There is a widely held belief that there are moral limits to what we can do to non-human living beings. This has inspired various varieties of non-anthropocentric ethics. Whether rights- or welfare-oriented, the focus has been on the organisms’ interests. The ability of these theories to explain the moral significance of interests and, more generally, to identify the source of obligation in ethics, is questioned. The metaphor of a game is provided, with the rules of a game, as a model (...) for what can give obligational significance. A Kantian-oriented view of ethics is developed from the model, providing a source for inter-human liberty-rights. Concerning such rights, animals are clearly neither agents nor patients. It is argued that inter-human moral relationships also involve welfare issues. In fact the meaning of ethics is dependent on the welfare aspect. Pre-moral compassion provides direction for the principal task of ethics: to bring compassion out of a particular realm of kindness and under the equity requirements of ethics. This effort demands respect for the welfare of all others, including non-humans. It further condemns acts of wanton destruction, even when no sentient being is the victim. Animals, plants and the environment are therefore the prima facie beneficiaries of an inter-human morality. The moral belief that morality is an issue in human–nature relationships is thereby integrated into an anthropocentric ethic. (shrink)

In recent decades, neoclassical economists have made heroic efforts to accommodate within the confines of the concept of rational utility maximization the fact that individual behavior is significantly affected by moral considerations. This article argues the merits of using an alternative approach: recognizing that individuals pursue at least two irreducible sources of value or “utility”, pleasure and morality. The possibility that some additional utilities may have to be recognized is explored. This raises the concern that conceptual anarchy will break out, (...) which in turn will force a search for a common denominator, and thus a return to one overarching utility. Arguments are presented to show that this concern is unfounded. The main focus of the article is a criticism of the monoutility conception and a brief for separating the sense of discharging one's moral obligations from all other satisfactions. The article first deals with general conceptual points, and then cites both everyday observations and empirical evidence in support of this position. (shrink)

In this essay I criticize the contigent valuation method in resource economics and the concepts of utility and efficiency upon which it is based. I consider an example of this method and argue that it cannot-as it pretends-substitute for public education and political deliberation.