Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions (...) of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential. (shrink)

In this work I will analyze the debate between Pascal Engel and Richard Rorty about the relevance of the notion of truth to the characterization of assertion. I will point out the theoretic advantages of Rortian conversationalism’s refuse of the idea of truth as a norm of assertion. For that, first of all, I will make an analysis of Rortian deflationism. Then, I will make an reconstruction of Engel’s defense of the normativity of truth. Finally, I will establish that that (...) defense is overcome by conversationalism. During the discussion I will criticize some theoretical developments by Akeel Bilgrami, Harry Frankfurt and Huw Price which could be useful to Engel’s position. (shrink)

Una consecuencia de la crítica formulada por Richard Rorty a la epistemología tradicional es el rechazo al veroteleologismo, esto es, a la tesis según la cual la verdad es el fin o la meta de la investigación. A partir del enfrentamiento con una serie de críticas provenientes tanto desde perspectiva..

One of the consequences of Richard Rorty’s critique of traditional epistemology is the rejection of veroteleologism, that is, the thesis according to which truth is the end or goal of inquiry. This article aims at consolidating the anti-veroteleological position, on the basis of a critical examination of a series of critiques made from both “realist” and Peircean-style pragmatist perspectives. Consequently, the debate centers on some considerations formulated by Alvin Goldman and Akeel Bilgrami in favor of veroteleologism and against positions such (...) as Rorty’s. (shrink)

“Pragmatist Receptions of Martin Heidegger”. This paper studies theAmerican Pragmatist reception of Heidegger’s thought. The article briely presentsBrandom’s and Okrent’s readings of Heidegger, paying attention afterwards toRorty’s articulation of the Heideggerian legacy with the work of Wittgensteinand classical Pragmatists, especially Dewey. Rorty’s appropriation of Heideggerassumes a philosophical and metaphilosophical anti-essentialist commitment.This commitment requires some reading operations in relation to the lastHeidegger, who cannot be easily assimilated by the Pragmatist tradition. Thetension between irony and nostalgia will be crucial for Rorty’s appropriation (...) ofHeidegger’s thought. (shrink)

El comentario se concentra en la práctica del voto como mecanismo de decisión y en las estrategias de disolución de las fuerzas antidemocráticas. El que las prácticas efectivas en ambos casos no difieran parece redundar en un déficit para el deliberacionismo, el cual, a diferencia del agonismo, no puede justificar claramente dichas prácticas. A su vez, se detiene en las diferencias epistemológicas que ambas posiciones presentan. The discussion concentrates on two aspects: the practice of voting as a decision mechanism and (...) the strategies for the dissolution of the anti-democratic forces. The fact that effective practices in both cases do not differ leads to a deficit for deliberationism, which, unlike agonism, seems to not be able to clearly justify such practices from its theoretical position. The discussion also pays attention to the differences between the epistemological assumptions that sustain both positions. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo defiendo la concepción conversacionalista de la justificación epistémica en la caracterización que de la misma ha hecho y sigue haciendo Richard Rorty. Me detengo en un grupo de objeciones provenientes del campo pragmatista. Vertebro la exposición a partir de la crítica a Rorty sostenida por Susan Haack, incorporando luego las observaciones que Hilary Putnam y Jiirgen Habermas le han presentado al proyecto rortyano. La critica de dichas objeciones conduce a la asunción de una caracterización contextualista y (...) convencionalista de los criterios de corrección justificatoria. Un punto clave de mi defensa de la posición rortyana es desarticular las consecuencias antintuitivas que supuestamente se siguen de abandonar el veroteleologismo, esto es, la idea de que la verdad es la meta de la investigación. In this paper I defend the Rortyan conversationalist conception of epistemic justification against some objections which have been supported by some pragmatist philosophers. First, I propose a reconstruction ofthe argument that Susan Haack made against Rorty's conversationalism. Then, I point out Putnam's and Hahennas' criticisms to rortyan project. The objections that I present to all those critics lead me to as sume a contextualist and conventionalist characterization of the criteria for justificatory correction. Finally, dismantling the anti-intuitive consequences which supposedly follow from giving up veroteleologism is the main point ofmy defense ofthe Rortyan account. (shrink)