Recent advances in neuroimaging technologies have rendered multimodal analysis of operators’ cognitive processes in complex task settings and environments increasingly more practical. In this exploratory study, we utilized optical brain imaging and mobile eye tracking technologies to investigate the behavioral and neurophysiological differences among expert and novice operators while they operated a human-machine interface in normal and adverse conditions. In congruence with related work, we observed that experts tended to have lower prefrontal oxygenation and exhibit gaze patterns that are better (...) aligned with the optimal task sequence with shorter fixation durations as compared to novices. These trends reached statistical significance only in the adverse condition where the operators were prompted with an unexpected error message. Comparisons between hemodynamic and gaze measures before and after the error message indicated that experts’ neurophysiological response to the error involved a systematic increase in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) activity accompanied with an increase in fixation durations, which suggests a shift in their attentional state, possibly from routine process execution to problem detection and resolution. The novices’ response was not as strong as that of experts, including a slight increase only in the left dlPFC with a decreasing trend in fixation durations, which is indicative of visual search behavior for possible cues to make sense of the unanticipated situation. A linear discriminant analysis model capitalizing on the covariance structure among hemodynamic and eye movement measures could distinguish experts from novices with 91% accuracy. Despite the small sample size, the performance of the linear discriminant analysis combining eye fixation and dorsolateral oxygenation measures before and after an unexpected event suggests that multimodal approaches may be fruitful for distinguishing novice and expert performance in similar neuroergonomic applications in the field. (shrink)

Recent advances in neuroimaging technologies have rendered multimodal analysis of operators’ cognitive processes in complex task settings and environments increasingly more practical. In this exploratory study, we utilized optical brain imaging and mobile eye tracking technologies to investigate the behavioral and neurophysiological differences among expert and novice operators while they operated a human-machine interface in normal and adverse conditions. In congruence with related work, we observed that experts tended to have lower prefrontal oxygenation and exhibit gaze patterns that are better (...) aligned with the optimal task sequence with shorter fixation durations as compared to novices. These trends reached statistical significance only in the adverse condition where the operators were prompted with an unexpected error message. Comparisons between hemodynamic and gaze measures before and after the error message indicated that experts’ neurophysiological response to the error involved a systematic increase in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) activity accompanied with an increase in fixation durations, which suggests a shift in their attentional state, possibly from routine process execution to problem detection and resolution. The novices’ response was not as strong as that of experts, including a slight increase only in the left dlPFC with a decreasing trend in fixation durations, which is indicative of visual search behavior for possible cues to make sense of the unanticipated situation. A linear discriminant analysis model capitalizing on the covariance structure among hemodynamic and eye movement measures could distinguish experts from novices with 91% accuracy. Despite the small sample size, the performance of the linear discriminant analysis combining eye fixation and dorsolateral oxygenation measures before and after an unexpected event suggests that multimodal approaches may be fruitful for distinguishing novice and expert performance in similar neuroergonomic applications in the field. (shrink)

Turuq al-taḥammul al-ʿilm is the methods of receiving a ḥadīth from the teacher in the science of ḥadīth. In general, scholars have pointed out eight different methods. While some of these methods are accepted as unanimously by everyone, some methods have led to polemics throughout the history. The methods did not appear out of nowhere, but appeared in a process. In this article, mukātaba (correspondence), one of the eight methods, will be examined and the events that laid the groundwork for (...) this method from the time of the Prophet will be discussed. Furthermore, the use of mukātaba in the ḥadīth transmission up to the third hijrī century will be mentioned. In addition, the origin and development of the term mukātaba will be researched. Finally, modes of transmission used while transmitting the aḥadīth obtained by this method in ḥadīth collections will be examined. As a result of the research, it has been seen that in the first centuries, kitāba/mukātaba was mentioned together with munāwala or ijāza, but later on, it began to be considered as a separate method. While it was mostly mentioned as kitāba until Ibn al-Salāh, it started to be called mukātaba later on. (shrink)

This article discusses the effects of the 24 year-old rule in Denmark utilising Foucault’s understanding of the ‘subject’ within a governmentality framework. The 24 year-old rule is a good example of how a gendered knowledge about immigration becomes a reality that steers biopolitics, enables practices of normalisation and subjectifies immigrants in various ways. The article foregrounds the subjectivity of immigrant women through a narrative analysis of the constitution of the subject within discourses and in an asymmetrical relationship to power in (...) governance. This analysis reveals the complexity of empirical interactions between the ideational structure of legislative measures and personal meanings expressed by immigrant subjectivities. While I illustrate certain modes of subjectification in relation to the 24 year-old rule, I emphasise the ways subjects employ certain identity strategies by resisting, reworking or contributing to the practices of normalisation. (shrink)

On dokuzuncu yüzyıldaki Osmanlı Devleti’nin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihini daha iyi anlamamızı sağlayan önemli kaynaklardan birisi de temettuat defterleridir. Bu defterler, kişilerin mal varlığını, gelir ve vergi miktarlarının sayısını ayrıntılı olarak gösteren sayım kayıtlarıdır. Bu çalışmada günümüzde Kütahya’nın Gediz ilçesine bağlı köylerinden biri olan Ağsaklar/Aksaklar köyünün 1845 yılındaki tarımsal arazi kullanımı ve verimliliği ele alınmıştır. Çalışma, Ağsaklar köyüne ait Hicri 29 Zi’l-hicce 1261 (Miladî 29 Aralık 1845) tarihli 07922 numaralı temettuat defteri esas alınarak yapılmıştır. Defterdeki tüm veriler öncelikle transkribe edilmiştir (...) ve akabinde veriler daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için tablolaştırılmıştır. Defterdeki kayıtların tablolaştırılarak değerlendirilmesine yönelik olan bu çalışma, giriş bölümü de dahil olmak üzere dört bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde temettuat defterleri, bunların kullanımı ve önemi hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Ayrıca bu bölümde Ağsaklar köyünün temettuat defterinden bahseden bir yüksek lisans tezindeki yanlışlar da tespit edilerek düzeltilmiştir. Birinci bölümde köyün coğrafyası, demografik yapısı ve günümüzdeki durumundan bahsedilmiştir. İkinci bölümde, 1845 yılındaki Ağsaklar köyünün zirai üretimi ve hayvancılığı hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde ise söz konusu yıldaki Ağsaklar köyünün vergi ve gelir durumu ele alınmıştır. Bunun haricinde Ağsaklar köyünde yaşayan nüfusun meslek grupları, tarımsal faaliyetleri ve gelirleri incelenerek buradaki nüfusun ekonomik farklılıkları vurgulanmaya çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

Ned Block’s Chinese Nation Argument is offered as a counterexample to Turing-machine functionalism. According to that argument, one billion Chinese could be organized to instantiate Turing-machine descriptions of mental states. Since we wouldn’t want to impute qualia to such an organized population, functionalism cannot account for the qualitative character of mental states like pain. Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland have challenged that argument by trying to show that an adequate representation of the complexity of mind requires at least 10 30,000,000 (...) homunculi. As such a large collection of Chinese is beyond comprehension, the intuitive force of Block’s example would be undercut. I argue that Churchland and Church land erroneously assume that every possible input-state combination in the human Turing-machine table must be assigned a homunculus. I attempt to restore the intuitive force of Block’s thought experiment by pointing to a way to simulate the human mind that does not require any such staggering number of homunculi. (shrink)

Ned Block’s Chinese Nation Argument is offered as a counterexample to Turing-machine functionalism. According to that argument, one billion Chinese could be organized to instantiate Turing-machine descriptions of mental states. Since we wouldn’t want to impute qualia to such an organized population, functionalism cannot account for the qualitative character of mental states like pain. Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland have challenged that argument by trying to show that an adequate representation of the complexity of mind requires at least 10 30,000,000 (...) homunculi. As such a large collection of Chinese is beyond comprehension, the intuitive force of Block’s example would be undercut. I argue that Churchland and Church land erroneously assume that every possible input-state combination in the human Turing-machine table must be assigned a homunculus. I attempt to restore the intuitive force of Block’s thought experiment by pointing to a way to simulate the human mind that does not require any such staggering number of homunculi. (shrink)

Ned Block’s Chinese Nation Argument is offered as a counterexample to Turing-machine functionalism. According to that argument, one billion Chinese could be organized to instantiate Turing-machine descriptions of mental states. Since we wouldn’t want to impute qualia to such an organized population, functionalism cannot account for the qualitative character of mental states like pain. Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland have challenged that argument by trying to show that an adequate representation of the complexity of mind requires at least 10 30,000,000 (...) homunculi. As such a large collection of Chinese is beyond comprehension, the intuitive force of Block’s example would be undercut. I argue that Churchland and Church land erroneously assume that every possible input-state combination in the human Turing-machine table must be assigned a homunculus. I attempt to restore the intuitive force of Block’s thought experiment by pointing to a way to simulate the human mind that does not require any such staggering number of homunculi. (shrink)

Hempel's famous Raven Paradox derives from Nicod's criteria for confirmation and the Equivalence Condition, the unintuitive conclusion that things like white roses, green T-shirts and ice cubes confirm the raven hypothesis ‘All ravens are black.’ By a small rearrangement of the Equivalence Condition, I show that we can also derive the conclusion, which sounds even more intuitively intolerable, that observation of black ravens fails to confirm the raven hypothesis. We are left with the contradictory result that black ravens both confirm (...) and do not confirm the raven hypothesis. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor’s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor’s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of “asymmetric dependence between nomic relations,” and the other is an assumption about the nature of the “causally operative properties” involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor’s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this (...) paper a difficulty with the other element of his theory concerning what kinds of properties are the causally operative ones in the tokenings of a semantic symbol in the brain of a perceiver. After presenting this difficulty, we examine three possible responses a Fodorian might make to our criticism. (shrink)

Despite the pervasive use of idealizations and approximations in science, the issue of their role has been neglected or misunderstood by philosophers. Idealizations enter into a scientific analysis or explanation in at least two ways. First, they may be embodied in the very statement or formulation of laws and theories; I call such laws idealizational laws. Second, they may be conjoined to a theory as extraneous assumptions, mainly to make it easier to work with the theory. I first examine the (...) problems of testing pertaining to idealizational laws. I argue that the major theories of confirmation face difficulties in accounting for the confirmation and disconfirmation of such laws. Underlying their difficulties is the fact that those laws are about nonexistent objects. The analysis I propose of the testing of idealizational laws is based on the fact that idealized objects comprising the domains of such laws can be approximated by real objects. ;I next investigate the problems of testing in relation to theories and hypotheses which are fed idealizational assumptions and approximations from outside. In the course of my discussion of the issues surrounding the use of idealizations and approximations in science, I critically examine the views of Milton Friedman, Clark Glymour and Ronald Laymon. In the final chapter I propose an analysis of confirmation which is within the Bayesian tradition. My analysis, if correct, is an improvement over the standard Bayesian framework in two respects. First, it is a more realistic representation of the testing process in actual science. Secondly, it is capable of solving "the problem of old evidence," which has recently troubled traditional Bayesianism. Both of these advantages my analysis achieves by taking as the evidence not the observation itself, but the error or discrepancy between the observation and what was predicted by the theory in conjunction with the idealizations and approximations. ;In the Appendix I argue against a prevalent view among physicists and philosophers of science concerning the interpretation of the domain of Newton's second law, viz. the view that the domain of this law, when properly stated, consists of point-masses. (shrink)

Gorbachev's ascent to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and the events that followed appear to have led to a dramatic decline in philosophers' interest in Marxist philosophy. The magnitudes of philosophical literature on Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Hegel recorded in annual volumes ofThe Philosopher's Index have all been shrinking in recent years. In the 1992 volume, the share of the publications on Marx within all philosophical publications has dropped to almost one-third of what it was on average in (...) the 1981–1985 volumes, on Engels and Lenin to about one-fifth, and on Hegel to about two-thirds. (shrink)

A famous puzzle called “Grandmother Paradox” is used to argue against the feasibility of traveling backward in time because of the logical and nomological problems such travel involves, and not only because we don’t have the technology to make it reality. The same kind of problems would be encountered in leaping forward in time and then returning to the time of departure. We argue that a similar family of problems also arise in our having foreknowledge of the future without making (...) any time travel. We point to the mysterious consequences of having access to a being, say a machine or a psychic, that can have infallible knowledge of the future and conveys this foreknowledge to human beings truthfully, without any lies or distortions. The cause of these mysterious consequences is the fact that such machines or psychics will raise logical and nomological complications reminiscent of the ones we encounter in time travel scenarios, and that is a strong reason why infallible foretellers cannot exist. We conclude that we can have foreknowledge of the future, in principle, only within certain narrow limits, if at all. (shrink)

According to Fodor, robustness of meaning is an essential aspect of intentionality, and his causal theory of content can account for it. Robustness of meaning refers to the fact that tokenings of a symbol are occasionally caused by instantiations of properties which are not expressed by the symbol. This, according to Fodor, is the source of the phenomenon of misrepresentation. We claim that Fodor’s treatment of content and misrepresentation is infected with a couple of flaws. After criticizing Fodor’s theory of (...) content, we propose a new theory of content which explains how misrepresentation is possible as a result of meaning-forming causation, and extend it to account for the property of robustness of meaning. (shrink)

Our aim in this essay is to take a look at cartoons under philosophical light. What are some of the similarities between philosophy and the art of cartooning? In what ways can cartoons be helpful to philosophy? What are some of the problems cartoons pose for philosophy? Perhaps the most basic philosophical question concerning cartoons is, “What is a cartoon?”. We argue that it is not easy to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a cartoon. We defend (...) the view that cartoons form a class whose members are interconnected with the Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” relations. We then look into the problems involved in finding a connectionist parallel-processing correlate of the Wittgensteinian notion in the context of cartoons. (shrink)

Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon (...) may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there seems no way they can settle their dispute in purely rational ways. For suppose A1 believes in the truth of claim Q on the basis of premises P and a valid argument P.'.Q, and A 2 believes that ~Q on the basis of premises R and a valid argument R.'. ~Q. Then it would seem on logical, hence rational, grounds that A 1 must reject A2's reasons R, since P.'. ~R is also valid. Thus the reasons P, which led Ai to rationally accept Q, also constitute rational reasons for A 1 to reject R, and consequently reject the argument A2 adduces for ~Q. Symmetrically, A 2 cannot but reject the reasoning A1 adduces for Q. So the dispute between A1 and A 2 concerning the truth of Q cannot be resolved—unless either side compromises its rationality and yields to such nonrational methods as threats, brainwashing, offers of money, etc. If all this is right, we have (rational) reason to be pessimistic about the value of rationality not only in philosophy, but in any sphere of thought, including science. I attempt to offer a rational counterargument against Köseraif's. (shrink)

Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon (...) may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there seems no way they can settle their dispute in purely rational ways. For suppose A1 believes in the truth of claim Q on the basis of premises P and a valid argument P.'.Q, and A 2 believes that ~Q on the basis of premises R and a valid argument R.'. ~Q. Then it would seem on logical, hence rational, grounds that A 1 must reject A2's reasons R, since P.'. ~R is also valid. Thus the reasons P, which led Ai to rationally accept Q, also constitute rational reasons for A 1 to reject R, and consequently reject the argument A2 adduces for ~Q. Symmetrically, A 2 cannot but reject the reasoning A1 adduces for Q. So the dispute between A1 and A 2 concerning the truth of Q cannot be resolved—unless either side compromises its rationality and yields to such nonrational methods as threats, brainwashing, offers of money, etc. If all this is right, we have (rational) reason to be pessimistic about the value of rationality not only in philosophy, but in any sphere of thought, including science. I attempt to offer a rational counterargument against Köseraif's. (shrink)

My focus in this paper is on how the basic Bayesian model can be amended to reflect the role of idealizations and approximations in the confirmation or disconfirmation of any hypothesis. I suggest the following as a plausible way of incorporating idealizations and approximations into the Bayesian condition for incremental confirmation: Theory T is confirmed by observation P relative to background knowledge B iff Pr&B) > PrandB), where I is the conjunction of idealizations and approximations used in deriving the prediction (...) PT from T, P. (shrink)

Religious songs have an important place in Turkish Classical Music in terms of maqam, usul, form, composers, and songwriters. The main purpose of this study is to examine the religious songs in Segâh Maqam in the TRT Turkish Classical Music Repertoire in terms of form, usul, composers, and songwriters. The data of the research were obtained through literature and document review. In this context, the musical notes of religious songs in Segâh Maqam were analyzed through content analysis. As a result (...) of the reviews of TRT Turkish Classical Music Repertoire, a total of 107 religious songs in Segâh Maqam has been identified. In the form analyses of the identified religious songs, it was found that İlâhi, Durak, and Teşvih forms were used frequently; in the usul analyses, it was found that Sofyan, Düyek, Devr-i Hindî, Durak Evferi, Yürük Semaî and Nim Sofyan usuls are used frequently; in the composer analyses, it was found that Bekir Sıtkı Sezgin, Güldeniz Ekmen, Amir Ateş,, Hüseyin Sâdettin Arel, Erdinç Çelikkol Zeki Altun, Faruk Şahin, Halil İbrâhim Taşkent, Hüseyin Sebilci, Mehmet Tulûî, Sadettin Kaynak, Süleyman Erguner, and Ümit Gürelman have more religious songs compared to other identified composers; in the songwriter analyses, it was found that Yûnûs Emre, Niyâzî-i Mısrî, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, Hamdi Özer, İbrâhim Hakkı, Sezâî, and Yûnûs have more songs compared to other identified songwriters. (shrink)