Nietzsche had a particular interest in the relationship between art and life, and in art's contribution to his philosophical aims--to identify the conditions of the affirmation of life, cultural renewal, and exemplary human living. These new essays demonstrate that understanding his engagement with art is essential for understanding his philosophy.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Schopenhauerian Challenge “Justification” The Extension of “Aesthetic Phenomenon” The Aestheticization of Suffering Concluding Remarks: The Ethics of Aesthetic Justification.

The main theme of Nietzsche’s first published work, The Birth of Tragedy, is that the affirmation of life requires ‘illusion’ which allows us to cope with the ‘insight into the horrible truth’ of our condition. This article argues that Nietzsche held the same position in his later works: that illusion is a necessary to affirm life. The discussion is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the core thesis of BT vis-à-vis the relationship between affirmation and illusion. Section 2 examines (...) the role of illusion in one of Nietzsche’s litmus tests of affirmation found in The Gay Science of 1882, ‘amor fati’—that is, the ability ‘to see as beautiful what is necessary in things’. Sections 3, 4, and 5 consider Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘self-creation’ and how, through the employment of ‘distance’ and ‘pretence’, it engenders an affirmation of existence. Finally, Section 6 attempts a provisional assessment of Nietzsche’s conception of affirmation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background: Schopenhauer's Methodological Presuppositions Empirical Consciousness Aesthetic Consciousness Moral Consciousness and the Path to Salvation Concluding Remarks Notes References Further Reading.

This volume brings together a number of new essays by leading Nietzsche scholars to examine the philosopher's famous critique of morality and his emphasis on life-affirming values.

I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always consists in a contrast between a fact and a foil. I argue that God could not figure in true contrastive explanatory statements, because the omnipotence of God guarantees that for (...) any true proposition p, God could have made it the case that ~p just as much as He could have made it the case that p. (shrink)