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  1. On Quine's 'so-called paradox'.J. M. Chapman & R. J. Butler - 1965 - Mind 74 (295):424-425.
  • How to set a surprise exam.Ned Hall - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):647-703.
    The professor announces a surprise exam for the upcoming week; her clever student purports to demonstrate by reductio that she cannot possibly give such an exam. Diagnosing his puzzling argument reveals a deeper puzzle: Is the student justified in believing the announcement? It would seem so, particularly if the upcoming 'week' is long enough. On the other hand, a plausible principle states that if, at the outset, the student is justified in believing some proposition, then he is also justified in (...)
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  • Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions.Laurence Goldstein - 1993 - Analysis 53 (2):93 - 99.
  • The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.J. Gerbrandy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):21-33.
    We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays a central role in (...)
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  • Blindspotting and Choice Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):337 - 352.