This paper argues that Marquis de Sade is a more original and relevant Enlightenment philosopher than it is commonly thought. We argue that de Sade is a notable author and a noteworthy naturalist thinker in contemporary times as well, concerning modern science, organized religion, (homo)sexuality, political violence and prevalent sociocultural norms. In order to demonstrate these claims, we thoroughly analyse de Sadeʼs philosophies of naturalism and materialism, i.e., his metaphysics and his radical ethics of “immorality”, based on viewing (human) Nature (...) as a sole organizing, creative and destructive principle. Furthermore, we detail his atheist and anti-theistic arguments, which he consistently uses to reject the possibility of a God and all supernatural beings, coupled with his social and political criticism of a faith-based society. Thus, we outline the philosophical arguments that made him a controversial, infamous and denounced thinker, and which socially distanced him from the prevailing philosophical milieu. We also argue for the possibility that he deserves a more prominent place in the history of philosophy which is not congruent with the various “rehabilitative” and “revisionist” narratives regarding de Sade as an early champion of the Counter-Enlightenment, anti-science and postmodernism. (shrink)

L?acte constitutif de l?histoire culturelle contemporaine?tait la coupure avec les presuppositions?pist?mologiques et m?thodologiques de l?histoire?conomique et sociale. Le champ nouveau de l?historiographie, rompant avec?la tradition historiographique?, s?est fond? sur le nouveau?mat?rialisme? et sur la th?orie de la r?pr?sentation. Une question inqui?tante cepandant s?impose: dans quelle mesure les conceptualisations et les m?thodologies de l?histoire contemporaine ne sont que costumes nouveaux pour vieux engagements de l?histoire? Le mat?rialisme nouveau ne d?guise-t-il pas la vieille pratique des historiens de rassembler des?faits?? La th?orie de (...) la r?pr?sentation ne d?guise-t-elle pas l?id?e des m?ntalit?s? Si la r?ponse est affirmatif, il faut poser une nouvelle question: Les grandes luttes dans le champ de l?histoire ne sont-elles pas des strat?gies d?oubli qui essaient d?effacer la m?moire de l?historiographie recente et de ses effets cognitifs? Konstitutivni cin za savremenu kulturnu istoriju bio je raskid sa epistemoloskim i metodoloskim pretpostavkama ekonomske i socijalne istorije. Novo polje istoriografije, raskidajuci sa?tradicionalnom istoriografijom?, pronaslo je oslonac u?novom materijalizmu? i teoriji reprezentacije. Namece se, medjutim, jedno pitanje koje stvara zabrinutost: u kojoj meri su konceptulizacije i metodologije savremene istorije samo novo ruho starih zaloga istorije? Ne krije li novi materijalizam stare prakse istoricara da prikupljaju?c?injenice?? Ne krije li teorija reprezentacije ideju mentaliteta? Ukoliko je odgovor potvrdan, treba postaviti novo pitanje: nisu li velike borbe koje se odvijaju u polju istorije strategije zaborava kojima se pokusava izbrisati secanje na skorasnju istoriografiju i posledice koje je ona imala po spoznaju? (shrink)

Starting from recent formulas of EU bureaucracy for subordinating scientific and educational apparatuses to the needs of the capital and to the requests of its political representatives, the article analyses the interconnection between the historical transformation of the ideological state apparatuses and the epistemological discontinuity provoked by the triumph of technosciences. The hypothesis to be tested is the following: While the crisis of West European-North American capitalism requires an ever tighter submission of ideological state apparatuses, and especially of scientific and (...) academic apparatuses to the needs of the capital, theoretical practices in the humanities and social sciences have come to the point where they entered into an open conflict with the domination of the capital and have, as a consequence, started to subvert their own institutional supports in the ideological apparatuses of the capitalist state. For this purpose, the article reconsiders social sciences as a compromise formation and, eventually, reassesses the historical materialism as a non-Cartesian modern science. Polazeci od skorasnjih formula EU birokratije putem kojih se naucni i obrazovni aparati podredjuju potrebama kapitala i zahtevima njegovih politickih predstavnika, ovaj rad analizira uzajamnu povezanost istorijske transformacije ideoloskih aparata drzave i epistemoloskog diskontinuiteta koji je izazvan trijumfom tehno-nauka. Ispitivacemo sledecu hipotezu: iako kriza kapitalizma u Zapadnoj Evropi i Severnoj Americi zahteva sve cvrsce podredjivanje ideoloskih aparata drzave - narocito onih akademskih i naucnih - teorijske prakse u humanistickim i drustvenim naukama su dosegle tacku otvorenog sukoba sa dominacijom kapitala, cime su sledstveno pocele da podrivaju sopstvena institucionalna uporista u ideoloskim aparatima kapitalisticke drzave. U tu svrhu, rad preispituje drustvene nauke kao jednu kompromisnu formaciju i, naposletku, iznova razmatra istorijski materijalizam kao ne-kartezijansku modernu nauku. (shrink)

Ovaj rad nudi tumačenje fenomenološke ontologije putem razrade njenih temeljnih stavova, kako bi objasnio njihov značaj za znanost i naš osobni svjetonazor. U radu je fenomenologija shvaćena kao ispravna metoda ontologije ili „znanosti o bitku” kao najopćenitije filozofijske discipline. Ovo utjelovljuje ideju „prve filozofije” koja je slobodna od svih predrasuda i koja odbacuje ili kritizira metafiziku, dualizam subjekt–objekt, empirizam, racionalizam, realizam, idealizam, materijalizam, skepticizam i relativizam. Članak odbacuje ontološki objektivizam kao metodološku zabludu i nastoji dosegnuti jasno razumijevanje znanosti te (...) nas samih i našeg odnosa prema svijetu. Kao takav, on predstavlja uvodni dio u metodologiju znanstvenog rada te alternativnu perspektivu na probleme egzistencijalizma, religije i duhovnosti. (shrink)

This article seeks to highlight and present two seemingly different conceptions of the philosophy of mind belonging to Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty. In this context, we first consider Wittgenstein’s critique of private languages, which is then used to reject and deconstitute the privacy of consciousness. In addition, the paper follows the evolving and deconstitutive character of Rorty’s philosophy of mind, showing how the American philosopher constantly defined consciousness, mind, or later selfhood – using naturalistic methods. The authors maintain and (...) justify the thesis that both philosophers have a common denominator which manifests itself in the rejection of traditional and metaphysical conceptions of consciousness and identity, but they also try to point out certain shortcomings and inconsistencies within the two conceptions of the philosophy of mind. (shrink)