Contrary to Singer's view, Kuper asserts that there is no "royal road" to poverty relief, but intersecting roads that may take us to a place without poverty. Drawing on the works of Rawls and Marx, Kuper examines how an effective political philosophy of this kind might be developed.

In response to Singer Kuper suggests that only a wider range of institutional reforms and political strategies can generate sustained inclusion in governance and the global economy.

This article reports on a conversation convened by Quentin Skinner at the invitation of the Editors of The Journal of Political Philosophy and held in Cambridge on 13 February 2001.

L'anthropologie sud-africaine a historiquement été divisée en deux écoles: l'une, associée aux universités de langue afrikaans, appuyait l'apartheid; l'autre, associée aux universités anglophones, s'opposait à la ségrégation et à la discrimination raciale. L'anthropologie afrikaner se focalisait sur la culture, la tradition et l'ethnicité, tandis que l'école rivale voulait étudier l'Afrique du Sud comme une société unique, en transformation rapide. Cette opposition, qui a parfois été exagérée, a été la plus marquée dans la période de renforcement de l'apartheid, dans les années (...) soixante et soixante-dix, mais il y a toujours eu un débat considérable sur les objets mêmes des recherches en anthropologie, en particulier sur la nature des groupes «raciaux» et «tribaux» en Afrique du Sud. Ces problèmes, fondamentaux d'un point de vue politique, ont forcé les anthropologues à se confronter aux grandes questions posées par les politiques gouvernementales. Cet article retrace l'histoire de ces débats sur la classification des populations en Afrique du Sud. (shrink)

The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c a lly inform ed approach to poverty rel i ef . Ch a ri t a ble don a ti on som eti m e s h elps—and som etimes harm s — but is no general solution to global poverty, and can be po s i tively dangerous wh en pre s en (...) ted as such. We need to consider, and often choose, other routes to helping the poor—including ethical to u rism and fair trade in lu x u ry goods. We will not be able to invest in such feasible routes if we give away all our extra income, as Singer recommends. Sticking to donation above all, when a combination of other strategies is necessary, is highly likely to harm the poor. Si n ger doe s n’t re a lly en ga ge my argumen t . In s te ad , he cari c a tu res our “f u n d a m ental disa greem en t” :a pp a ren t ly, Si n ger rej ects va ri o u s policies because he takes into account the “f act s” ; wh ereas Ku per is the one seeking a “f a i t h ,” a “po l i tical ph i l o s ophy. . . i m mune to ref ut a ti on on the basis of evi den ce .” Anyon e who has re ad my arti cle (pp. 1 07 - 2 0) must fin d this puzzling. The arti cle explains at len g t h wh i ch kinds of b ack ground theories help us to d i s cern and re s pon s i bly con s i der the rel eva n t f act s . I show that Si n ger sel ects and uses fact s u n c ri ti c a lly prec i s ely because he has no po l i tical econ omy, no po l i tical soc i o l ogy, and no t h eory of ju s ti ce . We are seri o u s ly misled if we do not draw adequ a tely on the wi s dom and.. (shrink)

How is it possible for individuals to exercise any control over a political order that is supranational and multilayered? This key question must be answered if we are to reconcile democratic principles with the requirement of global justice as well as with the cosmopolitan political institutions that play an ever-increasing role in our world. The leading answer to this question, at present, is that of Juergen Habermas and his followers: deliberative democracy. This article, however, argues that theories of deliberative democracy (...) fail to take seriously both the problems and the opportunities of large-scale societies and so cannot provide adequate conceptual foundations for deepening and globalizing democracy. In particular, the participatory requirements of Habermas’s normative theory can be met only by making assumptions about human cognitive capacities and institutional capabilities that are not remotely plausible in any pluralistic society. (shrink)