Abstract:I argue that, since the legal order is a public good, an act of legal punishment may be viewed as the imposition of a kind of tax, which I label ‘a quasi-tax’. Once punishment is viewed as a quasi-tax, the traditionally opposed approaches to punishment may be reconciled, as both utility and retribution jointly justify an act of legal punishment. I discuss objections to my argument and I reply to them.

Unimpressed by the exhortations of previous generations, our modern society accepts premarital sex. Advisably? In an attempt to answer this question, I shall make three related points, drawing on findings from evolutionary psychology and bargaining theory. First, premarital sex is potentially exploitative. Second, to allow premarital sex is not merely to extend a certain freedom, but indirectly to compel women to practice premarital sex, hence effectively to foster their exploitation. Third, some of the measures taken to combat the sexual exploitation (...) of single women can make matters worse, as the implementation of these measures tends to increase rather than decrease the level of the exploitation. (shrink)

In the current debate about same-sex marriage, the great majority of writers belong to one of two camps: either completely in favor of same-sex marriage or completely against it. No effort is typically made to treat different dimensions of the problem differently. My approach, however, is to distinguish between two dimensions of the problem—between the right to marry a person of the same sex on the one hand, and the right to obtain public recognition of such marriage, on the other (...) hand. It turns out, then, that the best solution to the problem of samesex marriage may actually fall between the opposing camps, between unqualified rejection and unqualified recognition of same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage ceremonies ought to be lawful, hence tolerated, but same-sex marriage need not be recognized; the benefits and protections of the marriage license may be denied to same-sex couples without discriminating against them. If sound, the argument of this paper as a whole demonstrates that, in the matter of same-sex marriage, a liberal democratic society, by virtue of the scope and flexibility of its institutions, is capable of reconciling majority rule and tradition with the demands of justice. (shrink)

Many people believe that it is either morally obligatory, preferable or beneficial for an expectant father to be present at the delivery of his baby. An examination of the research literature, however, reveals no benefit that is generally available to participants. I argue, in addition, that it is not morally obligatory for an expectant father to be present at the delivery of his baby.