G. E. Moore and Bad Faith

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):347-365 (2012)
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Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith



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Citations of this work

What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.

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References found in this work

On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.

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