This comment responds to Maul’s (2012) article evaluating the validity evidence and argument for the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as a measure of emotional intelligence (EI). We suggest that Maul’s standards for establishing validity evidence are unrealistically high, and may not be met by other established psychometric tests. As an example, we show that evidence for the validity of Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) is of a similar standard to the MSCEIT.

Emotional intelligence abilities relate to desirable outcomes such as better well-being, academic performance, and job performance. Previous research shows that coping strategies mediate the effects of ability EI on such outcomes. Across two cross-sectional studies, we show that coping strategies mediate the relationships of ability EI with both well-being and ill-being. Study 1 assessed EI with the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding and Situation Test of Emotion Management. Avoidant coping significantly mediated the relationship of both the STEU and STEM with (...) depression, anxiety, stress, and psychological well-being. EI was associated with lower avoidant coping, higher well-being and lower ill-being. Study 2 assessed EI with the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. Avoidant coping mediated the relationship between EI and ill-being, but not the relationship between EI and well-being. These effects were significant for three of the four EI branches—emotion perception, understanding, and management. We discuss possible reasons why avoidant coping may be an active ingredient by which lower EI relates to lower well-being. We also discuss a possible application of our findings—that EI training programs might benefit from including content aimed at reducing avoidant coping. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence (EI) stands at the nexus between intelligence and emotion disciplines, and we outline how EI research might be better integrated within both theoretical frameworks. From the former discipline, empirical research focused upon whether EI is an intelligence and what type of intelligence it constitutes. It is clear that ability-based tests of EI form a group factor of cognitive abilities that may be integrated into the Cattell–Horn–Carroll framework; less clear is the lower order factor structure of EI. From the (...) latter discipline, research linking EI with theoretical frameworks from emotion research remain relatively sparse. Emotion regulation and appraisal theory may be key to explain how EI may reflect different processes. We propose a research agenda to advance the EI study. (shrink)

In this volume, a diverse group of world experts in personality assessment showcase a range of different viewpoints on response distortion. Contributors consider what it means to "fake" a personality assessment, why and how people try to obtain particular scores on personality tests, and what types of tests people can successfully manipulate. The authors present and discuss the usefulness of a range of traditional and cutting-edge methods for detecting and controlling the practice of faking. These methods include social desirability scales, (...) warnings, affective neutralization, unidimensional and multidimensional pairwise preferences, decision trees, linguistic analysis, situational measures, and methods based on item response theory. The wide range of viewpoints presented in this book are then summarized, synthesized, and evaluated. The authors make practical recommendations and suggest areas for future research. Anyone who wonders whether people exaggerate or lie outright on personality tests -- or questions what psychologists can and should do about it -- will find in this book stimulating questions and useful answers. (shrink)

In this response to the critiques of Fontaine and Hughes and Evans, we touch on main points of consensus and contention, and offer some suggestions for future programs of research.

IntroductionResearch indicates that body image disturbance is associated with poorer psychosocial outcomes for individuals with physical health conditions, with poorest body image reported for individuals with visible bodily changes. Using White’s theoretical model of body image the present paper aimed to examine the nature of these relationships in two distinct groups: individuals with an amputation and individuals with diabetes. It was hypothesized that body image disturbance would be associated with psychosocial outcomes and would mediate the relationships between self-ideal discrepancy and (...) personal investment in psychosocial outcomes.MethodsIndividuals with diabetes and individuals with an amputation provided details regarding their medical condition, and completed measures assessing body image, investment, self-ideal discrepancy, depression, anxiety, and quality of life. Structural equation and invariance modeling were used to test the model paths and the invariance of the model.ResultsAs hypothesized, body image disturbance was found to mediate the relationships between personal investment and psychosocial outcome, and between self-ideal discrepancy and psychosocial outcome. The predicted paths were invariant across groups, although the model accounted for more variance in people with an amputation than people with diabetes.ConclusionBody image disturbance, personal investment, and self-ideal discrepancy are important factors contributing to psychosocial outcome for individuals with diabetes and individuals with an amputation. These findings not only confirm the validity of the model in these two groups, but they emphasize the importance of targeting body image in future psychological interventions for individuals with a health condition. (shrink)

Mestre, MacCann, Guil, and Roberts propose a model that suggests emotion regulation provides the mechanism through which ability emotional intelligence influences important outcomes. We argue that important nuance in our understanding of people’s choice of emotion regulation strategy can be gained by incorporating personality constructs such as trait emotional intelligence within this model.

MacCann, Matthews, and Roberts (2012) and Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2012) have offered responses to my evaluation of the validity of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as a measure of emotional intelligence. MacCann et al. argue that my standards for validity evidence are unrealistically high, but their argument mistakenly supposes that the concept of measurement is somehow relative, rather than absolute. Mayer et al. offer valuable clarifications regarding their emotional intelligence (EI) model, and some new evidence of (...) its correlates. However, the new evidence is not persuasive, and I think that they have largely missed the point of my call for a stronger focus on causal explanations of test performance. (shrink)