Geometry is an a priori science. However, its apriority is saddled with problems. The aim of this paper will be to show 1) how Kant understands that the contents of geometry are synthetic a priori judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason, and 2) if it’s still relevant to study Kant’s theory of geometry after the challenges posed by non-Euclidian theories of space. With respect to point 1: Kant understands geometry as the discipline that objectifies the pure intuition of space. (...) Every geometric concept is built upon the pure intuition of space through a synthetic ostensive process. Furthermore, the pure intuition of space is the form of external experiences. Thus, geometry and external phenomena share a common ground – pure space. This common ground is what provides an answer to the question of the possibility of mathematics as a universal and a priori science. With respect to point 2: the relevance of studying Kant’s theory of geometry lies not only in the fact that geometry can serve as an example to philosophy based on the fact that it establishes its propositions a priori, but also because the object-study of geometry – the pure intuition of space– forces the reader to review Kant’s thoughts about sensibility and its relation to space. The analysis of Kant’s theory of geometry then amounts to studying Kant’s theory of sensibility. (shrink)

The article investigates the reception of Pseudo-Dionysius’s negative theology in Alan of Lille’s philosophical and speculative theological works. In the first part, the paper discusses how Alan applied Pseudo-Dionysius’s negative theology to the problem of translatio and the limits of theological language. In the second part, the article sheds light on the problematic textual references and allusions in Alan’s appropriation and remarks about Pseudo-Dionysius. In the final section, the paper argues that despite Alan’s lack of access to the complete Corpus (...) Aeropagiticum, his interpretation and adoption of negative theology is philosophically compelling. (shrink)