In De Anima II.6, Aristotle divides the objects of perception into three kinds: “special perceptibles" (idia aisthêta) such as colours, sounds and flavours, which can be perceived in their own right by only one sense; “common perceptibles" (koina aisthêta) such as shapes, sizes and movements, which can be perceived in their own right by multiple senses; and “incidental perceptibles,” such as the son of Diares, which can be perceived only “incidentally” (kata sumbebêkos). In this paper, I examine this division of (...) perceptibles and consider what it amounts to. First, I argue that Aristotle’s distinction between perceiving something in its own right (kath' hauto) and perceiving it incidentally marks a causal distinction: what is perceived in its own right causes perception as such, whereas what is perceived incidentally coincides with what is perceived in its own right. Second, I argue that for Aristotle special perceptibles, unlike common perceptibles, belong to homogeneous bodies on account of their chemical composition. Finally, I explain the primacy Aristotle assigns to special perceptibles and his claim that perception of them alone is free from error. I conclude with some brief remarks on Aristotle and the primary/secondary quality distinction. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to study the philosophical basis of the architecture of two Artificial Intelligence systems (AlphaGo and Hide and Seek). The problem considers the elucidation of the epistemological distinction between “knowledge” and “intuition” and questions whether the fulfillment of a programmed metric can be considered as a product of knowledge or, as an example of intuitive thinking. Through the analysis of both examples, it is shown that achieving the desired objective (winning a game of Go and (...) developing new hiding strategies) is not derived from the system’s architecture, but from the AI’s creativity to achieve the desired result; in that sense, it can be confirmed that certain intelligent systems are capable of creative and intuitive thinking. El objetivo del presente artículo es estu- diar los fundamentos filosóficos de la arquitectura de programación en dos sistemas de Inteligencia Artificial (AlphaGo y Hide and Seek). El problema dilucida la distinción epistemológica de los concep- tos “conocimiento”, “intuición” y “abducción”, para definir si el cumplimiento exitoso de una métrica programada, por parte de una computadora, es con- dición suficiente para atribuirle un comportamiento inteligente. A través del análisis de ambos ejemplos se muestran dos cuestiones: i) el cumplimiento exitoso de un objetivo programado ofrece nuevos recursos de conocimiento, ii) dichos conocimientos dependen de la ejecución de un programa cuyo pro- cesamiento es desarrollado por una IA y, por tanto, las operaciones superan las capacidades intelectivas humanas. Las conclusiones apuntan a que las com- putadoras son recursos de conocimiento especiales de comprobación de hipótesis. (shrink)