We argue that, from the point of view public health ethics, vaccination is significantly analogous to seat belt use in motor vehicles and that coercive vaccination policies are ethically justified for the same reasons why coercive seat belt laws are ethically justified. We start by taking seriously the small risk of vaccines’ side effects and the fact that such risks might need to be coercively imposed on individuals. If millions of individuals are vaccinated, even a very small risk of serious (...) side effects implies that, statistically, at some point side effects will occur. Imposing such risks raises issues about individual freedom to decide what risks to take on oneself or on one’s children and about attribution of responsibility in case of adverse side effects. Seat belt requirements raise many of the same ethical issues as vaccination requirements, and seat belt laws initially encountered some opposition from the public that is very similar to some of the current opposition to vaccine mandates. The analogy suggests that the risks of vaccines do not constitute strong enough reasons against coercive vaccination policies and that the same reasons that justify compulsory seat belt use—a measure now widely accepted and endorsed—also justify coercive vaccination policies. (shrink)

The WHO, American Academy of Pediatrics and other Western medical bodies currently maintain that all medically unnecessary female genital cutting of minors is categorically a human rights violation, while either tolerating or actively endorsing medically unnecessary male genital cutting of minors, especially in the form of penile circumcision. Given that some forms of female genital cutting, such as ritual pricking or nicking of the clitoral hood, are less severe than penile circumcision, yet are often performed within the same families for (...) similar reasons, it may seem that there is an unjust double standard. Against this view, it is sometimes claimed that while female genital cutting has ‘no health benefits’, male genital cutting has at least some. Is that really the case? And if it is the case, can it justify the disparate treatment of children with different sex characteristics when it comes to protecting their genital integrity? I argue that, even if one accepts the health claims that are sometimes raised in this context, they cannot justify such disparate treatment. Rather, children of all sexes and genders have an equal right to bodily autonomy. This includes the right to decide whether their own ‘private’ anatomy should be exposed to surgical risk, much less permanently altered, for reasons they themselves endorse when they are sufficiently mature. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to critically review a traditional objection to preventive medicine (which I call here the ‘prevention problem’). The prevention problem is a concern about the supposedly inequitable distribution of benefits and risks of harm resulting from preventive medicine's focus on population‐based interventions. This objection is potentially applicable to preventive vaccination programmes and could be used to argue that such programmes are unethical. I explore the structure of the prevention problem by focusing upon two different types of vaccination (...) (therapeutic vaccination and preventive vaccination). I argue that the ‘prevention problem’ cannot be fairly applied to the case of preventive vaccination because such programmes do not just focus upon benefits at the level of populations (as is claimed by the prevention problem). Most such preventive vaccination programmes explicitly seek to create and maintain herd protection. I argue that herd protection is an important public good which is a benefit shared by all individuals in the relevant population. This fact can then be used to block the ‘prevention problem’ argument in relation to preventive vaccination programmes. I conclude by suggesting that whilst the future development and use of therapeutic vaccines does raise some interesting ethical issues, any ethical objections to prophylactic vaccination on the basis of the ‘prevention problem’ will not be overcome through the substitution of therapeutic vaccines for preventive vaccines; indeed, the ‘prevention problem’ fails on its own terms in relation to preventive vaccination programmes. (shrink)

This paper argues that mandatory, government-enforced vaccination can be justified even within a libertarian political framework. If so, this implies that the case for mandatory vaccination is very strong indeed as it can be justified even within a framework that, at first glance, loads the philosophical dice against that conclusion. I argue that people who refuse vaccinations violate the ‘clean hands principle’, a moral principle that prohibits people from participating in the collective imposition of unjust harm or risk of harm. (...) In a libertarian framework, individuals may be forced to accept certain vaccines not because they have an enforceable duty to serve the common, and not because cost–benefit analysis recommends it, but because anti-vaxxers are wrongfully imposing undue harm upon others. (shrink)

This paper argues that mandatory, government-enforced vaccination can be justified even within a libertarian political framework. If so, this implies that the case for mandatory vaccination is very strong indeed as it can be justified even within a framework that, at first glance, loads the philosophical dice against that conclusion. I argue that people who refuse vaccinations violate the ‘clean hands principle’, a moral principle that prohibits people from participating in the collective imposition of unjust harm or risk of harm. (...) In a libertarian framework, individuals may be forced to accept certain vaccines not because they have an enforceable duty to serve the common, and not because cost–benefit analysis recommends it, but because anti-vaxxers are wrongfully imposing undue harm upon others. (shrink)