I defend constitutivism against two prominent objections and argue that agential constitutivism has the resources to take normative and ethical deliberation seriously. I first consider David Enoch’s shmagency challenge and argue that it does not form a coherent objection. I counter Enoch’s view that the phenomenology of first-person deliberation pragmatically justifies belief in irreducibly realist normative truths, claiming that constitutivism can respect the practice of moral deliberation without appeal to robustly realist truths. Secondly, I argue that the error theoretic worry (...) that all normative judgements are false does not threaten constitutivism ; the objection either fails to shift the burden of proof to constitutivism, or poses justificatory challenges that constitutivism can meet. I conclude that a questionable foundationalism about justification underlies these objections. (shrink)

Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral (...) self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics. (shrink)

The concept of identification is often appealed to in explanations of how it is that some actions are authored by an agent, and so autonomous, or free. Over the last several decades, different conceptions of identification have been advanced and refined, and the term is now commonplace in moral psychology and metaethics. In this paper I argue that two dominant accounts of identification implicated in self-unity fail to acknowledge the significance of a related form of self-unifying activity, self-recognition. Self-recognition is (...) self-authoring because it involves identification with a new description of oneself, but it is excluded by standard accounts of identification which over-emphasize action and volition in autonomous agency. Although self-recognition is unlikely to produce immediate action, it accords with the activity of self-unity that is said to be constitutive of identification. (shrink)

The concept of identification is often appealed to in explanations of how it is that some actions are authored by an agent, and so autonomous, or free. Over the last several decades, different conceptions of identification have been advanced and refined, and the term is now commonplace in moral psychology and metaethics. In this paper I argue that two dominant accounts of identification implicated in self-unity fail to acknowledge the significance of a related form of self-unifying activity, self-recognition. Self-recognition is (...) self-authoring because it involves identification with a new description of oneself, but it is excluded by standard accounts of identification which over-emphasize action and volition in autonomous agency. Although self-recognition is unlikely to produce immediate action, it accords with the activity of self-unity that is said to be constitutive of identification. (shrink)

Faces of Intention is a fine collection of essays covering Michael Bratman’s work on intention and agency between 1992 and 1998, along with four critical reviews published between 1983 and 1998. In his introductory chapter, the only previously unpublished essay in this volume, Bratman outlines the broad themes which influence an expansion of his “planning theory of intention.” According to the planning theory, intentions are “elements of stable, partial plans of action concerning present and future conduct”. Plans are revocable, of (...) course, and so in order to understand intentions we must understand how it is that one comes to be now committed to later action once one has settled on a plan concerning one’s future conduct. Having focused on the nature of intention and basic features of agency in his 1987 book, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Bratman here turns his attention to forms of responsible and shared agency in order to further develop his account. The broad themes which influence his work are neither explicitly discussed nor defended in the essays that follow, a feature of this collection which detracts somewhat from its overall force. He sees agency as embedded in planning structures which are themselves valuable as a means of attaining an agent’s chosen ends, and thus avoids the need to appeal to any substantive conception of the good. He takes no stand on whether practical reason itself commands specific ends or moral constraints, but he does hold that any account of agency owes explanations of both responsible and shared intentional agency. Adherence to what he describes as a modest, non-mysterious, theory of the will has the consequence that interpersonal commitments and obligations are not derivable directly from the study of practical reason, but require a further investigation into moral philosophy. (shrink)