Dentre os problemas tradicionais da Epistemologia, uma das controvérsiasmais persistentes é a questão da inserção versus isenção de valores naciência. Filiando-se a uma longa tradição crítica, o filósofo Hugh Laceydesenvolve um exame contundente acerca dos fundamentos da ciência emsua interação com a sociedade, questionando a noção tradicional deneutralidade científica. Pretendemos nesse trabalho estender a crítica deLacey às ciências sociais, e especificamente à Economia. Argumentamosque a ortodoxia da ciência econômica moderna , atravésda incorporação do paradigma mecanicista da física clássica, bem comode (...) todo instrumental analítico das estratégias materialistas, não representaum tipo de compreensão neutra dos fenômenos econômicos, mas sim umaparticularmente notável manifestação dos valores predominantes nessasociedade , da qual faz parte.Assim, procuramos mostrar que, também no âmbito social, a preeminênciados aspectos nomológicos e quantitativos da realidade na formulação dasteorias econômicas de tradição neoclássica espelha valores sociais altamenteestimados nas sociedades modernas.Among the traditional problems in Epistemology, one of the most persistentcontroversies is the question of value insertion versus value exemption inscience. The philosopher Hugh Lacey, in consonance with a long criticaltradition, advances a sharp examination of the foundations of science andits interaction with society, questioning the traditional notion of scientificneutrality. In this essay we intend to extend Lacey’s criticism to the socialsciences – specifically to Economics. We argue that modern economicsorthodoxy , by the adoption of the mechanicalparadigm of classical physics and all the analytical instruments of thematerialist strategies, does not represent a type of neutral understandingof the economic phenomena, but instead, a particularly considerablemanifestation of the predominant values of the society of which it is a part. So, we intend to showthat also in the social scope, the favoring of the nomological and quantitativeaspects of reality mirrors social values highly regarded in modern societies. (shrink)

In his introductory textbook, Philosophy of natural science, Hempel presents, as an illustration and a starting point for an analysis of the processes of inventing and testing scientific theories, an account of the researches of Semmelweis the Hungarian physician who, in the middle of the xixth century, discovered the cause of puerperal fever and an effective method of prevention. The account does not involve anything that is factually untrue, but it is quite succinct, leaving out many important aspects of the (...) case. Our thesis is that, although those omissions are justified in view of the aims of the account, they are also convenient to Hempel, because they help to propagate an image of science which goes much beyond the processes of invention and test. It is an image which reflects the positivist conception of science, and thus, whatever the intentions of the author, contributes to the dissemination and strengthening of that conception, but which, at least in this case, does not correspond to reality. To demonstrate the thesis, we give an account of the parts of Semmelweis's story omitted by Hempel, and we show how they do not fit in with the positivist image of science. Along the way, we distinguish three types of critique of positivist historiography: the Kuhnian, the post-modern, and the engagé. In the conclusion, we present some considerations concerning the medical research of today. -/- . (shrink)