Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.

Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell's first book, has been recently rereleased with a new preface by the author. The book is a collection of essays spanning a twelve-year period, ranging in topic from the ‘ordinary language’ procedures of Austin and Wittgenstein to interpretations of literary works by Beckett and Shakespeare. It was originally published in 1969, yet it contains much that is still relevant for contemporary philosophy. Indeed, it could be argued that there is as much to (...) learn from it today as there was thirty years ago. (shrink)

Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell's first book, has been recently rereleased with a new preface by the author. The book is a collection of essays spanning a twelve-year period, ranging in topic from the ‘ordinary language’ procedures of Austin and Wittgenstein to interpretations of literary works by Beckett and Shakespeare. It was originally published in 1969, yet it contains much that is still relevant for contemporary philosophy. Indeed, it could be argued that there is as much to (...) learn from it today as there was thirty years ago. (shrink)