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Direction of fit and normative functionalism
Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203 (1998)
Abstract
What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor ofAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
References found in this work
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.
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