In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak Separability. (...) In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule. (shrink)

From “Die Offenheit lieben gegenüber jeglicher Wahrheit. Brief des Thomas von Aquino an Karl Rahner,” Mut zur Tugend. Über die Fähigkeit, menschlicher zu leben, Karl Rahner and Bernhard Welte, eds. (Herder: Freiburg, 1979), 124-133. Author in French, Yves Congar; translator into German, Ulrich Schütz; translator from German into English, Thomas O’Meara.