intuitions about distributive justice that are thought to support some principle of equality can be captured under the principle of desert. I argue that Kagan's claim fails because, in cashing out his notion of desert, Kagan makes tacit appeal to the principle of equality.
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  10.  34
    Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):731-753.
    Suppose a woman can carry to term only one of two viable embryos. One has the genetic potential to become a normal child. The other has a gene that gives it the potential for both the artistic genius and the severe manic-depression of the painter Vincent Van Gogh. I think it would be permissible to select either embryo. But I also believe that it would be impermissible to intervene to turn an embryo that has the potential to be normal into (...)
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  11.  27
    Why More Choice is Sometimes Worse Than Less.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):25-44.
    In this paper, I shall argue that personal autonomy requires the availability of an adequate range of valuable options from which to choose, but that the availability of a larger rather than a smaller set of valuable options can be inimical to, rather than supportive, of autonomy.
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  12.  9
    Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):731-753.
    Suppose a woman can carry to term only one of two viable embryos. One has the genetic potential to become a normal child. The other has a gene that gives it the potential for both the artistic genius and the severe manic-depression of the painter Vincent Van Gogh. I think it would be permissible to select either embryo. But I also believe that it would be impermissible to intervene to turn an embryo that has the potential to be normal into (...)
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