In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"A Mark ofthe Growing Mind is Veneration of Objects" (Ludwig Wittgenstein) Fay Horton Sawyier Introduction In book 1 of the Treatise,1 Hume directs his attention to two sets of concepts; one of these sets is what I think of as the "basic epistemological set" and the other as the "basic metaphysical or ontological set." Except for the idea of personal identity, the First Inquiry2 addresses the same arrays of (...) concerns. Within the "epistemological set" we find discussions ofknowledge, belief, origin of ideas, etc.; within the "metaphysical set"are seen space, time, identity, cause and effect, uniformity ofnature, external objects and so on.3 For the first (epistemological) set, Hume constructs a mode of analysis which depends crucially on the provenance of an idea or concept. Thatis, asit does forarthistorians today, authenticityortruth depends on how the thingin question came intoyour possession. Hume announces not only that every simple idea depends on and comes from its simple impression, but that the full understandingofa complexidea requires first factoring it into its simple components and then tracing them back to their impressions. Understanding is, so to speak, like displaying the family tree. It turns out that all of the members of the "metaphysical" set have dubious parentage. Even if one grants the accuracy and adequacy of Hume's factoring, we are left facing his demonstrations that for each metaphysical concept there are at least some elements with no clear ancestry from single impressions. In this wayHume directs our attention tohis questforhow suchideas(or such elements withinideas) are ever come by. Why do we attribute identity? Howcanwe assume thereisanecessary connection and apower? What can possibly bring us to imagine, even, that anything can be independent ofour perceptions? And so on. All ofthis is not only at the heart ofthe Humean enterprise inbook 1 ofthe Treatise ami theFirstInquiry butis well-known to anyone even modestly familiar with Hume's writings. The result of his powerful analyses is that these mysterious, illegitimate elements in the metaphysical concepts are generated within subjects exposed to repeated instances of, for example, pairings in time or place, similar sightings after temporal lapses and so on. The processes by which we Volume XVIII Number 2 315 FAY HORTON SAWYIER construct our categories as well as the elements out ofwhich we make them areimportantandin these cases were shown tobe developmental or time-dependent.4 Furthermore, since these processes and these resultant conceptshavebeen shown tohave been generated by us, they are uniquely quaUfied to demonstrate the nature of human nature, which was, after all, the subject ofthe Treatise? Having reminded ourselves ofthese extremely general features of Hume's exposition, I want now to isolate and to highlight some particular and peculiar features. 1.The subject upon whose mind or sensibilities paired and repeated events are presumed to impinge and by whose consequent conditioning these otherwise inexplicable concepts can be understood is always an adult male.6 2.The presentingsituation which is presumed to arise and repeatfor this adult male is always hypothetical and never observed. 3.Thisman'sconstructionofanyoneofthese concepts (like necessary connection) is always as his solution to a logical problem, his way-out ofa mental awkwardness or unease. 4.These adult male concept generators and logical problem solvers neverseem to doanything but sitstill and look around themselves.7 The fundamental character ofmy inquiry can be understood as a search for the (presumably deleterious) consequences of the four particular features noted above. Since the lives and experiences of young children are neglected and since acquisition of the basic metaphysical set is always initiated in early childhood, one may well hypothesize that Hume's results will be damaged or skewed. Intuitively, this would seem to be an obvious inference, but proof is needed that in some cases Hume did indeed misconstrue certain basic concepts and that the central factor in his shortfall was his neglect of the child's experience of concept development and acquisition. By contrast, his contemporary, Thomas Reid, remarked, "Could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath passed in the mind ofa child from thebeginning ofUfe and sensation, till it grows to the use ofreason... this would be a treasury of natural history, which would probably give... (shrink)

I consider the general question of whether a study of the life of a philosopher can help us to understand his/her philosophical principles. This topic is narrowed to the consideration of principles of moral and political philosophy, especially in instances in which the philosopher deliberately uses the experiences of his/her own life in formulating his/her views. Such use raises the problem of justification of the self as sampIe. As part of my general defense of the merits of studying a life (...) to grasp a philosophy, I argue that the meaning of a principle in the philosophy of X can be illuminated by trying to recognize what that principIe meant to X. All of these general issues are deployed in my study of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. In particular I focus on five points, the understanding of which I feel is deepened by studying how they involved his own life. These five are: a change in tone in ch. III of On Liberty, his conviction about free will, his commitment to a principle of vigorous action, his principle of balanced growth, and his fundamental axiom of Individualism. (shrink)

I consider the general question of whether a study of the life of a philosopher can help us to understand his/her philosophical principles. This topic is narrowed to the consideration of principles of moral and political philosophy, especially in instances in which the philosopher deliberately uses the experiences of his/her own life in formulating his/her views. Such use raises the problem of justification of the self as sampIe. As part of my general defense of the merits of studying a life (...) to grasp a philosophy, I argue that the meaning of a principle in the philosophy of X can be illuminated by trying to recognize what that principIe meant to X. All of these general issues are deployed in my study of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. In particular I focus on five points, the understanding of which I feel is deepened by studying how they involved his own life. These five are: a change in tone in ch. III of On Liberty, his conviction about free will, his commitment to a principle of vigorous action, his principle of balanced growth, and his fundamental axiom of Individualism. (shrink)