G. E. MOORE'S PROOF THAT 'GOOD' CANNOT BE DEFINED IS THE\nANALOGUE OF HUME'S PROOF THAT THE IDEA OF CAUSE HAS NO\nEMPIRICAL CORRELATE. AS A PROOF, IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ETHICAL\nINTUITIONISM, EMOTIVISM, OR THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF\nETHICAL NATURALISM WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO REST UPON IT.\nHOWEVER, IT DOES SUSTAIN THE THEORY THAT VALUES ARE CAUSES\nOF HUMAN RESPONSES, AND THAT, UNDER A METHODOLOGICAL\nINTERPRETATION OF OBJECTIVITY, VALUES HAVE OBJECTIVE\nCOGNITIVE STATUS AS CAUSES OF RESPONSES IN THE\nCONSCIOUSNESS OF A HYPOTHETICAL BEING, AN IDEAL OBSERVER.