The relation between violence and corporality is no more or less than teleological, a relation that had a huge impact upon an older one, between mind and body, or soul and body. This teleology of violence was made possible by the political investiture of the body. The extermination camp becomes the symbol and the symptom where the relations between mind and body were broke. Torture, as a limit experience, brings us in front of a revolt of the soul against the (...) body, a revolt that prolongs into the social life. In this way de-corporality becomes a simple mechanism of defense, which affects, perhaps forever, the feature of this fragile alliance between mind and body, while the principle that starts to govern the soul becomes: there is no sufferings where is no body. (shrink)

L’historienne Lyndal Roper entreprend dans son ouvrage Oedipus and the Devil (1994) la reconstruction des paysages psychiques de quelques individus ayant vécu aux xvie et xviie siècles à Augsbourg. Elle y interprète de manière originale des sources provenant du Conseil municipal d’Augsbourg en ayant recours à des modèles psychanalytiques (Freud et Klein). Bien que cette méthode suscite des critiques en raison de son anachronisme, elle donne lieu à des résultats intéressants qui vont plus loin que la révélation d’obsessions sexuelles. L. (...) Roper part en effet du présupposé que la forme symbolique des fantasmes psychiques n’est pas figée. Ainsi elle entreprend l’observation de conflits intérieurs à partir de leurs représentations culturelles et détermine des différences entre hommes et femmes ancrées dans une corporalité historique. (shrink)

Résumé L’article propose une analyse comparative de la pensée mystique de Jean Scot Érigène (810-877) et de Maître Eckhart (1260-1328). Nuançant les critiques contemporaines relatives au rôle joué par l’expérience dans le mysticisme médiéval, il défend la position selon laquelle il est préférable d’instaurer une comparaison sémantique détaillée de la pensée de ces deux auteurs plutôt que de diviser le mysticisme médiéval en fonction de l’influence mystique augustinienne ou dionysienne décelable chez chacun d’entre eux. L’auteure mène une telle analyse en (...) se reposant sur l’utilisation du concept d’incarnation comme principe sémantique fécond et non comme doctrine théologique. Tandis qu’Érigène utilise ce concept pour engager la conversation avec le divin (utilisation « horizontale »), Eckhart s’en sert pour donner naissance à une vision mystique plus incisive (utilisation « verticale »). Nuançant également l’idée selon laquelle l’apophase est une caractéristique commune de la tradition néoplatonicienne médiévale, l’auteure montre qu’Érigène et Eckhart utilisent l’apophase pour obtenir des effets fort différents. Guidés par leur désir de percer tout mécanisme de la contemplation mystique sans pour autant discréditer l’expérience en tant que telle, Érigène et Eckhart ne conçoivent pas l’apophase en contradiction avec la corporalité, mais l’utilisent pour affirmer l’ordre sous-jacent et le caractère commun de la nature et de la vie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Europe and EmbodimentA Levinasian PerspectiveJames Mensch (bio)The question of Europe has been raised continually. Behind it is the division of the continent into different peoples, languages, and cultures, all in close proximity to one another. Their plurality and proximity give rise to the opposing imperatives of trade and war. Since ancient times, the need to promote trade and the desire to prevent war have driven the search for a (...) basis for European unity. Various candidates, from that of Roman law in ancient times to the current economic and regulatory union of today, have been tried. Such bureaucratic solutions, however, have not proved sufficient. They regulate external relations but do not touch what is within. This, however, is the difficulty: how do we understand nations and their relations from within? On an individual level, it is customary to speak of the inner as “subjectivity.” Such a term generally means the “subject” of experience, the unique and individual self that has experience. If we are to avoid the Cartesian conceptions of this self, we have to speak of such a subject as an embodied whole: an organic unity that is both conscious of its environment and distinguishes itself from the latter. Such an organic unity cannot be thought in terms of Descartes’s distinction between mind and body, the mind being nonextended and the body being extended. The body grasped simply as extended is inanimate. To use [End Page 41] the German term, it is a Körper, a material body among bodies. The corresponding term for the animate, living body is Leib. A living body is characterized both by its organic needs and its ability to satisfy these through its “I can” (i.e., its capability to act to fulfill such needs). Subjectivity, as embodied, has to be thought in terms of the latter.Such thoughts, however, only increase the difficulty of speaking of the subjectivity of nations. Nations are political concepts. To speak of them as organic unities seems to return us to a discredited analogy, where we say just as the body has a common boundary separating its inside from the outside, so a nation has its frontiers. Similarly, we assert that just as an organic unity embraces the mutually dependent functioning of its parts — e.g., its various organs and limbs — so the state consists of the interdependent functioning of its classes and professions. Paul employs this analogy in speaking of the body of Christ.1 It also appears in Plato’s division of the classes of the state. One can also see it at work in the division of castes in Hindu society. As such examples indicate, its focus on natural classes makes it an inappropriate analogy for the modern state, where citizenship rather than class is the dominant conception. What, then, would be an appropriate way to speak of the subjectivity of nations? In what follows, I am going to use Levinas’s conception of corporalité (Leiblichkeit in German) to answer these questions. My claim will be that it permits the extension of subjectivity to the national level. Such an extension, I will argue, is crucial for understanding the group of nations that we call Europe. It is what allows us to catch sight of Europe’s particular identity.Two Views of European IdentityThere is a certain paradox in attempting to speak of the identity of Europe. Given the spread of the scientific rationality that originated in Europe, it is often claimed that what distinguishes Europe is the universality of the rationality that defines it. Husserl, in the twentieth century, made this claim. Such universality, he writes, is “contained from the start in the idea of philosophy” that appeared in Greece.2 [End Page 42] Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a general term that included “all the special sciences” — mathematics, astronomy, and so on — that developed as part of it. All these make universal claims. What they assert is claimed to hold everywhere, without exception. As Husserl admits, “philosophy, together with all the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture.” But for Husserl, “this part is the functioning brain” of “European spiritual life.”3... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Europe and EmbodimentA Levinasian PerspectiveJames Mensch (bio)The question of Europe has been raised continually. Behind it is the division of the continent into different peoples, languages, and cultures, all in close proximity to one another. Their plurality and proximity give rise to the opposing imperatives of trade and war. Since ancient times, the need to promote trade and the desire to prevent war have driven the search for a (...) basis for European unity. Various candidates, from that of Roman law in ancient times to the current economic and regulatory union of today, have been tried. Such bureaucratic solutions, however, have not proved sufficient. They regulate external relations but do not touch what is within. This, however, is the difficulty: how do we understand nations and their relations from within? On an individual level, it is customary to speak of the inner as “subjectivity.” Such a term generally means the “subject” of experience, the unique and individual self that has experience. If we are to avoid the Cartesian conceptions of this self, we have to speak of such a subject as an embodied whole: an organic unity that is both conscious of its environment and distinguishes itself from the latter. Such an organic unity cannot be thought in terms of Descartes’s distinction between mind and body, the mind being nonextended and the body being extended. The body grasped simply as extended is inanimate. To use [End Page 41] the German term, it is a Körper, a material body among bodies. The corresponding term for the animate, living body is Leib. A living body is characterized both by its organic needs and its ability to satisfy these through its “I can” (i.e., its capability to act to fulfill such needs). Subjectivity, as embodied, has to be thought in terms of the latter.Such thoughts, however, only increase the difficulty of speaking of the subjectivity of nations. Nations are political concepts. To speak of them as organic unities seems to return us to a discredited analogy, where we say just as the body has a common boundary separating its inside from the outside, so a nation has its frontiers. Similarly, we assert that just as an organic unity embraces the mutually dependent functioning of its parts — e.g., its various organs and limbs — so the state consists of the interdependent functioning of its classes and professions. Paul employs this analogy in speaking of the body of Christ.1 It also appears in Plato’s division of the classes of the state. One can also see it at work in the division of castes in Hindu society. As such examples indicate, its focus on natural classes makes it an inappropriate analogy for the modern state, where citizenship rather than class is the dominant conception. What, then, would be an appropriate way to speak of the subjectivity of nations? In what follows, I am going to use Levinas’s conception of corporalité (Leiblichkeit in German) to answer these questions. My claim will be that it permits the extension of subjectivity to the national level. Such an extension, I will argue, is crucial for understanding the group of nations that we call Europe. It is what allows us to catch sight of Europe’s particular identity.Two Views of European IdentityThere is a certain paradox in attempting to speak of the identity of Europe. Given the spread of the scientific rationality that originated in Europe, it is often claimed that what distinguishes Europe is the universality of the rationality that defines it. Husserl, in the twentieth century, made this claim. Such universality, he writes, is “contained from the start in the idea of philosophy” that appeared in Greece.2 [End Page 42] Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a general term that included “all the special sciences” — mathematics, astronomy, and so on — that developed as part of it. All these make universal claims. What they assert is claimed to hold everywhere, without exception. As Husserl admits, “philosophy, together with all the special sciences, makes up only a partial manifestation of European culture.” But for Husserl, “this part is the functioning brain” of “European spiritual life.”3... (shrink)

L’étude traite de différentes catégories de signatures (et/ou de noms d’auteurs) et de leur fonctionnement dans l’écriture de l’histoire. L’histoire est une écriture dialogique au sens où elle s’appuie sur les écrits d’autres spécialistes, mais aussi sur une matérialité documentaire signée par des acteurs de l’histoire. En se référant à la parole d’autrui, l’historien valide son propre travail. Le principal indice de ce dialogue est le nom propre d’auteur associé à un propos qui représente pour l’historien une référence. L’étude met (...) en évidence l’aptitude des noms d’auteur à recevoir une corporalité et/ou une voix. La thèse est la suivante: dès que le lecteur peut attribuer un corps et un certain renom à une signature, celle-ci peut être utilisée comme instrument de la preuve. Une attention particulière est portée aux signataires inconnus, aux noms des rédacteurs de «témoignages». Au centre de notre intérêt se trouvent les «ajouts» des historiens (titres, annotations, notes en bas de page, etc.) qui introduisent sur la scène académique les propos des «auteurs inconnus». Des ajouts accompagnant une carte postale, représentée dans l’ouvrage Lettres de Drancy, sont analysés de près. (shrink)

Se presentan en este artículo los resultados que surgieron de incorporar lecciones de Autoconciencia por el Movimiento (ATM) -como estrategia pedagógica- para reconocer y actuar en pro de nuestro ambiente interno y externo, realizado con un grupo interprofesional de mujeres. El grupo se forma e investiga a sí mismo, bajo el enfoque de la Investigación Acción Participativa, y busca comprender mejor los procesos de formación ambiental en los campos de la salud y el ambiente.

Du début du xxe siècle aux années 1950, en Égypte, le geste de se dénuder se politise. Cet article s’intéresse à la façon dont des militantes et artistes mobilisent le dénudement dans leurs répertoires d’actions et dans leurs stratégies rhétoriques à des fins nationalistes ou féministes. Cette recherche propose ainsi un panorama chrono-thématique des questions relatives à la corporalité féminine, mises au-devant de la scène par ces femmes engagées. Des années 1900 aux années 1920, l’étude se focalise sur les (...) corps féminins dans la rue, visibles, mobilisés et révélés au nom du « bien-être de l’humanité ». Puis, pour évoquer le tournant des années 1920 et 1930, l’analyse porte sur les corps dans les sports ou à la plage, exposés et « bons » pour la nation. Enfin, la réflexion se déploie sur les « beaux » dénudements et la patrie dans les arts, la mode et les concours de beauté, du milieu des années 1930 aux années 1950. (shrink)