The broad aim of this introduction to a Special Issue on “Susceptibilities: Toward a Cultural Politics of Consent under Erasure” is to broach key questions and research directions that illuminate contemporary public debates about the conditions and limits of conscious intention (and consent as a byproduct thereof), which is typically treated as a “property” that can be “underdeveloped”, “given”, or “taken away”. In keeping with Jacques Derrida’s repudiation of the metaphysics of presence, the perspective animating this essay is that the (...) psychoanalytic standpoint of the unconscious deconstructs the epistemological privilege of determinacy, consistency, and wholeness in treatments of intentional consciousness. Given Jean Laplanche’s attention to the residues of coherent ego fetishism in Sigmund Freud’s oeuvre, the former’s critique of self-sovereignty as evinced in his theorization of the “enigmatic signifier”, “primal repression”, and “afterwardsness” assumes a pivotal role in the analysis of how writers as represented here by Sarah Polley in Run Towards the Danger narrate the vicissitudes of their traumatic memories of sexual assault. Ultimately, then, the implications of this analysis will carry over to brief discussions of this Special Issue’s seven contributions by Melissa Wright, Karen McFadyen, J. Asher Godley, Madeleine Reddon, Gautam Basu Thakur, Robert Hughes, and Rebecca Saunders. (shrink)

This essay undertakes a critique of recent trends in affect theory from the standpoint of the “human motor”: a trope that presupposes a thermodynamic psychophysiology distended between energy conservation and entropy. In the course of reanimating thermodynamic motifs in Marx's labor power metabolics and Freud's trauma energetics, the essay broaches entropics as a poetics of depletion that offsets affect theories promoting open-system metaphors. Open-system affect theory sometimes amalgamates emancipatory post-humanist gestures inherited from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari with neuroscientific terms. (...) In the course of “liberating” affect from subject-oriented topoi, this “liberation-scientistic” admixture expropriates organic matter's degeneration over time. An “entropical” perspective also challenges Antonio Negri's Spinozaist affect conceived as a capacitating power that encounters obstacles but never limits. Both “liberation scientism” and “capacitation rhetoric” mimic capital's abstraction in infinitely expanding its potential to extract surplus value from finitely embodied labor. With enervation and deterioration at its crux, entropics illuminates how people might feel individuated by their respective struggles to safeguard scarce energy and forestall “heat death” while navigating simultaneous demands. The question is whether or not open-system motifs in affect theory can effectively register the political force of this struggle with depletion and present or imminent debilitation as its common ground. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Judith Butler’s configuration in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism of sacred life from the mystical motifs that traverse Walter Benjamin’s writings as the pivot of an anti-identitarian ethics committed to non-violent resistance. To gain critical leverage on Butler’s post-secular stance, my analysis turns to Talal Asad’s ‘Redeeming the “Human” Through Human Rights’ chapter from Formations of the Secular, where he enunciates a disparity between a ‘pre-civil state of nature’ and the notion of ‘inalienable (...) rights’ that informs the subject’s rights under secular law. In underscoring the secular state’s inability or refusal to ascribe sacredness to ‘real living persons’ over and against ‘“the human” conceptualized abstractly, or imagined in a state of nature’ as presumed by natural law, Asad indirectly articulates what is at stake in Butler’s explication in Parting Ways of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’. In this context, Butler unpacks Benjamin’s remarks about the sixth commandment’s non-coercive disposition and the inner struggle its provisional applicability prompts. A conception of ‘sacred life’ crystallizes through Butler’s emphasis on the open-endedness of this struggle, which encourages us to abandon a solipsistic investment in our own suffering in the process of acknowledging its eternally transient rhythm. I argue that Butler supplements this motif by drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s grounding of the political in cohabitation. My contention is that while ‘sacred life’ forms the backbone of Butler’s affirmation of civil disobedience, Arendt empowers Butler’s ethics to transcend Benjamin’s Jewish-messianic melancholy by radicalizing the passivity that refracts it. (shrink)