Bijural services as factors of production -- Commentary A on Breton and Salmon -- Commentary B on Breton and Salmon -- The challenge of incomplete law and how different legal systems respond -- Commentary C on Pistor and Xu -- Commentary D on Pistor and Xu -- Coevolution as an influence in the development of legal systems -- Commentary E on Breton and Des Ormeaux -- Commentary F on Breton and Des Ormeaux -- The demand for bijurally trained Canadian lawyers (...) -- Commentary G on Davis and Trebilcock -- Commentary H on Davis and Trebilcock. (shrink)

Competitive Governments, explores in a systematic way the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding (...) of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services. In the real world where information is costly, the links may not be first-best, but they will be efficient if competition is vigorous. (shrink)

This volume represents some of the most current thinking in the area of multijuralism and is essential reading for anyone interested in the coexistence of legal ...

In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on (...) the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it. (shrink)