The principle argument of the book is that, given the background of philosophy of mind, it is possible to identify a notion of human agency which goes beyond the limitations which Hume seems to have imposed upon empiricism and which takes advantage of a version of Aristotle's notion of 'soul.' Action, as it has been developed recently, particularly by those of an utilitarian inclination, has been subject to two criticisms: it makes responsibility a rather cheap and ordinary commodity, it makes (...) human agency simple and identifiable. The author accepts this first criticism, but spends most of his effort arguing against the second; he does not contend that action is always simple, but he does argue that the human agent can be identified with precision and that effects can be attributed to him in his role as someone who considered his act and decided to bring about the observed effect. The starting point is a consideration of embodiment, the situation in which considered effects are seen to be situated in the same realm as simple inanimate interactions; any version of human action will have to first of all differentiate itself from inanimate action; the fact that a man is involved in an event is no guarantee that the effect is the result of genuine action. Having done justice to what might be termed the empirical nature of the human condition, the author follows out his announced program: he argues that Hume's empiricism restricts and reduces the human agent and that if we mean by soul nothing much more than what Anscombe means when she typifies the agent as one for whom the question of his own activity arises, then the human agent may be said to have his own unique point of view in virtue of his soul. Whether agent or spectator, there is something uniquely purposeful about the being in the empirical order who manifests this view; it is this view which classical empiricism does not appreciate, and which enables the author to review a set of examples in order to determine what kind of conditions must be satisfied in order to be able to meaningfully attribute an effect to an agent. The examples are intentionally very simple, but the thesis of the argument is not.--J. J. E. (shrink)

The author reviews the various Anglo-American philosophies which align themselves directly in one way or another with mathematics, physics, and logic; this has been done in many ways, but this book does it in such a way that it seems to give more a feel for what is going on in a rather complicated corner of the world than the various histories and anthologies. Radnitzky is engaged in an ambitious critical project, which, put quite simply, says that English-speaking philosophies of (...) science are exercises in irrelevance. His point of view is the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition, and continental philosophy of science; moreover his point of view is that he has a point of view, and he insists that the Anglo-Americans do not; to be ignorant and uncritical insofar as one's own assumptions are concerned is to be open to many serious mistakes, many of which have been made by Americans: they have shifted their attention to less rewarding areas of interest, they have accepted models which are not fruitful, they have not been able to relate to actual scientific activity or methodology, etc. This sweeping criticism is of little value; it is partisan in precisely the manner that English speaking "program" philosophy strenuously attempts to avoid; it suggests that its own philosophy corrects major systematic mistakes in the areas surveyed. But in spite of what might be viewed as divisive and arrogant interference, this book could be of value to two groups of readers: those who are simply interested in what goes on in metascience; those who have some dissatisfaction with the self-knowledge that is displayed in these areas. A fair criticism of the book would be to say that the author exaggerates the lack of self-knowledge, and tends to devaluate the efforts of people like Quine and Goodman to bring logical empiricism to a less strictly positivistic position.--J. J. E. (shrink)

The author explores the relationships among science, theology, and philosophy, and the way in which each relates to mythical language or statement. The starting point is the scientific nature of our culture and certain of its features which are untenable; the assumption is that a mythical, eternistic [[sic]] point of view of the traditional religious type constitutes the only alternative to that which takes as its model the experimental sciences. There is a review of the familiar incursions which science has (...) made into the theological domain, to the point where the latter has doubted its own legitimacy. The effort on behalf of religion begins by an evaluation of science: it is seen to be less exact, less rigorous, and more dramatic, more human than it often is thought to be. In effect, science does not know itself, and can hardly dictate the limits of religion on the basis of ideals which are illusory. In fact, science has a need for mythical presentation of its own interests and activities; it has its own myths, and some are at odds with others. For example, the notion of objective man is not wholly compatible with the notion of man as object. The way has been cleared to claim that mythical language is legitimate, that it is central to the religious enterprise, and that religious myth may even serve science in the very way that science and the methodology of science have often sought to serve religious discourse--as a therapeutic device. This depends on an historical perspective: given the role that myth has played in religion and the role that it now plays in science, a more felicitous situation would be achieved if some of our convictions about myth were radically revised. The role of the philosopher in this projected task is analyzed and described as central. The conclusion is that science, far from being the force that eliminates religious language, shows, in its own activity, the urgent need for religious language.--J. J. E. (shrink)

The author claims to give a systematic, coherent, and thorough description of perception, of which he distinguishes two kinds: epistemic and non-epistemic. Non-epistemic seeing is characterized by lack of positive belief content. This point relies on G. Warnock's argument distinguishing a mode of perception from all accompanying kinds of mental activity. In non-epistemic seeing there is a primitive visual achievement by which actually existing objects or events are brought into unmediated relationships with a percipient being. It is only in epistemic (...) seeing that we are provided with information about that which is seen; and this acquisition of knowledge, which includes a great range of noetic activities, is still essentially visual in nature. The grounds for primary epistemic seeing are described in terms of background and proto-knowledge which has to do with the limits of a particular person's experience. Primary epistemic seeing is related to more complex kinds of seeing. The author seems particularly interested in establishing that mistakes and misjudgments are complicated phenomena, and that they testify to our perceptual and conceptual powers. The author is interested in applying his view of seeing to physical science, and suggests, in an interesting final chapter, that the philosophy of science should confront the crucial issues of epistemology.--J. J. E. (shrink)

This book evaluates Moore's contribution to the discussion of a number of epistemological problems, and arrives at the conclusion that Moore's contribution is not considerable. The author maintains that Moore was able to succeed philosophically in the refutation of Idealism, in the establishment of analytical techniques, and in his recognition of the role of common sense; but in those technical areas which were most interesting to Moore, the author finds little accomplishment, and even some confusion. For example, in considering the (...) problem of the relation between perception and an external world, Moore defends the common sense notions, but only on common sense grounds. The external world, which we know to exist with a high degree of certainty according to our common sense, we do not know to exist with any certainty at all when we approach the problem through an analysis of sense perception; and Moore will only say that we do not know that we do not know that external objects exist. Concerning the problem of truth and falsity the author finds Moore constructive but in need of revision and reconstruction, which the author obligingly attempts where necessary. Moore's position with respect to meaning and analysis is also evaluated with the same critical eye. Finally, the author shows the relative positions of common sense and ordinary language in Moore's thought.--J. J. E. (shrink)