Friedrich Schiller: Über Anmut und Würde Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2016 Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz mit einer Biographie des Autors bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger Entstanden 1793, Erstdruck in: Neue Thalia (Leipzig), 2. Jg., 1793, Heft 2. Textgrundlage ist die Ausgabe: Friedrich Schiller: Sämtliche Werke, Auf Grund der Originaldrucke herausgegeben von Gerhard Fricke und Herbert G. Göpfert in Verbindung mit Herbert Stubenrauch, Band 1-5, 3. Auflage, München: Hanser, 1962. Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Umschlaggestaltung unter (...) Verwendung des Bildes: Friedrich Schiller (Pastell von Frenzel nach dem Gemälde von Ludovike Simanowitz, 1793) Gesetzt aus der Minion Pro, 11 pt. (shrink)

The concept of grace has for better or worse disappeared from our daily experience and aesthetic as well as educational vocabulary. This paper presents briefly Friedrich Schiller’s analysis in Über Anmut und Würde of grace as an expression of an internal morality, i.e. the notion of a beautiful soul found in classical bourgeois Bildung. We then turn to Heinrich von Kleist’s Über das Marionettentheater, which challenges Schiller’s humanism by a provocative presentation of grace as mechanical perfection. The second part (...) of the paper examines the bearing and actuality of Kleist’s text from examples pertaining to athletics/sports, drawing critically on Simon Chritchly’s What We Think about When We Think about Football. The aim is a consideration of where and how grace manifests itself and seems to be something inexplicable and ‘extra’, a gift of the gods or of nature, as it still exists even if it is not easily put into words. (shrink)

Frederick Beiser’s study, Schiller as Philosopher, is a work of outstanding philosophical intelligence and exemplary scholarship. This is good news for the student of Schiller. It is, however, somewhat less good news for the aspiring critic of Beiser—at least for this aspiring critic, for there is little that I disagree with, and a very great deal that I admire, in Beiser’s book. Particularly valuable—to mention just one of the book’s many merits—is Beiser’s subtle and illuminating account of the relation between (...) grace and dignity in Schiller’s text On Grace and Dignity (Uber Anmut und Wurde). Beiser points out that grace and dignity are not different kinds of virtue or disposition for Schiller, but different instances of a single moral virtue—a virtue that finds expression as dignity in tragic circumstances and grace in non-tragic ones. Grace and dignity are thus not at odds with one another, as it has seemed to some, but belong to one and the same Schillerian ideal of humanity. [...]. (shrink)

In On Grace and Dignity, Schiller argues for the moral importance of grace (Anmut), an attractive quality we witness in people’s moves, gestures, or general demeanour, as they interact with others. He claims that grace is the manifestation in outer appearance of the highest kind of moral accomplishment. In this chapter, I seek to understand this surprising claim in light of Schiller’s engagement with Kant’s moral philosophy. Using both historical and contemporary material, I offer a reconstructive interpretation of the (...) concept of grace and show how it resonates with some contemporary treatments of Kantian ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of AutocracyRobert B. LoudenAnne Margaret Baxley. Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xvi + 189. Cloth, $85.00.Back in the early 1980s, Anglophone philosophers began to seriously explore the nature and role of virtue in Kant's ethics. This development itself was the result of a confluence of three other phenomena: (1) the growing influence (...) of virtue ethics within contemporary ethical theory; (2) the simultaneous publication of the first two complete English translations of Kant's important late work, The Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre); and (3) repeated claims made by virtue ethicists that Kant had denied the importance of virtue for ethical theory.Anne Margaret Baxley's book, Kant's Theory of Virtue, is the most informative and comprehensive discussion of the nature and role of virtue in Kant's ethics currently available. Making careful use of the relevant Kantian texts (including not only Kant's published works but also lecture transcriptions from his ethics courses and some of his unpublished notes and reflections on ethics and religion), an important text by Friedrich Schiller (Über Anmut und Würde), one of Kant's early Romantic critics, as well as a wide swath of contemporary [End Page 142] secondary literature written by virtue ethicists as well as Kant scholars, Baxley demonstrates incisively that virtue, far from being neglected by Kant, is vitally significant to his ethical theory.Baxley's distinctive approach to Kant's conception of virtue is signaled in her subtitle: The Value of Autocracy. Autocracy—understood here as rational self-rule over sensibility—is, Baxley holds, "the overriding metaphor throughout Kant's treatment of virtue as a character trait, and it provides the key for understanding his particular conception of virtue" (52). This accent on autocracy results in a somewhat sterner Kantian virtue ethics than others have argued for. As Baxley herself notes, "[A]t first glance, autocracy looks as if it amounts to a rigid, repressive form of self-rule, one requiring the suppression or wholesale extirpation of sensible feelings and inclinations" (49). In an effort to show that first appearances are in this case deceiving, Baxley stretches the metaphor of autocracy (or, as she puts it, "reconstructs" Kant's claims about virtue) into the following three-pronged theory:[A]utocracy involves containing feelings and desires at odds with duty (the containment model), but it also involves maintaining feelings and inclinations to accord with moral concerns (the maintenance model), as well as cultivating feelings and inclinations that promote morally good ends (the cultivation model).(173; see also 126–36)Strictly speaking, however, when Kant himself uses the term ‘autocracy' (‘Autokratie') in discussing virtue (and he actually only does so once in his published writings—other terms such as ‘moral strength' [‘moralische Stärke'] and ‘courage' [‘Tapferkeit'] are used much more often), it refers exclusively to what Baxley calls the containment model, not the maintenance model or the cultivation model. Autocracy, Kant states in the Tugendlehre, "comprises a consciousness of the capacity to become master of one's inclinations that oppose the law" (6.383). Nevertheless, even if Baxley is asking the metaphor of autocracy to carry a bit more weight than Kant intended, her own reconstruction of Kant's theory of virtue is very well articulated and defended. And she is certainly correct in holding that Kantian virtue, correctly considered, entails not merely containing those feelings and desires that are opposed to duty, but also maintaining and cultivating those that are conducive to the moral life.Three important, interrelated aspects of her account that deserve highlighting are the following:Virtue and radical evil. Kant's account of radical evil, as presented in part 1 of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, forms an integral but underexplored component of his theory of virtue, and his belief in the existence of a universal human propensity to evil is the clearest example of how his understanding of virtue differs from the more familiar Aristotle-inspired accounts favored by contemporary virtue ethicists. As Baxley correctly emphasizes, on Kant's view virtue is "a corrective... to our propensity to evil... (shrink)

Tibulls Sprache ist voller Zartgefuhl und Anmut. Dies finden wir in einer der anregendsten Schopfungen der romischen Literatur bewiesen: der Liebeselegie. In die Lieder an seine Herzensdamen Delia und Nemesis streut der Dichter viele verschiedene Themen ein, die von Burgerpflichten, Heeresdienst und Landleben bis hin zu Poetologie und Musenpflege reichen. Von Quintilian wird er als bedeutendster romischer Elegiker gelobt. Zusammen mit Ovid und Properz bildet Tibull die Trias der Elegiker Roms.".

Kallias, oder, Über die Schönheit -- Über Anmut und Würde -- Vom Erhabenen -- Über das Pathetische -- Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen -- Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung.