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  1. What Is Evolutionary Altruism?Elliott Sober - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (sup1):75-99.
    In this paper I want to clarify what biologists are talking about when they talk about the evolution of altruism. I’ll begin by saying something about the common sense concept. This familiar idea I’ll call ‘vernacular altruism.’ One point of doing this is to make it devastatingly obvious that the common sense concept is very different from the concept as it’s used in evolutionary theory. After that preliminary, I’ll describe some features of the evolutionary concept. Then I’ll conclude by briefly (...)
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  • What Is Evolutionary Altruism?Elliott Sober - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 14:75-99.
    In this paper I want to clarify what biologists are talking about when they talk about the evolution of altruism. I'll begin by saying something about the common sense concept. This familiar idea I'll call 'vernacular altruism.' One point of doing this is to make it devastatingly obvious that the common sense concept is very different from the concept as it's used in evolutionary theory. After that preliminary, I'll describe some features of the evolutionary concept. Then I'll conclude by briefly (...)
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  • Review of Michael Ruse: Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy[REVIEW]Michael Ruse - 1988 - Ethics 98 (2):400-402.
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  • Vaulting Ambition.Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):479-482.
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  • Reason in Human Affairs.Herbert A. Simon - 1983 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
    What can reason do for us and what can't it do? This is the question examined by Herbert A. Simon, who received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for his pioneering work on decision-making processes in economic organizations." The ability to apply reason to the choice of actions is supposed to be one of the defining characteristics of our species. In the first two chapters, the author explores the nature and limits of human reason, comparing and evaluating the major (...)
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  • Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy.Michael Ruse - 1986 - New York, NY: Prometheus Books.
    Brings together traditional philosophy and modern sociobiology to examine evolutionary biology and its relation to the evolution of knowledge and ethics.
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  • Levels of selection: An alternative to individualism in biology and the human sciences.David Sloan Wilson - 1994 - In E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology. The Mit Press. Bradford Books.
  • Evolutionary altruism, psychological egoism, and morality: disentangling the phenotypes.Elliott Sober - 1993 - In Matthew Nitecki & Doris Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics. Suny Press. pp. 199--216.
    I want to explain some of the gaps I see between the concepts of morality and altruism. Indeed, there are three concepts here that need to be disentangled, not just two. Evolutionists use the terms “altruism” and “selfishness” in a way that differs from the usage found in ordinary parlance. So my goal is to separate evolutionary altruism, psychological altruism, and morality. Morality includes a variety of characteristics. There is more to morality than altruism. If we can avoid the mistake (...)
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  • What is psychological egoism?Elliott Sober - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):89-102.
    Egoism and altruism need not be characterized as single factor theories of motivation, according to which there is a single kind of preference that moves people to action. Rather, each asserts a claim of causal primacy—a claim as to which sort of preference is the more powerful influence on behavior. This paper shows that this idea of causal primacy can be clarified in a standard scientific way. This formulation explains why many observed behaviors fail to discriminate between the hypothesis that (...)
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