How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204 (2015)
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According to the normativist, it is built into the nature of belief itself that beliefs are subject to a certain set of norms. I argue here that only a normativist account can explain certain non‐normative facts about what it takes to have the capacity for belief. But this way of defending normativism places an explanatory burden on any normativist account that an account on which a truth norm is explanatorily fundamental simply cannot discharge. I develop an alternative account that can achieve explanatory adequacy where this sort of truth privileging account falls short.



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Kate Nolfi
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Belief as Commitment to the Truth.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.

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References found in this work

A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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