Ofrecemos la primera traducción castellana de las primeras tres cuestiones del comentario de Juan Duns Escoto a las Categorías de Aristóteles. En ellas, el franciscano distingue el subiectum del tratado aristotélico bajo el concepto lógico de «categoría», fundando la unidad de su tratamiento sobre la unidad de dicho concepto. Para tal efecto, Escoto distingue el estudio propiamente lógico de las categorías, tanto de su estudio lingüístico, como de su estudio por parte del metafísico, al menos en esta primera etapa de (...) su pensamiento. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the fundamental problems (...) confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)

La théorie scotiste des universaux échappe aux étiquettes que sont le « nominalisme » et le « réalisme ». Le lien de l'universalité est en effet l'être formel de l'essence, commune à plusieurs choses et concevable abstraitement par l'intellect. Mais l'être de l'universel n'est ni une chose, ni un concept : il est l'unité intentionnelle et réelle qui fonde leur adéquation. Scotus' theory of the universals goes far beyond such labels as « nominalism » or « realism ». For him, (...) universality lies in the formal being of essence, which is common to several things, and can be conceived abstractedly by the intellect. But formal being is neither a thing, nor a concept: it is the intentional and real unity which underlies their adequation. (shrink)